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Re-conceptualising the Energy and Security Complex in the Eastern Mediterranean

Filippos Proedrou

Abstract
Recent gas discoveries off Cyprus have elevated tensions and created an energy and security complex in the Eastern Mediterranean. While the mainstream understanding of this complex focuses on energy as a zero-sum game that will be played out in accordance with geopolitical alliances and dividing lines, this paper aims to counter this view. It considers energy as a critical issue that can be positively utilised within the framework of integrated markets and interdependence and as a positive-sum game. It also regards it a potential game changer that can propel a chain of conciliatory moves. The analysis culminates with the designation of three scenarios in which this complex can evolve. It concludes that it is up to the main actors, on the basis of their particular conceptualisation of the issues at hand, to determine whether energy will be used in a conflictive or assuaging way, deteriorating tensions in the region, or, alternatively, making energy a crucial pillar of stabilisation and rapprochement.

Keywords: gas, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, Israel, energy security, Exclusive Economic Zone, normative foreign policy

Introduction
The thorny issue of Cyprus has been on and off the agenda of the international community for decades. Recently, Cyprus has once more entered the spotlight due to the gas explorations it undertakes in its south. These open a window of opportunity for enhanced energy security for the European Union, the market of which seems to be the natural destination for Cypriot gas, and have thus attracted pan-European interest. At the same time, however, they present significant challenges and add further complexities to long-lasting disputes between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot sides. These revolve around the sovereignty of Cyprus and the balance between the two communities, gas exploration rights and who will reap the benefits of gas-born income, together with the impact of these developments on Greek and Turkish foreign policies and on the recent dispute between Israel and Turkey. This dangerous nexus includes diverging interests.

of many actors and has come to be seen as undermining peace and stability in the region.

Such an understanding flows from a particular theorisation of energy politics as a competitive, zero-sum game. Energy wealth is seen as a means that can fortify one player at the cost of another. Traditional hostilities and existing political patterns frame energy issues in a conflictive course, consequently aggravating further an already perilous geopolitical environment. This paper aims to challenge this mainstream view. It posits that energy can be both a negative and a positive-sum game. In many cases, there is ample space for cooperation that can bring absolute gains to all parties. Energy unites the prosperity of different political communities, while the ensuing interdependence can become a major factor for stabilisation. Politics, instead of reproducing past rivalries, can be re-conceptualised on the basis of yielding emphasis on higher order goals as peace, stability and order that are beneficial to all stakeholders, as well as on revisited calculations of benefits and losses.

In this understanding, the newly found energy wealth in the south of Cyprus and the projections for further, even more substantial than the initial, discoveries within the Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus, is seen as a game changer that can boost reconciliation and rapprochement within the island plus have a soothing effect on the Turkey–Israel–Greece triangle. Although disagreements for now prevail, there exist mechanisms that can distribute gains, embed the stakeholders in an interdependent network and enhance both the EU energy security along with overall security in the region.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section one de-constructs the mainstream underlying assumptions of energy politics which lead to a conflictive reading of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. The second section shows how managing interdependence, making energy a positive-sum game and subsuming energy considerations under a broader normative and more prudently rational framework can lead to benevolent solutions. Section three envisages three potential scenarios for developments in the region. These range from an aggravated geopolitical environment that is split in different alliances and may lead to the eruption of a violent conflict, to a holistic one that will utilise energy developments in order both to strengthen the energy security of all the players, besides averting the possibility of conflict, cement peace and stability and perhaps even make inroads into more permanent solutions to the traditional rivalries in the region.

Energy Politics and Energy Security: A Debate on Underlying Assumptions

Resource endowment is usually conceptualised as leading to energy autarky thus fortifying the security and prosperity of the holder. While empirically this is not frequently the case (Haghighi, 2007, p. 14), from an analytical perspective resource endowment can be instrumentalised much more fruitfully within a framework of interdependence and integrated markets, rather than if perceived as a tool against (inter)dependence and utilised principally domestically (Yergin, 2006, p. 79; Verrastro and Ladislaw, 2007, pp. 95–101; Nivola and Carter, 2010). Taking this into consideration, what matters most is not energy independence but managing energy

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interdependence. Energy policies that aim at autarky build on traditional notions of sovereignty, according to which authority should lie exclusively with one’s government, and dependence on external players is seen as problematic and deficient. Such policies, however, ignore the profound transformation the international system has gone through and the fact that the prosperity of our political communities is increasingly intertwined. Unilateral policies fail to develop the capacity of the state to handle complex issues with other players, and also may serve to isolate the country from the broader political environment; in such an interdependent world, this is a cumbersome and risky pathway to follow since it would most probably weaken rather than enhance wider notions of security. To the contrary, energy interdependence cultivates the dynamics of political and economic interdependence that can, under certain circumstances, diffuse gains and lead to improved overall relations. This builds upon the theorisation of sovereignty not as absolute and indivisible, but more as a currency in the globalising system that helps states negotiate and further their political stance and main interests (McGrew, 2008). As a bottom line, it seems more prudent for states to endeavour to accept that the key to energy security is managing increased interdependence rather than escaping it.

Secondly, energy is usually considered from within realist lenses and framed according to stark conflictive lines. It is approached as a zero-sum game where what one gains, the other must necessarily lose (Klare, 2008; Dannreuther, 2010b, p. 3; Benner et al., 2010). There is ample empirical evidence to support such a thesis; take for example the energy crises of 1973 and 1979 that led to increased revenues for the exporters at the cost of importers, increasing energy demand from developing countries that acts as a price hike instigator for all importers, as well as energy-fuelled crises in Africa. Nevertheless, one cannot fail to see that this is not always the case. Energy trade can also be seen as a positive-sum game, in which all parties benefit (Goldthau and Witte, 2010, pp. 2–3, 11; Colgan et al., 2011; Dannreuth, 2007, pp. 91–92). This is reasonable since cooperation in the energy sector is not forced upon states, but follows from deliberate moves that aim to increase their energy security. This is why energy trade is sustained, regional gas markets are developing further and a truly global oil market has been established to serve the interests of both exporters and importers. Despite the vivid debate on the conflictive and contrasting interests between OPEC and importers, energy trade persists. The EU and Russia, to take a further example, have cemented their decades-long energy partnership and, despite some mishaps, maintain the benefits that accrue from it. In this light, the energy domain is also characterised by steady patterns of cooperation too. Both importers and exporters share the fundamental interest in energy security and cooperate to this goal. Therefore, we can not a priori consider energy a zero-sum game; exploring the conditions under which it can be made into a positive-sum scenario is worth considering.

Thirdly, it is necessary to examine the rules of the game in energy issues. While in some cases the economic logic prevails and market mechanisms determine flows and patterns of energy and level of volumes and prices, in many others energy issues are strongly influenced by political
interests, a tendency reinforced by the current wave of resource nationalism. At the same time, geopolitical rivalries, historical animosities and broader alliances are all appreciated as playing an essential role in energy affairs (Müller-Kraenner, 2008, p. xi; Nye, 2003, pp. 207–208). The US alliance with Saudi Arabia, as well as China’s aggressive energy diplomacy in states that are indifferent to human rights violations and/or rival to the US, pinpoint to the nexus politics, security, energy and ideology shape (Daojong, 2006, p. 182).

While this interaction has been amply studied (Klare, 2002, 2008), it is worth examining the reverse ordering, namely how energy developments can positively impact upon the geopolitical environment, and scrutinise the ways in which energy can act as an instigator of reconciliation and rapprochement. In compliance with the classical liberal argument, trade has pacifying effects; since energy trade presupposes peace and stability, it can act as a factor for stabilisation. One could perhaps detect such effects in the EU–Russia energy trade. Gradual cooperation in the energy sector since the 1960s provided the European states with fresh impetus to downplay differences with the Soviet Union and support the improvement of the overall political climate in the détente decade, in addition to encourage a more cooperative stance throughout the 80s withstanding calls for radicalisation of the conflict and supporting and facilitating the peaceful, ordered termination of friction between the two camps. This is not to argue that energy was the critical factor behind reconciliation; only that energy considerations played a reinforcing role. Furthermore, energy issues may not lead to conflict, as the cases of the disputes between Norway and the UK in the North Sea, and Indonesia, East Timor and Australia in the Timor Sea with regard to sovereign rights on exploration of natural resources attest to. They have been resolved peacefully through the delimitation of the continental shelf and the creation of Joint Development Areas (Kaye, 2011; Ong, 1999). Moreover, once infrastructure is in place other disputes might not take centre-stage and may be resolved in light of mutual gains. For example, although the liberalisation project and the unbundling regulation in the EU is creating anxieties in both Norway and Algeria with regard to security of demand, this has had little impact on their gas trade bearing in mind that all sides stand to lose from decreased trade and cooperation (Proedrou, 2012, pp. 108, 112). Likewise, when due to the rise of domestic gas production in Argentina the country’s government asked for lower volumes of imports contrary to pre-agreed terms, the Bolivian government agreed to these in view of its need to continue reaping revenues from gas exports to Argentina (Hayes and Victor, 2006, 2012). It follows that diverging interests do not have to result in total fallout; joint infrastructure and solid cooperation can maintain these patterns in the long-term. At variance with this, poor infrastructural maintenance, obscure deals, lack of trust and deteriorated political relations between Russia and Ukraine since the early 2000s have led to an essential reconfiguration of their energy trade. The construction of Nord and South Stream pipelines belittle Ukraine’s role as a transit state for Russian gas and fundamentally reshape the EU–Russia energy map and gas trade.

Developing further the argument, it is useful to consider how developments in the energy
sector can reshape the appreciation and understandings of historical conflicts, not counting
calculations of benefits and losses, remoulding this way the contours of geopolitics. Such a
conceptualisation leads us to the domain of normative foreign policy. This draws from
consequentialist ethics (Manners, 2006) and can be defined as co-optative rather than coercive
action aimed at the achievement of higher goals (peace, order and stability) that are broadly
endorsed (Tocchi, 2008, pp. 1–11). In order for this action to be legitimate, it should align with
fundamental norms of international law and, instead of ‘being a pure expression of power’, it
should ‘undertake the function of “taming” and regulating power’ (ibid., p. 5). It should be
underlined that normative foreign policy is not at odds with rational choice theory. Conversely,
prioritising peace and stability as foreign policy goals is in itself rational. What is more, energy
security considerations can change the players’ overall assessment of a situation and as a result
facilitate foreign policy shifts. In this light, commitment to higher goals and non-violent means to
achieve them, together with utility maximisation considerations, can prove significant factors in
alternative and innovative approaches to historical disputes.

Building on Dannreuther (2010b, p. 5) who maintains that ‘the role of international markets
and regional and international institutions in managing and diffusing conflicts are discounted’, the
goal is to see not only how conflict can be managed and diffused, but also how more lasting cordial
outcomes can be achieved. In this mind-set, the emphasis does not lie in how politics determine
energy flows; contrarily, it rests upon how energy issues can open a window of opportunity for
more inclusive deals and subsequent amiable relations. It is up to the main actors to seize on such
opportunities in order to deliver public goods, such as consolidation of peace and stability.

Revisiting the Energy and Security Complex in the
Eastern Mediterranean

In this framework, this section looks at the Eastern Mediterranean energy and security complex
through the lenses of interdependence, and considers it as a positive-sum game and an opportunity
to improve the regional geopolitical environment. Starting with the first pillar, Cyprus has been
planning to proceed to LNG imports in order to introduce gas to its fuel mix for political,
economic and environmental reasons. Indigenous gas discoveries make a strong point for
cancellation of such plans promising energy autarky. The public debate thus has been dominated
by Cyprus’ forthcoming ability to be energy independent. Yet, autarky should not be viewed as
panacea and as a first order goal. This is not to argue that Cyprus is not prudent to and will not
utilise gas discoveries for domestic use as well. It should be stressed that after the destruction of
Cyprus’ main power plant in 2011, the country is using more oil, which leads to very high prices
for electricity. Conversion to gas would substantially bring prices down and support the overall
economy that seems to be in strains amidst the financial crisis in the Eurozone and subsequent
rounds of debt downgrading by rating agencies (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 3). At the
same time, however, it is particularly lucrative for Cyprus to supply with gas South-Eastern (and
perhaps even Central) Europe. In any case, the recently discovered gas wealth of Israel provides supply alternatives and may lead to joint infrastructure projects that will direct Israeli and Cypriot gas to European consumers. Market mechanisms and economic efficiency considerations may be better arbiters for decisions on the utilisation of natural resources than centrally-planned solutions.

Nonetheless, what are much more important for Cyprus are the economic and political underpinnings of the gas discoveries. Cyprus forms an energy island as it is not interconnected to the European gas grid. Gas discoveries will enable the linkage of Cyprus to the huge internal market from a particularly advantageous position, that of the supplier. The findings in the block 12 of the Aphrodite well amount to 142–227 billion cubic metres, while the licensing processes for other promising blocks have been launched. In a market characterised by oligopolistic external supply structures and dominated by imports from Russia, Norway and Algeria, Cyprus has an important role to play. Contributing to the EU gas market’s smooth function will not only allow vital cash inflows (estimated to range from €30 to €100 billion only from the block 12) and energy security as a consequence, but also political advantages stemming from its new status as a supplier (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 12). Due to Cyprus resource wealth, the EU and the international community will acquire an even more profound interest in the security of the island and the avoidance of any conflict that may hamper European energy security. The key issue for Cyprus is how to manage skilfully this new role.

One could counter-argue at this point that energy is a zero-sum game and this creates question marks around Cyprus’ future role. Turkey, for example, and the Turkish Cypriot side, both view the gas explorations that Cyprus undertakes as illegal and unacceptable, a response stemming from their denial to accept the sovereignty of Cyprus; in this rationale, what the Greek Cypriot side wins, the Turkish Cypriot side must lose. Still, one should think of what mechanisms and political arrangements could distribute benefits to all citizens of Cyprus. For example, the Cypriot government could commit a part of gas-born income to the Turkish Cypriot community relative to its size, thus diffusing proceeds to the whole population of the island. At a broader reading, Turkey should examine the impact of Cyprus’ gas discoveries on the European gas market and how it may enhance its role in it. At first sight, recent gas discoveries can be seen as working against Turkey’s aspirations to become a gas hub, since they may provide more gas to the EU market through routes that bypass its territory. Nevertheless, a more thorough investigation of economic and geopolitical factors may lead to more encouraging conclusions. For one, the EU gas market is currently undergoing a particularly dynamic phase of development marking the shift from expansive to mature markets (Boon von Ochsee et al., 2010, p. 3). De Jong (2011, p. 10) reinforces this conclusion maintaining that

‘the long-term demand projection for imported gas to the EU remains a strong one, especially as a fuel for power generation. With all the uncertainties about renewables, coal and nuclear, gas remains a preferred choice and/or a choice of consequence … A major driver might be the role of gas in the changing fuel mix for power generation. With the increasing
role of intermittent energy sources and the need for balancing and backing-up the electricity system, gas as a flexible deliverable and relatively clean fossil fuel and also with relatively easy and cheap possibilities of expanding gas-fired power generation installations, might create for itself a new "golden era".

The projections that the EU's main gas supplier, Gazprom, will face difficulties in significantly raising its gas output, thus failing to cover the projected increase of gas demand in Europe (Christie, 2012; Weijermars, 2011), together with its gradual export diversification policy to the East (Proedrou, 2012, pp. 86–88, 90–91), amplifies the need for further upstream and downstream investments. Additionally, the gas glut (global supply surpassing global demand) is likely to be maintained and further extended in case US projections for shale gas wealth are confirmed (Pike, 2011). This will make a strong case for interconnections between regional gas markets and the move to a more globalised gas market (Dannreuhter, 2010a, p. 5). From a geopolitical perspective, tightening relations between the West and Iran, the EU embargo on its fundamentalist regime and Iranian counter-measures that involve a ban on oil exports to the EU, all strengthen policies that aim to substitute oil with gas even further. In light of these developments, the expansion of the market allows space for the materialisation of many projects that under more embryonic market conditions would be regarded competitive, not complementary and serving the overall goal of catering for increased demand. It flows from the above that the expansion of the markets is a potential game changer, since it can transform energy from a zero- to a positive-sum game (Goldthau and Witte, 2010, pp. 6, 12). Turkey can, due to its geographical position, play a major role as a transit state, not least with the eventual construction of the much-discussed Nabucco pipeline. Ironically, discoveries in Cyprus, by means of contributing to the further development of the EU gas market, can contribute to a strengthened, not lesser, energy role for Turkey, not least, as examined below, in case Turkey becomes a transit state for Cypriot and Israeli gas.

That being said, one could argue that even if these benefits accrue to Turkey, they are outweighed by the geopolitical losses. The gas discoveries will fortify the sovereignty of Cyprus, which Turkey denies to recognise, elevate Cyprus' energy role in the EU gas market far more than Turkey's, and deepen the gap between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to the detriment of the latter. It is for these reasons, the argument continues, that Turkey has no other option but to follow polemical policies against Cyprus and start its own explorations in the north of the island thus dangerously raising the stakes in the Eastern Mediterranean. This is where normative foreign policy and prudent estimations of benefits and losses comes in. It is up to the main incumbents, namely the two Cypriot communities, and Greece and Turkey, to consider the space for mutually agreed solutions. While military escalation will be detrimental for all sides and will sink the island into deeper grievances and hostility, recent energy developments hold high promises for the welfare of Cyprus. Moreover, it should be underlined at this point that Greece and Turkey initiated a reconciliation approach in the late 90s, which has led to a small package that can serve as a shared basis for a more holistic negotiated solution to their disputes. Although this
process has lost impetus since 2003, overall relations remain at a relatively positive level with both sides keen to downplay their traditional differences; to this aim, they have increased their diplomatic meetings with an eye to make their positions converge further (Heraclides, 2010). The tension that recent gas discoveries have created should be managed within this working framework. Israel’s involvement in gas explorations, together with its deteriorating relations with Turkey, complicates the situation, not least since Israel is renowned for its inclination to use hard power and coercion to achieve its foreign policy goals. Nevertheless, as a state surrounded by rival states, Israel has every interest to normalise relations with Turkey and improve its regional geopolitical environment. This also holds for Turkey, if it wants to be seen as consistent on its dogma of ‘Zero problems policy with neighbours’ that it has proclaimed. Greece’s rapprochement with Israel, on the other hand, follows a ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ futile logic that exacerbates Turkish fears and reinforces conflictive mentalities; for this reason, it should perhaps be up for reconsideration. A more sensible and far-sighted policy for all the stakeholders would be to prioritise the aversion of conflict and stability, and inaugurate a conciliatory approach examining ways in which energy can be made into a positive-sum game.

The prospects of reconciliation would be realistically fewer if the main external players in the region did not also have important stakes in the issue. At a normative level, the EU and the US share an interest in, and in many cases act in defence of, higher goals such as peace, stability and order. The EU is the most widely accepted normative power in the global scene (Manners, 2002). Its strength lies not in military force, but in the promotion of norms, soft power, and the powers of attraction and co-optation. As a result, the EU, despite its precarious debt crisis, should be willing to mediate in the issue, set the framework for multilateral discussions and oversee a mutually agreed arrangement. The US, in contrast, is renowned for its propensity to use force in cases deemed necessary. Nevertheless, the Eastern Mediterranean complex involves allies and well integrated members of the West; in this context, violence is not an option for the US either. The US can utilise other policy instruments stemming from its hegemonic role in NATO, offer carrots and play a catalytic role in the stabilisation of the region.

From an interest-based perspective, the EU and the US also share the goals both of enhanced energy security for Europe, as well as the avoidance of any hot episode in the Eastern Mediterranean among its allies and the resolution of the Cypriot issue. Starting with energy security, the EU’s overt reliance on gas imports from three main suppliers has created an urgent need for alternative supplies. Ironically, while the fourth corridor has been planned for years and was expected to be filled by Caspian gas, it is recent gas discoveries in Israel and Cyprus that can lead to a new source of supply (either by pipeline, or in LNG form). This will bear a number of advantages for the EU:

a) It will add to the diversification both of sources and routes of supply, a fundamental pillar of the EU energy security strategy.

b) It will decrease dependence on Russia’s Gazprom, the market power and political leverage of
which are strongly contested by ‘new’ European member-states, and lessen the subsequent friction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe originating in energy issues.

c) It will have a critical impact on the smooth function of the integrated EU gas market as it will help to protect European markets from monopolistic practices, especially under the latest regulation that mandates bringing its energy islands (Cyprus included) out of isolation by 2015 (Proedrou, 2012).

The US shares the EU’s energy goals since it views dependence on Russian gas and Gazprom’s dominant role in the European gas market as dangerous, on top of which it supports the development of a truly liberalised gas market for efficiency reasons (Cornell and Nilsson, 2008). The military presence both of Turkish and Israeli vessels around the island, however, as well as Turkey’s plans to proceed with explorations off the northern part of Cyprus, heightens the risks of escalation and endangers supplies from the region. So, there is the need to diminish tension as a means to ensure future energy supplies from Cyprus.

As far as the security dimension is concerned, the recent deterioration of Turkish–Israeli relations has framed traditional disputes on the status of Cyprus. Greece’s strategic move to come closer to Israel through a defence pact has added to the creation of two rival axes: the Greek–Greek Cypriot– Israeli vs. the Turkish– Turkish Cypriot (Dokos, 2011). Any worsening of the political climate can have detrimental consequences for the West that has every interest in averting the most dreadful scenario of violent eruption in its backyard. Hence, there is space for joint EU–US involvement that has the potential to forestall any deterioration of the situation, monitor appeasement and eventually instigate rapprochement between the two Cypriot communities, Greece and Turkey.

What Next?

The previous section attempted to demonstrate how going beyond established mind-sets and a conflictive reading of energy politics has the potential to redraw the geopolitical landscape and the options for international players. It is worth examining how this energy and security complex that has been created can unfold in the near future. It is envisaged that it could evolve in three broad directions:

a) The regional alliances scenario: Existing geopolitical alliances determine patterns of energy cooperation and conflict. Accordingly, Israel and Cyprus gradually become gas suppliers to South-Eastern Europe. As a result, Cyprus cements its sovereignty, and its role as a supplier works as a further shield of protection to its security. Greece also benefits since it becomes a hub for the Eastern Mediterranean gas. Cypriot (and Israeli) gas comes to Greece either via a pipeline, which is a rather costly option since it involves laying long legs under the bottom of the sea, or from LNG plants that can be built either onshore or offshore Cyprus. The creation of LNG plants grants flexibility in the quest for markets and allows for diversification. This
advantage, however, does not seem to be of central importance if one takes into account that
the netback value of gas sales to Europe seems more promising than LNG exports to more
distant markets as that of Asia. Additionally, the upfront costs of this investment are quite
high and LNG shipments are much more expensive than piped gas. Furthermore, guarantees
for security of demand stretching to a period around 30 years will have to be given before such
a project can commence. Moreover, such a project would only be marginally profitable for the
investors. Double the capacity of the up to now proven reserves will have to be found (which
may imply that we might have to wait for further discoveries before the project is launched)
so that profitability rates are satisfactory enough (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 14).
Political reasons then enforce a sub-optimal transportation route from an economic point of
view. As a result, the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey are on the losing side. In the
worst case scenario, Turkey’s role as a transit state is marginalised since Nabucco does not
come on stream; alternatively, Turkey’s role as an energy hub is advanced, but still these
benefits pale in comparison to the ones Cyprus entertains. The Turkish Cypriot community
does not reap any of the energy-born income. Turkey, henceforth buttresses the sovereignty
of the northern part of Cyprus, reinforces dividing lines and goes on with explorations off
northern Cyprus. Consequently, tensions persist, dividing lines and animosity become starker
and an atmosphere of instability is perpetuated. Israel, Greece and Cyprus are allied against
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community in a cold-war type confrontation. In such a
geopolitical environment the chances for the eruption of violence should not be
underestimated. The energy security of the EU is in danger of facing setbacks, while a
potential conflict between allies constitutes a bitter blow to the West that may, in the case of
an Israeli involvement, further unsettle the volatile peace in the Middle East.

b) The ‘ambivalent compromises’ scenario: Politics do not determine energy patterns; a lot of
effort is placed on revisiting the geopolitical climate and compromising adversarial positions.
In this context, Cyprus accommodates Turkish and Turkish Cypriot grievances and protests.
An allocation mechanism is set up to deliver part of the gas-income to the Turkish Cypriots,
while Cyprus agrees to integrate Turkey in the gas supply chain. This can be done in two ways.
Cypriot gas can either reach Israel and from there link to the Arab Gas pipeline, which
connects Egypt, Israel, Syria and Lebanon and is projected to be linked to Turkey in the
future, or through a direct link to Turkey, perhaps linking to and boosting Nabucco. The latter
is the most competitive option, amounting only to 10% of the cost of LNG (International
Crisis Group, 2012, pp. 14–15). Turkey’s role as a transit state is thus enhanced. This agreement
may be in need of Israel’s consent or even contribution which for the moment seems unlikely.
Nevertheless, Israel is under pressure to ameliorate relations with Turkey and may find this a
good starting point. These measures aim to appease Turkey and maintain stability in the
region. But contrariwise, this decision frustrates Greece as the state fails to become a gas hub
and earn income from transit payments that are perceived essential within the context of its
severe financial difficulties. Greece is also deprived of the political advantages that emanate from its role as a hub. This development undermines the profoundly amiable ties between Greece and Cyprus which experience a deteriorating phase but do not threaten overall stability. Although Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community ensure a good deal, Turkey is still only partially satisfied, since the status of Cyprus as gas exporter cements its sovereignty, a development resisted by Turkey and one that does not improve the legal and political status of the Turkish Cypriot side. As a result, energy flows and decisions are not determined by political alliances, but are based on economic calculations and aim to impact positively on the political environment. Even so, both Greece and Turkey are, to differing degrees, unsatisfied and consequently inimical to developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. Hostility, mistrust and dissatisfaction with the status quo put both energy and military security in jeopardy.

c) A normative-based scenario: The EU and the US, both on normative and interest grounds, seize on the opportunity and promote a more holistic solution. They prioritise the aversion of conflict, the maintenance of stability and order, the smooth flow of energy and further energy explorations in the region. Accordingly, energy and security considerations become a lever for a broad political arrangement. It is left to market mechanisms to determine the optimal route for gas exports from Cyprus to Europe. The Cypriot government commits itself to making a corresponding portion (around one-fifth) of the energy-produced income available to the Turkish Cypriot community. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community understand that it is to their benefit to seek for a potentially energy-rich bi-zonal state solution. An incremental bargain to the Cypriot problem is put forward and the road is opened for the reunification of Cyprus on the basis of constitutional guarantees on human and minority rights, electoral and administrative processes, as well as resolution of property-rights related issues at the International Court. Encouraging developments on the thorny issue of Cyprus increase trust that bilateral disputes in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey can also be accommodated. Pressure builds up that Greece, Cyprus and Turkey define their Exclusive Economic Zones, a necessary development for the creation of new gas infrastructure and further gas explorations in the region. Israel welcomes the improvement of the overall political climate and accepts this working framework. Traditional hostilities and suspicions do not evaporate, but a more conciliatory and cooperative framework and atmosphere is created.

Conclusion

To sum up, the energy and security complex in the Eastern Mediterranean can unfold according to three different scenarios. The first one follows classical patterns of rival geopolitical alliances and will serve to reproduce and aggravate hostility. Greece, Israel and Cyprus seem to be on the winning side; they will, however, have to face an active revisionist policy from Turkey and the
The Turkish Cypriot community. As a result, friction remains within NATO and the West.

In the second scenario, innovative thinking comes in, but fails to manage all the parameters of the complex issues at hand. Greece is on the losing side, while Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community gain economic and political benefits. Cyprus (and Israel) stands to benefit the most. It is for these reasons that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community are still not satisfied. This scenario blurs dividing lines and geopolitical alliances and reshuffles benefits and outcomes, but fails to provide a holistic solution to the Eastern Mediterranean complex.

This can only be achieved in the third scenario. The US and the EU play a central role in monitoring an incremental but all-encompassing pact. This includes a new arrangement on the political status of Cyprus, namely reunification on strict legal, political and judicial guarantees, demarcation of Exclusive Economic Zones among Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, and a progressive understanding between Greece and Turkey with regard to the Aegean.

These differing scenarios build on diverse understandings of energy politics. While mainstream thinking sees energy as subordinated to geopolitics, a zero-sum game and a way to step out of interdependence, this paper aims to provide substantial evidence that these are far from a priori given. To the contrary, energy can be a game changer and a crucial factor in managing conflicts and contributing to stability. At the same time, it is a critical issue and should be utilised as such in an increasingly interdependent world, where the need for cooperation becomes starker and the losses born out of conflict extravagant. Energy can be a positive-sum game having multiple winners, rather than pitting winners against losers.

Decision-making is believed to be essentially based on rational calculations of benefits and losses. Be that as it may, in such complex issues, it is usually the case that procedural and ad hoc rationality leads to rather irrational outcomes (Hill, 2003). It is for these reasons that principles and norms are foreign policy anchors; international actors (should) turn to norms as roadmaps for action and the logic of appropriateness (should) frame(s) their foreign policy conduct. A commitment to the norms of peace and stability could provide enlightened solutions to the rising challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean.

References
Re-conceptualising the Energy and Security Complex in the Eastern Mediterranean


The Politics of (Re)Unification:
Lessons from Yemen for Cyprus

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Abstract
By embarking on a comparative engagement with the histories of division and the politics of (re)unification in Yemen and Cyprus this article draws tentative lessons for Cyprus from Yemen’s experience of (re)unification and its repercussions. It argues that the Yemeni case provides Cypriots with strategies for the de-legitimisation of narratives of intractability. However, despite some positive lessons, the greatest lesson the experience of Yemen should teach Cyprus is to avoid engaging in the politics of (re)unification under the guidance of opportunism and without any vestiges of prudence. Therefore, this article argues that for now, in light of the lessons Yemen has taught us, (re)unification should be avoided. It should only be revisited when prudence prevails on both sides.

Keywords: Yemen, Cyprus, (re)unification, intractability, natural gas, prudence

Through the adoption of the comparative approach to the histories of division and the politics of (re)unification1 in Yemen and Cyprus this article draws tentative lessons for Cyprus from the experience of Yemen’s (re)unification and its aftermath. To do that it traces the origins of the political conflicts in the two states that were cemented in the 1960s and 1970s, to both externally driven factors like the effects of colonialism, decolonisation and the Cold War and internal ones such as the entrenchment of the political elites. Further, it examines the efforts made in both cases towards (re)unification. It discusses Yemen’s experience of (re)unification, which followed the weakening and eventual collapse of the USSR, and examines the Yemeni state’s disintegration following the events of the Gulf War, the Yemeni Civil War and the Arab Spring. Based on Yemen’s experience and on Cyprus’ failure to move towards (re)unification this article points to specific policies that the Yemenis pursued which, if emulated, could benefit the path of Cyprus to (re)unification along with the actions of Yemeni politicians that should be avoided at all costs.

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1 (Re) is used in parenthesis throughout the article because in the Yemeni case unified polities existed in the past; however no modern unified Yemeni state existed before 1990. Thus, in the case of Yemen it is appropriate to speak of unification whereas in the Cypriot case, where division came after the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) in 1960, it is appropriate to speak of re-unification.
**Histories of Division**

Throughout the past two centuries it would not be a struggle to find similarities between the cases of Yemen and Cyprus since the two states travelled down similar, albeit distinct, paths in the period that preceded and followed decolonisation. The Republic of Yemen (RoY), which was founded on 22 May 1990, is located at the intersection of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula and is home to one of the most impressive natural harbours in the world. Hence, the various politics that ruled the Yemeni 'people' consistently attracted the attentions of conquerors, traders and religious mercenaries. Beyond geopolitics Yemen has great religious significance, being central to Islamic history and home to a Shi'ite Zaydi² sect (which includes many *sayyids*³) and a Sunni Shaffii⁴ community. Cyprus sits at the crossroad of three continents making it an important geopolitical location for major empires and powers from Europe, Asia and Africa. Furthermore, it is central to Orthodox Christianity since its church is autocephalous (independent from all patriarchates) and was therefore able to safeguard its treasures from the religious wars of the Orthodox Church, becoming a treasure-trove of Orthodox history and art. Additionally, it is home to a significant Islamic Turkish community as well as to Armenian, Maronite and Catholic communities. Consequently, Cyprus and Yemen share geopolitical, geographical, religious and cultural characteristics that have contributed to their histories of violence. In the 1970s Yemen, like Cyprus, was divided into north and south; however, unlike Cyprus the two Yemeni states were legally equal and eventually reached an agreement to (re)unify.

The origins of the concrete division of Yemen can be located in the age of colonialism and the manifestation of great power rivalries in South Arabia. The British and Ottoman Empires established themselves in Yemen by 1849, finally partitioning the territory of today's Yemen into North and South in 1905. This division was not accepted by the Zaydi Imam of North Yemen, and did not reflect local realities, but it eventually proved fundamental to the two communities’

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2 John Esposito writes that *Zaydis* [are a] Moderate branch of Shi’ite Islam that diverges from other Shi denominations in a dispute over succession to the imamate. (...) Its first state was founded in northern Iran in 864 and lasted until 1126. A longer lasting state was established in northern Yemen in 893, where it endured until 1962. It is the closest of all the Shi factions to the Sunnis. (...) The only qualifications for the imamate are descent from Ali and Fatima, absence of physical imperfections, and personal piety ... See J.L. Esposito (2003) *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 347.

3 Esposito defines *sayyid* as an *honorable* title used by those claiming descent from Muhammad, especially through his second grandson, Husain. *Sayyids* receive the proceeds from a special Islamic tax, *khums*, to prevent hardship and maintain dignity ... See J.L. Esposito, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

4 Esposito defines the *Shafi School of Islamic Law* founded by Muhammad ibn Idris ibn al-Abbas ibn Uthman ibn Shafi in the eighth century. Prominent in Egypt, Palestine, and Jordan with a significant number of followers in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Hejaz, and Indonesia and among Sunnis in Iran and Yemen. (...) Considers hadith superior to customary doctrines of earlier schools in formulation of Islamic law. Denied preference (istishan) as source of law. See J.L. Esposito, *op. cit.*, p. 285.
**THE POLITICS OF (RE)UNIFICATION: LESSONS FROM YEMEN FOR CYPRUS**

respective identities as it came to signify the dissimilarity between northern and southern Yemenis. The differences were centred around political culture as the northern polity, which was ruled by Zaydi Imams from 1926 until 1962, was tribal, politically regressive and isolated, whereas in Aden, especially, the southern intelligentsia, which matured in the shadow of British colonialism and Arab nationalism, was adverse to the political organisation in the North and ill-disposed to the strength of the northern tribal elites. Because of this, a new strand of nationalism - the Adeni - was created in the South which existed in parallel to Yemeni and Arab nationalism. This has arguably been strengthened over the years that followed 1967 and has resurfaced in the form of the Al-Hirak: the Southern secessionist movement.

Though the division of Cyprus does not share the same trajectory, it too can be traced to the age of colonialism. The roots of the division of the island's two most populous ethnic communities can equally be found in the Ottoman millet system, Britain's instigation of 'divide and rule' policies in late 1956 and in the consequential rise of Greek and Turkish nationalisms. During the nineteenth century the identities of the two communities were constructed accordingly by local actors regarded as the political elites and by outside powers as mutually exclusive. The two communities have since been locked in a chronic existential, hence political, conflict whereby each is the other's enemy. Akin to Yemen, the intervention of the two colonial powers in Cyprus plus the manoeuvrings and responses of the local political elites led to the creation and entrenchment of contrasting identities of two communities; communities that in the past co-existed at times, blurring the lines that distinguished one from the other and even forming hybrid identities. Nonetheless, unlike Yemen, the division in Cyprus originally had its roots in the ethnic differences


8 This analysis is based on Carl Schmitt’s the Concept of the Political, in which he argued that the ‘specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy’ which denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation (p. 26). The enemy in Schmitt’s account is one that is extremely different and alien, but not necessarily evil or ugly, with whom conflict may turn into a struggle to preserve one’s way of existence. According to Schmitt the state is the ultimate political grouping because it can command its citizens to go to war and therefore put their lives on the line. See C. Schmitt (1976) The Concept of the Political, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.

of the two communities rather than in variances of political culture. The conflict between the two ethnic communities of Cyprus intensified during the war of decolonisation when the strategic interests of Greece, Turkey and Britain and the overarching rivalry of the Cold War were added to the already explosive mix. Afterwards, following independence, clashes ensued, most notably in 1963 indicating the effect of a power vacuum left in the wake of Britain’s withdrawal, which by 1964 necessitated the intervention of the UN. In the end the Greek coup of 15 July 1974 and the Turkish invasion five days later cemented the already existing division.

In Yemen the decolonisation war which started in earnest in the South in October 1963 was preceded, in September 1962, by the start of a revolution followed by civil war in the North. The two conflicts developed in tandem with Britain pursuing a ‘divide and rule’ strategy throughout both. When it became obvious that Britain’s goals could not be accomplished in the South and its base in Aden would have to be abandoned, British officials explored the options of stationing Britain’s former allies in the northern part of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). In 1972, Saudi Arabia, which has always been mindful of its populous and troublesome neighbour, put this plan into practice in order to weaken the revolutionary Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). As a result of British, Saudi and Cold War machinations, along with the revolutionary character of the PDRY regime and the claim of both states to be representing the whole of the Yemeni nation, the conflictual relationship between the two states was sealed.

It could be argued that although of different character, the histories of division in the two states share striking similarities. They both had their respective roots in the age of colonialism and were cemented in the wake of decolonisation as a result of local and international factors. This signifies the intrinsic part of colonialism as well as the intervention of outside powers immediately


11 During this time the links to Cyprus became direct with reports that the Yemeni insurgents from the National Liberation Front (NLF) were surely inspired and potentially trained by EOKA. Evidence that the two movements were loosely linked are found in the tactics adopted by the Adeni insurgents; they employed the same subversion tactics used by EOKA (bombings, targeted assassinations etc) collectively referred to as ‘terrorist incidents’ by Britain. See National Archive at Kew Gardens, Folders: CO/1055/220; CO/1055/202; FCO 8/173. Indications of a direct link can be found in a report written by colonial officers who were involved in the Aden Insurgency which states that ‘Such military training as has been necessary [for the NLF] has been provided by the UAR, the Yemen and, according to one account, by EOKA.’ See British National Archive at Kew Garden, FCO 8/339 ‘NFL’, 15 November 1967, p. 17.

12 FCO 8/260, RG CY, ‘The rulers’ potential as dissident leaders’.


after decolonisation, in the development stages of relations of conflict in these two vulnerable post-colonial states. The status-quo created in this period was normalised due to the lack of contact between the populations of South and North Yemen and southern and northern Cyprus, making efforts towards (re)unification complicated and treacherous.

In Cyprus, talks to facilitate (re)unification have been held to no avail under US and UN auspices since 1977. In 1983, Raouf Denktash, the Turkish-Cypriot leader announced the formation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) which has so far only been recognised by Turkey. This move has increased the complexity of (re)unification talks because any engagement with the leadership of the TRNC by the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) can be perceived as a move towards recognition and legitimacy. Further, the failure of the 2004 Annan Plan and Cyprus’ accession to the EU as a divided island has made the situation more complicated. The latest round of talks under UN auspices between President Demetris Christofias and Turkish-Cypriot leader Dervis Eroglou came to a standstill when Cyprus took over the Presidency of the Council of the EU on 1 July 2012.

The situation could not have been more different in the two Yemens before 1990. In the absence of a UN peace-keeping force and in the context of the Yemens’ strategic role in the Cold War, the rivalry between these two countries escalated to armed conflict on more than one occasion. Efforts towards (re)unification were the by-products of the first two conflicts that took place in 1972 and in 1979. When considering the characters of the two regimes and the PDRY’s alliance with the USSR, it can be argued that the announcements stating that the two states would move towards (re)unification were made to placate the constituents of both states who at the time still saw themselves as Yemeni and Arab nationals and desired (re)unification. As a consequence these efforts differed to those made by the two Cypriot communities since the Yemen case involved two sovereign states, unwilling to (re)unify, due to their radically different internal make-ups that were supported by Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union respectively.

15 The framework discussed at the talks since 1984 has been on the creation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. However, it should be noted that the RoC and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership are at odds about what the term means in practice. On the one hand the RoC politicians envision that the two federal entities would not be exclusively defined by their ethnic make-up, though they may possess features that make them more or less Greek and/or Turkish Cypriot. On the other, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership envisions the creation of two entities defined by their ethnic make-up. Further, the two disagree on the powers of the central federal state, with the Greek-Cypriot politicians pushing for the creation of strong federal institutions, while their Turkish-Cypriot counterparts are in favour of devolving as much power to the federal units. For more on the two sides’ disagreements regarding a potential solution see J. Ker-Lindsay (2011) *The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 78–94.


Yemen (re)unified

Yemen was officially (re)unified on 22 May 1990. Arguably, one of the most important reasons leading to the (re)unification was the weakening of the Soviet Union and its slow withdrawal from the Arabian Peninsula following the Afghanistan invasion debacle which cost the PDHY its sponsor. In addition, the 1986 civil war that took place in the South left the PDHY devastated. The war resulted in 3,000 members of the ruling Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) transferring their allegiance from the YSP to the YAR which shattered the former. The exodus of the PDHY’s most seasoned politicians also impacted the regime’s legitimacy.19 On the other hand, the YAR’s President Ali Abdullah Salih and his umbrella organisation, the General Congress Party (GCP), found themselves with more power vis-à-vis the PDHY and the YSP. As a final point, Robert Burrowes in his volume The Republic of Yemen: The Politics of Unification and Civil War, 1989-1995, advocates that (re)unification was also the effect of the discovery of oil resources found by the American Hunt Oil Company in 1984 in the Marib area which borders the two states where only co-operation could warrant favourable results for all.20 In consequence it transpires that the (re)unification was the result of convenient timing and opportunism21 as politicians on both sides had much to gain and hardly anything to lose.

During secretive talks which did not include public opinion, the two oligarchic elites of Yemen agreed to (re)unify the states. The agreement, however, was the product of little forethought and a great deal of mistrust. As a result the armies of the two states remained intact until 1994 and no move was made to develop institutions that might reflect the newly created facts of an integrated (re)unified and democratic state.22 Consequently the absence of forethought revealed friction among the elites and strife soon manifested itself among the population, especially within the less populous and economically disadvantaged South. According to journalist Brian Whitaker, it appears that the way democracy was applied in Yemen ultimately created a barrier to unity since the methods of dispute resolution and trust were not there, and because the South was so inherently disadvantaged.23

Further compounding the situation at the time were regional and international actors, the most important of them being Saudi Arabia. Since the 1970s the Saudi government and prominent individuals have been sponsoring independent power centres and kin groups, hence

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19 F. Halliday, ibid., p. 42.
21 Ibid.
fostering division and limiting the government’s influence in Yemen. Moreover, Saudi resources have been the cornerstone of Saleh’s neo-patrimonial patronage network, thus granting the Kingdom influence over Saleh and other pivotal Yemeni actors. Finally, until 1990, Saudi Arabia was home to one million Yemeni workers whose contribution to Yemen’s economy was of immeasurable importance. This asymmetrical relationship remains Yemen’s most noteworthy with a regional and an international actor. Its significance was illustrated during the Gulf War when Saudi Arabia punished Saleh for his adherence to an ‘Arab Solution’ to Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in the UN Security Council, by expelling one million Yemeni workers from the Kingdom and withdrawing all aid. The consequences were dramatic with unemployment rising sharply from 4% to 25% between 1990 and 1993.

Even though this mounting crisis delayed the outbreak of civil war between the former northern and southern Yemens, it did not put it off entirely; it eventually broke out in 1994. The civil war was won by Saleh, partly with the help of returnees from the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan who were recruited by Sheikh Abdel Majid al-Zidani. But in spite of this victory, secession has been a constant headache for the regime in Sana’a. The northern elites have made Aden an arena where their rivalries are actualised and diffused with the acquisition of land and influence. At the same time the population of the South remains disadvantaged; this is evident in the refusal of the RoY to pay pensions to ex-officers of the PDRY’s army. This refusal led the officers to form a peaceful protest movement, the Al-Hirak which is demanding secession, but having said that, leadership in the South is lacking. Even though the South is reputedly involved in the upcoming ‘national dialogue’, a part of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) deal that ousted Saleh, it is doubtful that it will present a united front. As such, it is unlikely that the Al-Hirak will be able to successfully pursue secession. And it is also improbable that the ‘national dialogue’ will produce a federal state based on a new agonistic relationship between the South and


the regime in Sana‘a wherein each will not perceive the other ‘as an enemy to be destroyed, but as an adversary whose existence is legitimate and must be tolerated’. 28

The problematic nature of the Sana‘a regime’s legitimacy in the South has created a safe-haven for jihadist groups, the most important of which is the Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Its foiled attempts against the USA, most significantly in December 2009 and its growing presence on the ground indicate that this faction poses the greatest danger of Al Qaeda’s affiliates in the world at the moment. The inability or unwillingness as stated by some Yemenis,29 of the Sana‘a regime to deal with the AQAP has invited the involvement of the USA in the form of a campaign of targeted assassinations which, according to analysts is both unlawful30 and counter-productive.31

In the years since (re)unification the regime has faced two other challenges not directly related with its lack of legitimacy in the South. The first has been the Al-Huthi conflict in the governorate of Sa‘ada which began in September 2004. Its roots originated in the tribal and religious make-up of Sa‘ada and in the economic crisis which plagued the governorate as a result of the Saudi–Yemeni border settlement in 2001;32 while its escalation has been a consequence of the rivalry between ex-President Saleh and Major-General Ali-Muhsin Al-Ahmar.33 The second crisis is the Arab Spring-style revolution which swept Yemen in February 2011 demanding an overhaul of the corrupt neo-patrimonial system. The manifestation of the revolution in the South was brutally suppressed by the regime in the absence of media presence there, and it was also used as an excuse to detain members of the Al-Hirak.34 In due course the revolution was over-run by the elites and external interests. In November 2011 a deal, brokered by the GCC, ensured Saleh’s removal and uncontested elections followed which resulted in the appointment of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al Hadi. Though it is argued that Hadi, who has previously served as vice-President under Saleh, will

not bring a change in substance, it is yet uncertain what his intentions are or whether he will manage to merge the fractured army and rid the state of the influence of Saleh and his family. In addition, the potential for a substantive and useful national dialogue – one of the stipulations of the agreement – is disputed as argued above.

Lessons for Cyprus from Yemen

Admittedly, the unification project in Yemen has been unsuccessful in both the South and the North since it failed to change the basis of their relationship from antagonistic conflict to agonistic coexistence, resulting in war and constant calls for secession. Further, the constant crisis of legitimacy facing the regime in the South has allowed the creation of safe-heavens for militant organisations that threaten Yemen, the region and the rest of the world. The reasons for overall failure and the lessons it can offer are examined below. Nonetheless, it is first deliberated that from the chaos created because of the botched process some constructive insight may be drawn from specific actions pursued by both the YAR and PDRY regimes prior to 1990.

The first positive step undertaken by the two regimes prior to (re)unification was their rejection of the narratives, in part, imposed upon them by their overlords and internalised through the elites, which suggested that each regime was the other’s existential enemy. Before 1990 each was a threat to the other’s existence due to the fact that they both claimed to represent the nation, their spatial proximity and their ideological distance. The Marxist ideology of the PDRY was incompatible with the conservative pseudo-republicanism of the YAR, which was based on the power and familial structures of the tribal elites of the highlands and on Saudi investment, and vice versa. The rejection of these narratives was a precondition for (re)unification. Yet, in many ways this rejection was already decided, most notably because of the decline of Soviet power and its withdrawal from the Arabian Peninsula. Saleh, realising that the YSP was weakened took advantage of the situation, but he knowingly acted against the wishes of his Saudi overlords who did not want to see Yemen (re)united. To some extent he also acted against the wishes of the Saudis’ American counterparts. By 1990 the two sides moved to de-emphasise the perceived intractability of the conflict that existed between them, hence creating the conditions for national (re)unification. However, an agreement was reached not via popular consultation but through an arrangement reached between the elites of the two states. This, nevertheless, was received jubilantly by crowds on both sides of the divide.

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In the case of Cyprus, the narratives propagated are primarily ethnic. They have been reproduced on both sides of the island through the dissemination of histories that present the two sides as being locked in an intractable, constant and violent confrontation. In line with the case of the two polities in Yemen, Anna M. Agathangelou and L.H.M. Ling state that ‘both Greeks and Turks stake absolute claims on the island’s political, educational, and cultural identity’. For these same reasons the conflict is presumed to be intractable and this narrative is embraced by most of the politicians on both sides, while those in the Greek side who oppose this narrative are viewed as traitors and ‘turkophiles’. The Yemeni case illustrates that for (re)unification to be even possible these narratives should be abandoned at the expense of local, regional and global elite interests.

Agathangelou and Ling contend that the narrative of intractability benefits the business elites who supervise the division of the economy and engage in lucrative trade with each community’s respective sponsor. On the other hand, in light of the recent economic crisis affecting Cyprus, the UN Special Envoy, Alexander Downer, has argued that (re)unification ‘would reduce the sovereign risk of investing in Cyprus, clear up the problems of investing in property, grow GDP and offer capacity to service and pay off debt’. That being the case, another explanation is required to clarify the persistence of narratives of intractability. This can be found in the gains amassed by the political elites on both sides of the divide in the form of status, wealth and power as a result of their claim to represent the two ethnic communities. As Nathalie Tocci observes, the elites on both sides are relatively content with the status quo and thus their incentives to compromise are low.

The case of Yemen demonstrates that the rejection of narratives of intractability – a necessary precondition for (re)unification – is possible. To some extent their dismissal in Yemen was a given fact largely due to the decline of the USSR. Additionally, it was actively pursued by politicians on both sides because it favoured them. The situation in Cyprus is different since the elites do not have sufficient incentive to reject the discourse of intractability. Agathangelou and Ling are aware of this and suggest that the adoption of ‘interstitiality’ might be the answer. They argue that women could spearhead a movement away from intractable identities towards interstitial, middle, common

38 Ibid., p. 23.
identities in similar vein to that of mother, daughter or teachers. The existence of bi-communal organisations for peace and cooperation at the grassroots level also create the ground for a rejection of the prevailing discourse. Regardless, it must be said that the inability of these organisations to enter into mainstream politics or make a significant dent in existing discourse puts into question their capacity to influence the situation. In recent attempts at educational reform, initially indicated by the Turkish-Cypriot and currently by the Greek-Cypriot side, there is potential for the rejection of this discourse. It should, however, be noted that although the reaction by the Greek-Cypriot political and ecclesiastical elites to the suggested reforms is most discouraging, regrettably it is not surprising.

The case of Yemen allows fresh insight into the narratives of intractability strengthening the argument against their permanence: it demonstrates how the interests of the elites coalesce, thus reducing the emphasis on narratives and delegitimising them briefly in time, allowing space for the successful initiation of a (re)unification process. In the case of Cyprus, – as in Yemen – ‘a change of heart’ on the part of the elites would be the most effective tool to combat such narratives. Be that as it may, this has not taken place yet due to a lack of incentives. All the same, groundwork has been undertaken and avenues have been opened in the space of civil society. Moreover, if actualised, a review of the education system in the RoC has the potential to generate the foundations that will move Cyprus, like Yemen in the 1990s, toward the creation of a discursive space conducive to (re)unification.

The second constructive lesson that can be drawn from the Yemeni case of (re)unification is the use of newly-found natural resources as a stepping stone to rapprochement. Their decision to co-operate meant a relaxation of border tensions which led to renewed interest in (re)unification as it would potentially allow the elites to benefit equally from the revenues. In the case of Yemen, natural resources combined with the weakening of the Soviet Union and its waning grip on the region, gave enough incentive to the political and economic elites to engage wholeheartedly, though not sincerely, with the (re)unification project.

Cyprus now finds herself in a similar situation to that of Yemen in 1984. Significant natural gas reserves have been discovered in Block 12 of the RoC’s maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which is part of the Aphrodite gas field. However, the regional environment that the RoC finds itself in is significantly more unstable than the situation in the Arabian Peninsula in

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42 Agathangelou and Ling, op. cit., p. 25.
45 ΣΚΑΙ. Μάθημα Κυπρικής Ιστορίας. Οι Νέοι Φακέλοι [ΣΚΑΙ. Lessons in Cypriot History]. The New Files] [video online], available at [http://folders.skai.gr/main/theme?id=86&locale=el], accessed 20 July 2012.
1984–1988. The Levantine Basin where the gas field is located is a highly volatile zone because the delination of maritime borders is constantly contested there.\textsuperscript{46} Also, Turkey contests the sovereignty of the RoC, maintaining that the Republic does not safeguard the rights of its Turkish-Cypriot community residing in the ‘TRNC’. Additionally, Turkey argues that the RoC unfairly refuses to share the revenue from the exploitation of the resources found in Block 12 with the ‘TRNC’ and the Turkish-Cypriot community.

Turkey’s protests stem from an anxiety of being left behind in a game played out in the Levantine Basin to secure natural gas and the rights for its dissemination in Europe. Regarding the regional and international context the International Crisis Group (ICG) claims that the RoC has the right and need to exploit its maritime resources, yet ‘its unilateral start of exploration is a violation of the pledge to share natural resources, and undermines the already fragile reunification talks.’\textsuperscript{47} This observation brings forth the internal aspect of the issue. The discovery of gas in Block 12 came to light at a time when the latest round of (re)unification talks in Cyprus reached a stalemate. Thus, the political leadership of the RoC reacted spasmodically – with the backing of Israel and Greece – when natural gas was discovered, vaguely promising, without commitment, to share revenues. On the other hand, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership – with the backing of Turkey – responded in an equally negative manner with aggressive rhetoric, similarly undermining (re)unification.\textsuperscript{48} These corresponding adverse reactions have expanded the rift between the two communities and strengthened the rhetoric of intractability at the same time. It can be concluded, therefore, that in the case of natural resources and (re)unification, Cypriot politicians lacked the forethought displayed by Yemeni politicians in a similar situation.

The ICG has made recommendations regarding imminent domestic and regional issues which, if accepted, could remedy the now established situation.\textsuperscript{49} But in any event, acceptance would entail the commitment of the political elites on both sides of the fence to first engage the matter of (re)unification and secondly a rejection of self-help as the sole operating logic of the state. Following the ICG’s recommendations could potentially allow Cypriots to build a stepping stone towards (re)unification by permitting them to work together and create a discursive space of trust instead of intractability.

Beyond such tentative positive lessons regarding the establishment of essential stepping stones that may lead to (re)unification, the overall Yemeni case is one that should not be emulated at all costs. Yemeni politicians, as Kostiner reasoned, were both the builders and the destroyers of their

\textsuperscript{46} For example Lebanon is contesting Israel’s newly defined maritime borders and Turkey is contesting those of Cyprus and Greece.


\textsuperscript{48} Ibid

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid

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newly established state. In deciding to act secretively and in their purpose to fortify their respective parties, the politicians from the two sides, condemned (re)unification to failure and, to a certain degree, destined themselves to a chronic effort to control the adverse effects of their actions that have now been aggravated due to regional and international pressures. The tendency of Yemeni politicians to revert to strategies designed to reinforce their particular parties, regions, tribes and clans has left them unable to tackle issues which are crucial to the establishment of a successful state or inspire any real lasting sense of unity in their diverse populations. The above substantiates that fundamentally, prudence, an essential ingredient of 'good' politics and vital for complex political puzzles, was deficient in the years that immediately preceded and followed (re)unification. Because of the reasons outlined, it is suggested that the main lesson to be drawn from the Yemeni case is that for unification to succeed, the politics in question need to move nearer to prudential politics.

The concept of prudence, or practical wisdom, as employed here is derived from Aristotle's articulation of phronesis which was later embraced by Machiavelli as prudenza and has become a cornerstone of classical realist thinking exemplified by the work of Hans Morgenthau. As such, it is not employed to mean cautiousness; instead, as Chris Brown describes, it is employed as 'the ability to weigh the consequences of one's actions rather than as providing reasons for inaction'. This ability, Brown explains, is not borne of theoretical knowledge and cannot be learned by the study of books. Robert Hariman and Francis Beer describe its core characteristics thus:

'the political actor must strive to achieve what is good both for the individual and for the community; doing so requires the capacity for adaptive response to contingent events; this amalgam of ends and means is developed through deliberation; and it culminates in character rather than technical knowledge.'

Thus prudence is a virtue possessed by seasoned politicians who are characterised by reflexivity in their mode of thinking and operation, a quality which the Yemenis lacked in the 1990s. As a consequence they opted for a botched (re)unification process that would provide them with instant benefits, without considering its future trajectory.

In suggesting that the main lesson Cypriots, on both sides, should draw from the Yemeni case is one of the necessity of prudence does not imply that they should be timid and leave such 'hard'
issues like power considerations out of the equation or that they should remain inactive. Indeed, as James Ker-Lindsey notes, the current status quo is likely to become less and less appealing for both sides since the facts on the ground are being shifted to the disadvantage of both communities. In light of his assessment it is argued that action is needed but in order to avoid the pitfalls that the Yemeni politicians have fallen victim to, action should be driven by the postulates of prudence. These dictate that responses should not be motivated solely by the selfish goals of the political elites and consideration for their respective ethnic group. Action should also be driven by attentiveness to what is best for all the communities of the island. If an endeavour is to be undertaken along these lines, politicians should, at the very minimum, be expected to support the de-legitimisation of the narratives of intractability that fundamentally hamper the road to (re)unification. This, as the Yemeni case has shown, is within their means. To end, it must be reminded that arguing that Cypriot politicians should practice prudential politics does not lead to policy prescriptions for a new round of negotiations because, as claimed above, an essential element of prudential politics is practical engagement and reflexivity.

**Conclusion**

This article compared and contrasted the histories of division in Yemen and Cyprus and reveals that, despite their differences, they share some striking similarities. It has been argued that some positive lessons can be drawn from the Yemeni case, the most important one being that the narratives of intractability that lock communities in antagonistic political relationships can be de-emphasised, making room for the creation of a discursive space of trust. This in turn can change the relationship from one of political antagonism to one of agonism, which facilitates co-existence. The case of Yemen also provides pointers for the de-legitimisation of these narratives by emphasising the crucial role of the elites and the possible constructive use of natural resources. It is debated here that Cyprus can and should emulate the Yemeni process by following the ICG recommendations regarding the newfound gas resources. What is more, the plans for reform of the educational system in the RoC should not be abandoned despite the opposition and short-term political costs, since the potential for future gains outweighs the price tag.

Finally, the experience of (re)unification in Yemen should serve as a cautionary tale for Cypriot politicians on both sides of the fence since the weakening and disintegration of the Yemeni state into chaos is largely the result of an absence of prudence on the part of Yemeni politicians when the decision to (re)unify was taken. Accordingly, the outcome should caution everyone against engaging in the politics of (re)unification under the guidance of opportunism and without any vestiges of prudence. As of now, the last round of negotiations between the RoC and the

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Turkish Cypriot leadership indicates a conclusion that prudence has been wanting on both sides. This article, therefore, claims that even though action is sorely needed to arrest the detrimental course of events, (re)unification should be avoided for now, in light of the lessons Yemen has taught us. It should only be revisited when prudence prevails on both sides.

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Making a British Atmosphere in Cyprus, 1931–1939: A ‘Coup D'état’ on Greek-Cypriot Elementary Education?

ANTIGONE HERACLIDOU

Abstract
This article aims to analyse the steps taken by the British administration for the introduction of fundamental changes in the elementary education system between 1931 and 1939 together with the motives behind them. The uprising of October 1939 in Cyprus resulted in the imposition of an authoritative regime with the fundamental aim to eradicate the enosis movement in order to restore political stability. Since the British themselves always recognised the centrality of educational questions in such a process, this article will explore how elementary education was reformed during the 1930s in order to serve the objective of introducing a 'British atmosphere' into the island. A series of laws which gave the Government complete control over elementary education, including the curriculum and the text-books, led the Church of Cyprus, which had so far been enjoying the privilege to be responsible for Greek-Cypriot education, to speak of de-hellenisation and a coup d'état on elementary education. To what extent these accusations were right will constitute part of our discussion.

Keywords: Enosis, education, elementary schools, Cyprus, Church, de-hellenisation, 1931 uprising, curriculum, teachers, British administration

The education system in Cyprus has always been interwoven with shifting political developments both domestically and internationally. In an island with mixed identities, ruled by foreign powers and now divided in two, the education system inevitably became a reflection of controversies and disagreements. Consequently, education presented an effective stage from which political manifestations and interests were ardently projected. This was certainly the case during the colonial era, especially after the October riots of 1931 when Britain tried to retain its supremacy in the Mediterranean and stifle any opposition within Cyprus. Yet, education in Cyprus remains a subject which has not been properly studied. This article aims to analyse the steps taken by the British administration to enable the introduction of fundamental changes in the elementary education system between 1931 and 1939 as well as the motives behind them. Elementary education was not the only sector of the education system that underwent a transformation during this period but it merits a special focus here. The reason for choosing the year 1931 as a starting point is because the unpremeditated events of 1931 resulted in the imposition of an
authoritative regime which completely altered the administration of the island and which was, to
some extent, relaxed in 1939 when the Second World War loomed imminent. The first part of the
article briefly introduces how elementary education functioned in Cyprus up to 1931 in order to
shed light on the background essential to the period under scrutiny.

Let Them Be, 1878–1931

During the first half of British rule, the administration of education was left to the separate
communities due to financial limitations. As a consequence this area remained out of the
administration’s reach for a long time, and since government aid to schools was essentially
symbolic, the schools depended on pupil fees and private donations. A *laissez-faire* policy, as
Persianis described it, was especially convenient for the Greek Orthodox Church which had
enjoyed the privilege of controlling education during the Ottoman rule. Duties such as the
appointment, dismissal, and promotion of elementary teachers; the establishment and
maintenance of primary schools; and the prescription of the school curriculum were shared by the
Town or Village School Committees, the District Committees and the Board of Education, all of
which were separately provided for by Greek and Muslim communities. Indeed, Lord Kimberley,
Secretary of State for the Colonies in Gladstone’s Government of 1882, supported the collaboration
of the Government with the local authorities and he unreservedly rejected High Commissioner
Biddulph’s ‘axiom’ that only by learning English would the inhabitants reach a higher civilisation
and acquire ‘access to every branch of human knowledge’.

Notwithstanding financial shortcomings, the end of the century marked the beginning of
some remarkable progress in the education sector. Nicosia High School, which in 1896 was
renamed The Pancyprian Gymnasium, apart from being a secondary school, found a new role in
the training of teachers of elementary schools. Katsiaounis explains that while only Turkish
schools were in receipt of state aid during the Ottoman period, the Greek schools had to make ends
meet with communal contributions; however, this discrimination was eliminated under British
rule. And, whereas in 1881 there were 91 schools, the number had risen to 273 by 1901. This can
be attributed not only to the steady rise in aid provided to schools but also to the growing demand

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[Education in Cyprus during the British Rule, 1878–1946], Λεμεσός [Limassol]: D Alastos (1953) *Cyprus in
History*, London: Zeno.
3 G.S. Georghallides (1979) *A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus 1918–1926*, Nicosia: Cyprus
Research Centre, pp. 27–29.
Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, p. 93.
for more and better education within Cypriot society.\(^6\) From the end of the nineteenth century, education might therefore be viewed as part of an expanding civic society in Cyprus.

Within the Greek-Cypriot community teachers held a highly respected position; hence people who were illiterate spent a great deal of time at the coffee shops, listening to them read the newspapers aloud and expressing their opinions on current matters. Additionally, the local politicians and the clergy also expected teachers not only to support the cause of union with Greece but to propagate this policy in their speeches in the villages to which they were appointed.\(^7\) This explains their vulnerability to unjustified transfers or dismissals. As for the schools, they were modelled on their counterparts in Greece and were staffed by graduates of the University of Athens. The curriculum and the books were chosen by the Greek Ministry of Education with roughly one-third of teachers originating from Greece. As High Commissioner Sir W.F. Haynes-Smith alarmingly noted ‘the whole of the Greek school is being based as an organisation for the Hellenic propaganda’.\(^8\) Enosis – or union with Greece – aspirations were professed from the onset of British administration. In 1878, taking a cue from the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1864, Greek Cypriots expected something similar from the British and perceived the change in the administration of the island to be a step closer to the fulfilment of their national aspirations. This was not so for the Muslim community (i.e. one-quarter of the population) which, in spite, or because of the end of Ottoman rule, showed an inclination to rely on the British authorities from the start.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the funding of education had gradually become more prominent in both public debate and within the Legislative Council. However, in the Session of 1909 the Greek elected members asked for the people to be entirely relieved of any direct financial responsibility for the maintenance of schools whilst retaining direct control over them.\(^9\) Regardless of this, High Commissioner Sir Charles King-Harman was unwilling to sanction any further increase in the annual appropriation of grant in aid of elementary schools without an independent report on the state of education in Cyprus. Accordingly, in 1913 two experts, J.E. Talbot and F.W. Cape, were appointed by the British Government as Inspectors of Education. In turn, they delivered a full analysis of the current education system, identifying its defects and making extensive suggestions for improvement, thus providing a template for most British thinking \textit{vis-à-vis} Cypriot educational questions for many years to come. Noticing the genuine zeal for education which has inspired and still inspires, the Cypriot people,’ Talbot and Cape underlined the need for a substantial increase in the amount devoted towards public education out of revenue. They advocated, however, that any substantial rise in Government aid should be

\(^7\) Persianis (1978), \textit{op. cit.}, p. 17.
\(^8\) Georgallides (1979), \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 94–95.
accompanied by increased government control in the schools. But, whereas the Muslim deputies
accepted the proposals, their Greek counterparts rejected them. The latter had treasured their long
standing autonomy in running their schools and considered this freedom to be a precondition for
their further pursuit of political liberty.

On 5 November 1914, Britain annexed Cyprus without signifying any decision on the
island's ultimate future. Neither the entry of Greece into the war in 1917, nor the Treaty of Sevres
in 1920 brought Cyprus closer to enosis. On the contrary, all the external complexities and upsets
of the early 1920s, not least the disastrous Greco–Turkish war in Asia Minor, turned Greek-
Cypriot political discourse to concentrate on concerns of purely internal policy. Logically, this
included educational issues which again became a reflection of the deteriorating friction between
the Greek-Cypriot community and the Government. In 1920, the problem of the inadequacy of
teachers' salary re-emerged and became more acute due to the spiralling cost of living.
Government's reply to such anxieties came in the form of the 1920 Elementary Education Law
which, clearly shaped by the 1913 proposals of Talbot and Cape, made provisions to enable
decisions to be taken concerning the teachers and the establishment of schools should the
Government increase its financial assistance to the education system through taxation.
Additionally, the Boards of Education would retain the right to decide the curriculum and select
textbooks. The Turkish members of the Legislative Council accepted the law, saying that without
it 'there could have been no elementary education for the Muslims of Cyprus'. Conversely, the
Greek members viewed the law as a government attempt to undermine the teachers and alienate
the Bishops who always held seats on all the educational boards and committees of the country.
Eventually, the law was amended to apply only to non-Christian Orthodox schools, which
effectively brought the Turkish minority closer to the Government but at the same time it
heightened the distance between the two communities. Despite the change of government the
Turkish Cypriots were willing to cooperate with the British authorities from the beginning, and
by extension, were most receptive to educational change. They were less educated than their Greek-
Cypriot peers and eager to avail themselves of higher educational standards.

The December 1922 legislative elections constituted a serious defeat for the nationalists and a
success for the more moderate politicians. Emphasis was given to progressive constitutional
advance and the prosperity of the island. It was in this context that the Government managed to

10 Ibid.
11 Georgallisides (1979) op. cit., p. 31.
13 Georgallisides (1979), op. cit., p. 188.
14 Minutes of the Legislative Council, Session of 1920, Volume XXXII, Public Record Office, The National
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enact the Elementary Education Law; but in bringing about such change, the desire of the teachers
to see their salaries and professional conditions brought under a supposedly impartial Board of
Education for the first time, should not be underestimated. Following a six-month debate at the
legislative session of August 1923, the Government introduced a bill to fund education which
would be provided by indirect and direct taxation, 60% and 40% respectively, and teachers would
be appointed by the High Commissioner on the recommendation of the Board of Education.
Regardless of personal opinions of teachers on enosis, the majority of them resented being ‘tools in
the hands of the so-called leaders and tyrants and were utilized by them for the purpose of
promoting their political views’.16

The Elementary Education law of 1923 was a major blow to the Greek Cypriot politicians
and a setback for the Greek Orthodox Church, whilst it opened the way to the centralisation of
education. Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that the Greek authorities in Cyprus, specifically
the Legislative Council and the Church, were not opposed to the idea of centralisation in principal.
Power within the Greek community had certainly been centralised effectively during the
Ottoman period under the aegis of the Church. But, at this juncture, as Weir persuasively put it,
‘the wrong government had been doing the dictating’.17

Meanwhile, in the same year the Treaty of Lausanne proved a great disappointment for the
Greek Cypriots, mitigated only by the fact that Turkey had seemingly given up all claims to the
island by recognising the annexation of Cyprus to Britain. Still, after decades of turmoil in the
Near East, the long-standing animosities between Greece and Turkey had been resolved without
any account being taken of Cypriot enosis.18 Indeed, in 1925 Cyprus was proclaimed a Crown
Colony. Having said that, a generally favourable reaction on the island was created in 1926 when
Sir Ronald Storrs was appointed as Governor. This optimism, however, did not last long and the
years that followed saw a sharp deterioration in Anglo–Cypriot relations, culminating in the
uprising of October 1931. By the end of the 1920s, the imperatives of an English attachment and
the aspirations of enosis among a Greek majority had intensified in different ways. This was
symbolised by Storrs’ perhaps ill-advised decision in 1928 for the administration to celebrate fifty
years of British occupation in sharp contrast to the multiplying demonstrations of affinity with
Greece. In particular, the Greek national ideals continued to be inculcated within schools and
through such institutions as Boy Scout Troops. Storrs recalled in his Orientations:

> There was no definite anti-British curriculum in the Schools, but they are all actively
Hellenising. All Greek elementary schools use the ‘Analytical Programme’ as published in

15 Georghallides (1979), op. cit., p. 246.
16 Session of 1923, 21 August 1923, TNA, CO 69/37.
17 W.W. Weir (1952) Education in Cyprus, Limassol, p. 87.
18 Holland and Markides, op. cit., p. 182.
Greece, and adopted by the Board of Education. No reading books are allowed in these schools except those that have been approved by the “Critical Committee” in Athens. Portraits of King Constantine and Queen Sophia, of Venizelos and other worthies, but of no English Sovereign, adorned the walls of the class-rooms, together with elaborate maps of Modern Greece; while that of Cyprus, if to be found at all, was as a rule small, out of date, worn out and frequently thrust behind the blackboard.\(^\text{19}\)

In Storrs’ judgment, even if it was true that in a secret ballot the great majority of the population would vote for the closest union with Britain, it was nonetheless doubtful ‘how far the young generation brought up under this Pan-Hellenic curriculum would continue so to vote’. In 1929 Prime Minister Passfield made clear to a Greek-Cypriot deputation that the subject of enosis ‘is definitely closed and cannot be further discussed’.\(^\text{20}\) Indeed, a move towards responsible government, or extended autonomy, was ruled out.

Alongside this polarisation, however, the education question continued to evolve. Although the desire for enosis was shared by the majority of teachers, 622 still subscribed to a petition to the Government requesting that their salaries should be increased and that pensions should replace retirement gratuities. The teachers also asked to be incorporated within the civil service because under the 1923 law, appointments, promotions and transfers vested in the Greek Board of Education, exposed them to whims and to political or other interests of elected councillors serving on educational bodies.\(^\text{21}\) On 22 July 1929, the Greek deputies sent a letter to the Colonial Secretary to speed up educational reform, and Storrs at this point seized the opportunity to make changes in the education system which would later create more friction between the Government and Greek politicians. He therefore proposed to curtail the power of the Board of Education and subject the teachers, under legislation, to the control of the Department of Education: debarring them ‘like Government servants, from all interference of politics’ because this was deemed necessary for the preservation of British rule.\(^\text{22}\)

According to the new law, the Governor would be responsible for the appointment of teachers. The three elected members of the Legislative Council would be eliminated from the Greek Board of Education, and the six members of the Board, so far elected by the District Committees, would be appointed by the Governor. Yet, the Boards of Education would retain their right to prescribe the curriculum and choose the textbooks.\(^\text{23}\) By such means Storrs was clearly determined on squeezing Pan-Hellenic propaganda out of the schools, but this did not necessarily mean that he was embarking on a programme of de-hellenisation in the island as his Greek-

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\(^\text{20}\) Passfield to Storrs, 28 November 1926, TNA, CO 67/277/6.
\(^\text{22}\) Ibid., pp. 257–260.
\(^\text{23}\) The Cyprus Gazette, 18 December 1929, TNA, CO 69/41.
Cypriot critics alleged. Without doubt, in Egypt where Storrs’ Eastern Mediterranean ideals had been largely shaped over many years of service, he had developed a strong opposition to any notion of de-nationalising or anglicising cultures that were already deeply embedded. It was, as he said in his diary, already too late in the twentieth century to think in such terms. He stated his belief that:

‘The Greekness of Cypriots is ... indisputable ... A man is of the race of which he passionately feels himself to be. No sensible person will deny that the Cypriot is Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking, Greek-feeling, Greek, just as much as the French Canadian is French-speaking, French-thinking, French-feeling and French.’

What he did not accept in either Egypt or especially later as a Governor in Cyprus, was that authentic cultural loyalty or identity should be allowed to slip into political sedition. It was this distinction – manifestly open to objection by others – which led him to realise the urgent need for educational reform in Cyprus. The law was contested by the Greek-Cypriot members of the Legislative Council, together with the Church and the Press. It was also resisted by Turkish Cypriots who, influenced by Kemalist ideas, developed a strong patriotism regarding educational matters. A few months after the enactment of the law, the pupils of the Turkish Lycée, the only Muslim Secondary School on the island, took strike action because their English headmaster refused to hoist the Turkish flag at the school.

By and large the 1929 law was one of the reasons that led to the disturbances of 1931, but most of all it constituted a major step towards the submission of elementary education to Government control.

The 1933 Law

The 1931 disturbances, however spontaneous, marked a serious turn in the administration of the island. The fundamental aim was the eradication of the enosis movement as a precondition for political stability. It was not that the British hated the idea of enosis so much, or perhaps the aspiration to it, but that they viewed the movement as depriving them of the tranquillity which was their primary goal in the Mediterranean. The years ahead were to witness the enactment of a series of authoritarian laws aiming to ensure law and order in the future, and transform Cyprus into a loyal Crown Colony. Because at the time it was taken as axiomatic that the island would remain British, Cypriot identities, hitherto conditioning their allegiance to Greece and Turkey, had to be thoroughly transformed. Rappas, has recently argued that British colonial policy in Cyprus sought to inculcate colonial loyalty and social transparency by using a radical programme of social engineering through methods of discipline, punishment and persuasion.

themselves always recognised the centrality of educational questions in such a progression regarding Cyprus, we next explore how elementary education was reformed during the 1930s in order to serve the objective of introducing a ‘British atmosphere’ into the island, cutting the links with foreign countries and making colonial citizens out of Cypriot subjects.

Measures taken by the Government to restore order in the island included the deportation without trial of ten people involved in the disturbances, in addition to the suspension of the 1882 constitution, the dissolution of the Legislative Council, the prohibition of the flying of foreign flags (Greek or Turkish), the illegal ringing of Church bells, and the severe censorship of the press. Lastly, with the enactment of the new Criminal Code, agitation in favour of enosis was declared a criminal offence. Neither the Church nor Cypriot politicians were able to mount an effective resistance to the Government’s repressive measures especially as little active sympathy was forthcoming from Greece, still struggling to come to terms with the recent upheavals in national life.27 But by the end of 1931, law and order had been restored to the island.

Any form of political representation of the Greek Cypriots in the island’s political machinery was absent throughout the 1930s as well as the vacancy of the Archbishopric after the death of Kyriillos III in 1933. This meant that opposition to the regime was restricted to a section of the Church led by Leontios, the Bishop of Paphos, and the clandestine communist party.28 As always, the education system could not be isolated from wider political developments. The October riots constituted the most serious political challenge that the British had endured so far and school boys had played a prominent role in them. Acting on the powers given to him by the 1929 Elementary Education Law, the Governor promptly suspended twenty-one schoolmasters for their involvement in the disturbances and he eventually dismissed eleven of them.29 Strikingly, the educational reforms pursued in Cyprus in the first half of the thirties paralleled those followed by the Italians in the Dodecanese. According to Barros, Rome’s policy after 1925 was, ‘one of religious assimilation and Italianization’.30

In a letter to Governor Storrs, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Philip Cunliffe-Lister, transmitted Venizelos’ view that there was no inconsistency in a man having a pride of race, and at the same time being entirely loyal to the state of which he was a subject, and he suggested that ‘this loyalty would be encouraged if children were to be taught to know more of the Empire to which they belonged’.31 Henceforth, apart from being intended to deal with normal administrative

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29 Persianis (1978), op. cit., p. 103.
problems relating to schools, educational laws and decisions were aimed at ending, or at least weakening the links between Cyprus and Greece. This should not necessarily be interpreted as an attempt to anglicise, or de-hellenise Greek Cypriots as many politicians and prelates would suggest, but as the only effective way to make the young and new generations in Cyprus loyal to the Empire. At that moment the fundamental British position was very clear: ‘no question of union with Greece can be entertained and the determination of the future constitution should be deferred until the present agitation has died down in Cyprus and Greece as well’. Throughout this period the strategic value of Cyprus for the British remained limited, but they still had no intention of abandoning it to anybody else, and certainly not to a weak power like Greece.

Now that the handling of the Legislative Council no longer posed difficulties, Storrs emerged strongly in favour of introducing a new education law placing the syllabus and discipline of all elementary schools in the hands of the Government. A keen supporter of educational reform in Cyprus, Storrs seized the opportunity to persuade the Colonial Office to introduce such reforms to combat all the inefficiencies from both an administrative and political angle. He pointed out that:

‘The Board of Education had been turned by the local politicians into a political machine. Appointments, promotions, transfers and dismissals are regulated by considerations of party politics without regard to the Educational welfare of the island ... Throughout the schools there is a great deal of anti-British propaganda which may, in future, have serious effects.’

His suggestions were discussed at a Colonial Office meeting where the Colonial Secretary, Henniker-Heaton, reiterated Storrs’ view that ‘control of the curriculum was the key point and that unless Government obtained such control, the trouble in Cyprus would inevitably continue’. One of Storrs’ initial and most important steps towards attaining this ultimate goal was to diminish the Church’s role in the political affairs of the island, and specifically to reduce its involvement in educational affairs. Beyond the latter part of 1931 it became axiomatic in local official circles that Philhellenism would die out quickly if the influence of the Church could be removed. In Cyprus, as in Malta, events occurred which provided an opportunity to push a dominant local Church out of the secular sphere and into a constricted religious role.

That said, the opinion among British officials in Cyprus was varied as to how sweeping the educational reforms should be and when they should be introduced. Some of them were in favour of radical and speedy reforms whereas others supported more gradual change. For instance, the

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32 Cunliffe-Lister to Storrs, 17 November 1931, TNA, CO 67/240/11.
34 Ibid
35 Colonial Office meeting, 6 November 1931, TNA, CO 67/242/8.
36 Memorandum by Sir R.E. Stubbs, 16 November 1933, TNA, CO 67/251/3.
Director of Education, J.R. Cullen expressed his concerns over the intentions of the Greek Board of Education to use all their available clout to follow the example of Greece wherever possible. Cullen believed that only by enhancing the Government’s control over the educational system would these problems be solved:

‘I am strongly of the opinion that this divided control should cease and that the Government should be the only ultimate authority for all matters connected with elementary education … I consider therefore, that the Boards’ deliberations should be strictly limited to those matters entrusted to them by the law.’

Cullen went on to clarify that the removal of this function from the Boards did not imply the immediate substitution of a new curriculum since these changes should be effected at an ordered and not too drastic pace.

Not everybody on the British side shared this more measured approach. The Acting Commissioner of Nicosia supported more radical means to ensure that ties between Greek Cypriots and Greece were eroded, and suggested that links between the island’s inhabitants and the British Empire should be strengthened. With an eye perhaps on recent Egyptian experience, where the colleges, especially of law, had been breeding-grounds of anti-British feeling, the Acting Commissioner went on to remark that:

‘History has proved that the student class generally plays a prominent part in an insurrection, especially if it has been reared on wrong principles. The events of the last few weeks have shown that the action of this class in Cyprus had been no exception to the rule. Educational reforms must aim at eliminating insubordination in this class at teaching the British standard of discipline and that of making loyal subjects. They must mould it and guide it along the right lines.’

To this end, he believed that it would be vital to make the teaching of English compulsory in all schools on the island. Moreover, English should be recognised as the official language, and the books used in schools should be carefully revised and the Greek flag banned.

Against this background, Storrs requested approval on 7 March 1932 ‘for enactment of legislation to amend the existing Elementary Education laws with a view to reducing the influence of Boards of Education and increasing the control of the Government over the teachers’ and expressed his desire that the measure should be passed without delay.

37 Cullen to Colonial Secretary, 18 December 1931, State Archives Cyprus (SA), SA1/1468/1931.
38 Acting Commissioner of Nicosia to Colonial Secretary, 12 November 1931, SA, SA1 1468/1931.
39 Ibid.
40 Storrs to Cunliffe-Lister, telegram, 7 March 1932, TNA, CO 67/246/12.
education, should be mainly in the hands of the Government'. A key recommendation was a reduction in the role of the Boards of Education, particularly with regard to the curriculum, textbooks and fixing the public holidays. The apparent necessity of such a measure arose from the current politicisation of these aspects. In Storrs' words:

‘The curriculum at present enforced in the schools has slight regard for the educational requirements of the population; the textbooks are chosen for their value as instruments of propaganda rather than of instruction; days are fixed as holidays which are of more proper interest to Greek citizens than to Cypriot British subjects.’

Storrs was undoubtedly referring here to the annual celebration of Greek Independence on 25 March. Nonetheless, he did not see the implementation of his proposals because he was asked to leave Cyprus in June to take over the governorship of Northern Rhodesia. He was to be succeeded by Sir Reginald Edward Stubbs, former Governor of Jamaica, who arrived in Cyprus on 4 December 1932. Stubbs was to stay in Cyprus for a year before taking up the post of Governor in Ceylon, and then be succeeded by Sir Richmond Palmer in November 1933. In the interim period between Storrs’ departure and Stubbs’s arrival, Acting Governor Henniker-Heaton presented to the Colonial Office a draft bill on elementary education. The draft provided for the Governor to be the central authority for all matters relating to elementary education in the Colony and is charged with the control and supervision and the performance of all duties and the exercise of all powers connected therewith. This meant, according to the bill, that the Government had the power to decide the appointment, promotion or dismissal of teachers, together with the books to be used in schools, the curriculum to be followed and the conduct of business of the Committees and the Boards. In effect, the Boards of Education had been deprived of most of their powers and would henceforth act only as advisory bodies. Even their unofficial members would be nominated by the Governor instead of being selected by the elected members of the Legislature as in the past. In addition, the Governor would be responsible for the duties and powers of teachers, school attendants and inspectors, the discipline to be enforced at schools, the grants and loans to be made from the Education Fund, and the mode of payment and the assessment of the qualifications of the teachers.

The proposals produced a lively discussion in the Colonial Office. A consensus emerged that should the Cyprus Government want to eliminate enosis propaganda in the schools and strengthen its position on the island, it was essential to assume complete control over education. Having advised a few changes on purely technical points, the Colonial Office gave their

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41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 The Cyprus Gazette (extraordinary), 1 April 1933, TNA, CO 70/21.
44 Ibid.
unanimous approval to proceed with the law since ‘the case both politically and educationally for
the Government now to assume complete control is unanswerable’. A heightened fear of local
communism stemming from the recent outbreak only accentuated this momentum. How
important the education reform was to the Government can be judged from the budget allocation.
The education fund was one of the largest estimates along with the police fund, with provision for
£110,000 to cover employment of teachers. The new law made elementary education free of
charge, hence making the offer of education more universal. Removing fees at the elementary stage
was especially important for girls as poor families were far less inclined to send their daughters to
school. This was one way the Government might become ‘popular’, and enhance its ability to
defeat enosis. Perhaps it was for this reason that when the law was first published for general
information it aroused the anger of the Church and the Press, who denounced it as ‘the
enslavement of Greek education’.

Leontios, Bishop of Paphos, emerged as the most severe critic of the Law on behalf of the
Church. He sent two memoranda to the Governor of Cyprus in which he protested against its
enactment, the abolition of the ancient rights of the Church and the enslavement of Greek national
education. He described the 1933 law as the ‘ultimate blow maintained against elementary
education’ and he underlined that the Church rejected it because:

‘it deprives the people of their rights over their orthodox Christian education and their
human rights to determine, according to their traditions, the Greek education of the youth;
rights that were respected by the Turkish occupation and, for a long time, by the British
Administration as well.’

To Leontios, Church and education were inseparable, and as the Church had always been
Hellenism’s guardian, the new law had to be withdrawn since ‘it denied to Hellenism the right to
manage our national education, putting it instead under the absolute control of the Government’. A
particularly strong objection was that teachers of foreign languages and certain other subjects at
elementary schools were not required to profess one of the two main religions of the island, a
provision deeply resented in the Church for it perceived it to be indispensable for a teacher to be
Orthodox Christian. Furthermore, ecclesiastical control in this sphere was also to be reduced by

46 Cullen to Colonial Secretary, 28 January 1932, SA, SA1 953/1929/3.
47 Leontios’ Archive, ‘Book π£’, ‘History of Education in Cyprus’ written by the editor of Phoni as Kyprou [Voice
of Cyprus], 21 March 1936.
48 Bishop Leontios, despite being a keen supporter of enosis was not deported because he was in Greece during the
disturbances.
50 Leontios’ Archive, ‘Book π£’, date unknown – probably the document was written in 1936.
51 Leontios’ Archive, ‘Book π£’, Leontios to Stubbs, 6 May 1933.
the provision that henceforth the Governor had the power to directly order the closure of a school where Church interference ‘has been such as to render it impossible for the teacher to carry out his duties’. Leontios detected in this a British aim to entrench their position, not by sheer power but more subtly through an essentially internalised and psychological process of ‘Anglicisation and the stultification of Cypriots’ Greek character’. As a result Leontios believed that the intention ‘turned not to the older generations but to the schoolchildren, as they could more easily get emotionally influenced’. Both Kyrillos before his death, and then Leontios, advised parents to keep their children away from schools should the law begin operating. But, given the strong desire for education in Cyprus, such advice could eventually weaken the Church’s position. At any rate the Government managed to side-line Leontios by depriving him of the right to participate in the Greek Board of Education, explaining that as Locum Tenens he was not legally entitled to do so.

The new education law was certainly not well received by the Press. Even before its official enactment, the nationalist newspaper, Paphos, wrote that it was incomprehensible ‘why the Government wanted to deprive a people with such an educational zeal … and a genuine interest in the progress and good administration of schools of the right to decide for its own education’. Kyprakos Fylax argued that the legislation undermined both the Boards of Education and teachers themselves by curtailing their own proper professional responsibility. The members of the Greek Board of Education expressed resentment at their meetings of May and July 1934 in the presence of the Governor and the Director of Education. On this occasion the British officials defended the law because not only did it provide the requisite conditions to teach the future citizens of Cyprus to become loyal subjects of the British Empire but it also contributed to the direct state control and secularisation of education; a process that was well under way and generally accepted in other countries. The members of the Board, in their response, counter-argued that the law deprived the people and the Board of their educational rights. They underlined that it was a matter of justice and responsibility since the Cypriot people make an annual contribution of £130,000 to education and send 53,000 children to the schools so they should have a direct voice in the education and the religious edification of their children.

It is clear from these Greek-Cypriot and Greek reactions that the education law was viewed as an attempt to anglicise young people and to detach them from both Hellenic ideas and the Church. In this there is some truth, although certain distinctions need to be made. Stubbs and his colleagues certainly wanted to create a more ‘British atmosphere’, but this might be considered to have been a vaguer intent than ‘Anglicisation’. Furthermore, it was undeniable that the colonial

52 The Cyprus Gazette (extraordinary), 29 May 1933, TNA, CO 70/21.
54 H.W. Blackwall (Attorney General) to Colonial Secretary, 25 January 1934, SA, SA1: 1468/1931.
55 Paphos, 17 February 1933.
56 Kyprakos Fylax [Cypriot Guardian], 12, 14 April 1933.
57 Paphos, 21 April 1933; Phoni tis Kyprou, 13 May 1933; Μυρανθόπουλος, op cit., pp. 110–111.
administration had always distrusted the Church but they did not necessarily relish a head-on clash with it. Their desire for more secular control and a shift towards scientific and vocational subjects – echoing the original recommendation of Weir in his volume on educational life in Cyprus – had a non-political logic of its own. Nevertheless, the reality, given conditions on the island, was that the reforms were bound to put the British and the Church at logger-heads.

On 29 May 1933 the Cyprus Government duly passed what the Colonial Office in London admitted was ‘certainly one of the most important laws they have ever enacted’. Given that the proposed law granted the Governor complete power over the teachers and the curriculum, putting elementary education in Cyprus on a thoroughly sound footing, the Colonial Office unreservedly gave the green light for its enactment. Notably, the distinction made in the new law was no longer between Muslim and Greek Orthodox schools but between Muslim and Christian schools. Only the religion of each community was stated and not its nationality. Having achieved this much, the Government’s intention was to push on and introduce a new curriculum.

**Changing the Curriculum**

The essential principle of introducing a more British ‘atmosphere’ infused discussions on changes to the curriculum based, as Cullen himself summarised it ‘on a comparative study of the curricula and suggestions for teachers in numerous other countries, particularly those of Palestine, Ceylon and Northern Ireland’. The aim was to introduce announcing them in the school year 1934–1935. At this stage Palestinian models were used frequently for Cyprus in the agricultural sector as well as in educational reforms, but the outbreak of the Arab rebellion in 1936 – on a scale far surpassing the Cyprus revolt in 1931 – was to make this particular analogy less appealing. According to Cullen, the main objects of curriculum revision were to simplify the present over-elaborated curriculum and give a new orientation to the courses of geography, history and nature study, besides adding a rural bias to the teaching. No English lessons were to be included in the curriculum on the grounds that the inclusion of a foreign language for pupils with a maximum age of twelve, was educationally unsound. Furthermore, readers and textbooks for the teaching of geography and history would be prescribed (and if necessary written) to eliminate ‘nationalist’ reading matter and be generally tailored to suit the needs of schools and children in Cyprus rather

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59 The Cyprus Gazette (extraordinary), 29 May 1933, TNA, CO 70/21.
60 Minute by A.J. Dawe, 23 May 1933, TNA, CO 67/249/13.
61 Minutes 22 March 1932 – 5 December 1932, TNA, CO 67/246/12.
62 Τ. Παπαγεωργίου (2008) Η επιβολή ασφαλιστικού ελέγχου στη δημοκριτική εκπαίδευση της Κύπρου μετά τα Οκτωβριανά [The Enforcement of Sufocating Control in the Elementary Education of Cyprus after the October Revolt], Κυπριακές Σπουδές, No. 69, pp. 137–151.
than in Greece or Turkey. Due to pressure of time, it was decided that the new curriculum should be introduced during the school year 1935–1936.

The local press paid particular attention to amendments to the elementary curricula. Paphos published the regulations regarding the history and geography subjects for all the six classes of elementary school, presumably to show that a separate lesson on the history and geography of Greece was no longer prescribed. Despite initial plans that no English lessons were to be introduced in the curriculum, such lessons were in the end taught in the two top classes in schools with at least three children. By the end of 1934 the revised draft of the curriculum was ready for submission to the Colonial Secretary. Apart from the amendments to history and geography, the British Royal House had been included in the subject of citizenship. The new curriculum also gave more emphasis to agriculture, allocating three hours per week to these lessons, on a par with those of history. As a result, gardening and forestry lessons held a prominent position in the new curriculum and special awards were given to the schools with horticultural facilities. This turn towards agricultural and practical education was seen by critics as part of an attempt to curtail national aspirations in the schools by directing attention away from the public sphere and as a consequence from the ideal of enosis. In a letter to the Secretary of State, Palmer revealed how important a significant revision of the curriculum was for the elimination of Greek propaganda in the schools:

‘Under the revised syllabus history will be related to geography and will proceed from an outline study of the world on a regional basis, to a study of the individual regions in which the geography and history of ancient and modern of Greece, as a part of the Near East, will be given their proper place. Special attention will be devoted to Cyprus and to the position of the British Empire within the world framework. In effect, the anomaly whereby in a British possession the teaching of history has taken the form of national propaganda by a foreign state will be abandoned in favour of a system free from political objection and in accord with generally accepted educational principles.’

The important thing here is the placing of Cyprus and Greece in ‘the Near East’. This identification of Cyprus as an eastern island runs all the way through. Also, the text of the English National Anthem was distributed for teaching in the schools. Moreover, the Director of Education recommended the introduction of educational cinemas in schools and villages that would show films on subjects such as nature study, hygiene and geography, so that:

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63 Director of Education to Colonial Secretary, 14 May 1934, SA, SA1:731/1934/1.
64 Paphos, 26 July 1934.
They would help materially to break the bonds which have hitherto fettered education in Cyprus by linking it rigidly to education in two neighbouring countries. The addition of captions in English might help the spreading of English in the country.  

From January 1934, Cyprus was affiliated to the newly established British Film Institute, paying an annual subscription of £110.68. The English-language and officially approved, Cyprus Mail, was circulated free, for both staff and pupils’ use, to 80 of the schools where it was proposed that English should be taught. However, one of the innovations suggested for elementary schools incited vigorous discussion. After the Commissioner of Famagusta noted that none of the schools of his district ‘displayed a photograph of His Majesty the King’, he suggested that portraits of the Royal family should be given to schools. A similar suggestion was also made by Sir George Hill who, on his visit to Cyprus noticed that the only portraits in the schools and other public places were Greek Royalty. That said, Cullen opposed the compulsory introduction of alternatives and he recommended that the School Committees be left to apply for them. He demurred:

‘To compel School Committees to buy and display portraits of their Majesties is a form of propaganda by pin-pricks to which I am strongly opposed. We cannot make Cypriot children English, and I personally do not want to try: if we cannot make them loyal subjects otherwise, cramming these emblems down their throats will not succeed.’

Notwithstanding Cullen’s background – being married to a Greek Cypriot – and the fact that ‘the idiosyncrasies of a particular officer cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the development of a policy’, the Colonial Secretary arranged for over a thousand portraits of the King to be sent to elementary schools in connection with the coming Jubilee.

In contrast to the Muslim community, which embraced changes in the curriculum and especially the teaching of English, the Church and the Greek press reacted with some hostility. For the Church, it was a double blow. Not only did the new curriculum diminish the emphasis given to Greece but it marginalised the stoutly defended influence of the Church in the schools. In a report initiated by the Locum Tenens taking issue with the educational reforms, the prohibition of the teaching of Greek history and geography, the Greek national anthem, the circulation of the maps of Greece and of pictures of Greek heroes and famous public figures, were all seen, according to Leontios, as serving the Government’s aim to ‘cut off completely any links between contemporary Cypriots with modern or ancient Greece, with their national descent and with their nation’s glorious past’.

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67 Cullen to Colonial Secretary, 25 July 1934, SA, SA1:872/1934.
68 Colonial Secretary to Cunliffe-Lister, 31 July 1933, SA, SA1:253/1930/2.
69 Cullen to Colonial Secretary, 14 January 1935, SA, SA1:561/1934.
70 Cullen to Colonial Secretary, 13 August 1934, TNA, CO 67/258/6.
71 Mayhew to Palmer, 21 November 1934, TNA, CO 67/258/6.
72 Director of Education to Colonial Secretary, 24 December 1934, SA, SA1:731/1934/2.
In a letter he sent to Palmer on Christmas Eve, 1934, Leontios criticised the new curriculum which he found detrimental to the general education of the Greek youth of Cyprus. He thought that it was incorrect to teach the pupils of elementary schools a foreign language as this would limit their ability to learn comprehensively their mother tongue and therefore understand the ecclesiastical hymns. Politically, he believed that the new curriculum was unjust to the people of Cyprus and asked the Governor to consider that ‘justice may be done to our people by the restitution of its sovereign rights’. The short, even slightly acid reply by the Government to Leontios neatly reflected its intense suspicion of the Church as the ultimate propagator and repository of the enosis ideal. On behalf of the Governor, the Acting Colonial Secretary merely informed the Locum Tenens that His Excellency could not enter into correspondence with him on that subject since the proposed changes in the curricula ‘relate exclusively to secular education and have been fully considered by the responsible authorities’. Persians (2010), talks about the politics of the content in education, meaning the curriculum and the books, and how these were influenced by internal developments and external influences. The British and the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus did not share the same educational philosophy. The former resented the fact that the Church had a say in the formation of the content of Greek-Cypriot education but both of them saw the analytical programme as a means of controlling citizens’ behaviour. As a result the Cyprus Government seized the opportunity it was given to finance education under certain conditions, not least with the introduction of a new curriculum. This controversy between the Church of Cyprus and the British Administration constitutes one of the main developments that shaped the content of education. On the one hand the new analytical programme transformed the content of the schools with the introduction of the English language, and on the other the schools’ ideological orientation with the revision of the class of history where emphasis was now placed on European and international history, and a reduction in the hours allocated to the teaching of Greek.

In this setting it is vital to underline that while the role of the Greek language could not possibly be dispensed within Cypriot education, in the minds of the great majority of British officials Greek-speaking Cypriots were not necessarily Greeks. Stubbs, during his tenure, had emphasised that the teaching of English ‘in my opinion is absolutely essential to stop the nonsense about Cypriots being Greeks (which they never were)’. Similarly, a Colonial Office analysis asserted forcefully that ‘it is very doubtful that the Greek-speaking Cypriots can be said to be of the

74 Leontios to Palmer, 24 December 1934, TNA, CO 67/259/12
75 A.B. Wright to Leontios, 31 December 1935, TNA, CO 67/259/12
Greek race. The many nations which have passed over the island from antiquity onwards have left their mark upon it and ethnologically there is no question that the Cypriots are of mixed provenance. Such views had long been entertained amongst British officialdom and it marked after all, a default position in the counter-ideology which in a somewhat fumbling way the British tried to construct in defence of their position on the island. Yet, in parallel with the educational reforms we have described, such broader arguments became sharper and more frequent, and to this extent allegations of outright de-hellenisation were credible.

With the Cyprus Government seemingly making rapid progress in constructing a reality out of educational reforms, and doing so with a political agenda of fundamental importance which it did little to conceal, it is scarcely surprising that those whose interests and beliefs were in direct opposition felt threatened, and even a little desperate. This was truer of none other than the Locum Tenens. In November, Leontios sent an inflammatory memorandum to the Governor in which he reiterated that the Apostolic Church of Cyprus had always been the supreme responsible authority for the lay and religious education of the Greek Orthodox people of Cyprus and he severely criticised the Government's educational policies:

'It should be noted that there is no justification whatsoever for this coup d'état on the part of the government because this noble people, being under political servitude, and in spite of his great poverty, owing to his great and inherent love for learning maintained with much deprivation of his own self both before but more especially after the English occupation, the schools of the children and always advanced them ... And caring above all for the freedom of his education he refused and resisted from time to time any interference with it by a foreign to his sentiments and aspirations Government.'

Leontios also characterised the new curriculum as 'a most clear proof that the intention of the Government is nothing but a pernicious influence on the conscience of Cypriot Greek children.' Referring to the memorandum, Palmer said to the Secretary of State that Leontios was a political diehard who did not represent the present feeling of the majority and that his reactions were unjustified: 'You will notice', Palmer rather scathingly observed, 'that the Locum Tenens claims the right to Ethnarchy and the right of the Church to interfere in secular affairs. The new educational policy does not in any way interfere in the religious rights of the people. If it did there might be some excuse for his intervention. But as it does not there can be no excuse for this hotchpotch of political tenets masquerading as a protest against educational reforms.' The Government's attitude towards the concerns of the ecclesiastical leadership, in fact, was to be consistently distant and even denigrating. In the years before the Second World War the contest between Bishop

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78 Memorandum by the Colonial Office, 15 August 1935, TNA, CO 67/259/10.
80 Ibid.
Leontios and the British was to move to the political forefront. By the end of 1935, the Cyprus Government and Colonial Office had together made some progress towards their aim of introducing a ‘British atmosphere’ in Cyprus, and side-lining enosis as a movement, if not eradicating the enosis idea itself. The measure of their success was that everybody recognised an essentially repressive system, which nonetheless managed to secure enough local consent and cooperation to operate with some degree of effectiveness. Education remained a key lever in this process.

‘Scotchted Rather Than Killed’

In 1936, following the Abyssinian crisis which posed a serious threat to Britain’s hegemony in the Mediterranean, London was prompted to conclude that the area should not be abandoned. The Secretary of State for the Colonies declared that the Government intended to face these new and difficult problems and ‘make our future position secure’ – an argument that was reinforced after the First Lord of Admiralty’s visit to Malta and Cyprus.82 Indeed, Britain decided to strengthen its Mediterranean fleet and mobilised army and air units in the area for ten months, until June of 1936.83 Against this backdrop, the attraction of Cyprus as an alternative British base grew strongly, since the naval base of Malta would probably be neutralised in any war with Italy because of its vulnerability to attack by the Italian air force.84 Consequently, Cyprus required nothing less than a strong local Government and loyal subjects.

At the end of the summer the Governor clarified that there was no prospect of a constitutional move in Cyprus. Even so, much to the annoyance of the Government, the Greek-Cypriot press reported the setting up of a deputation to travel to London to ask for a revision of the existing – although still suspended – constitution. An unsatisfactory interview which took place between the deputation and the Colonial Office resulted in the Office reiterating the statement made by the Secretary of State in the House of Commons that: ‘it would be undesirable to alter the present constitution of the central government of Cyprus’.85 The deputation, along with the London Committee for Cyprus Autonomy recently formed by leftist Cypriots in London, might best be understood as attempts to explore an alternative to enosis such as self-government within the empire. The effort would at least yield a start towards reviving genuine political dialogue on the island after the post-1931 repression.

This setting provided a good boost to the teaching of English language and the promotion of

85 Dawe to Palmer, 8 April 1937, TNA, CO 67/279/6.
English culture. The Director of Education, James Cullen, was dissatisfied with the existing curriculum which limited the teaching of English to three hours per week, taught simultaneously to the two upper classes. He, therefore, proposed that the lesson should be given to each class separately; an idea that would require three extra hours at the expense of other classes, such as Religion.\(^{86}\) However, the Acting Colonial Secretary demurred because he thought that such a step would invite adverse criticism. His suggestion was that these three extra hours should be taken from auxiliary subjects such as drawing and music – a proposal that was eventually adopted.\(^{87}\) By the end of the school year 1937–1938, English language was taught in 107 Greek and 17 Turkish schools. Additionally, distinguished secondary pupils of the English School, the Muslim Lycée and the Famagusta Gymnasium were encouraged by the awarding of prizes.\(^{88}\) Teachers as well as pupils were motivated to learn English while the British Council offered various grants to schoolmasters to study at an English University in order to learn the language.\(^{89}\)

Furthermore, in the context of introducing a British atmosphere in the schools, the Department of Education proclaimed 12 May 1937 a school holiday to celebrate the coronation of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth. By this stage it was apparent that the Government had successfully managed to entrench its position in the elementary schools and, to a great extent, pupils in Cyprus followed the curriculum and the regulations applied to elementary schools in England. Michalis Maratheftis, a pupil during Palmer’s Governorship tried to convey the existing atmosphere: ‘At elementary school I was never taught the history and geography of Greece nor did I see pictures of the heroes of the Greek Revolution. I however learned a lot about the history and geography of England. We celebrated the birthday of the English King and the Empire Day. At every festivity we used to sing the English National Anthem and hoist the English flag.’\(^{90}\) Although these measures proved to be quite effective they were not enough to eradicate enosis manifestations. As Shuckburgh from the Colonial Office quite perceptively noted, ‘the movement of enosis ... is scotched rather than killed; and there is always the risk of breaking out fresh if a suitable opportunity presents itself.’\(^{91}\)

During discussions on the archiepiscopal question in May 1937, education again became a key issue of the criticism unleashed by clerics against the Government. The exiled Bishop of

86 Cullen to Colonial Secretary, 19 July 1936, SA, SAI: 731/1934/2.
87 Acting Colonial Secretary to Cullen, 31 August 1936, SA, SAI: 731/1934/2.
88 Cullen to Colonial Secretary, 6 November 1937, SA, SAI: 1349/1937.
91 Shuckburgh to Orme Sargent (FO), 1937, TNA, CO 67/281/1.
Kerynia in Athens took the occasion of the coronation of King George VI to lambaste the Government’s educational policy. In a letter to Sydney Waterlow, the British Minister in Athens, the Bishop deplored the fact that a happy occasion such as the coronation found the island in despair. He wrote:

‘Cyprus, hoping that Great Britain would provide the bridge to unite her with her Mother Greece, has seen with bitterness these hopes not only falsified but also a systematic attempt made by the Government of Cyprus, with the tacit consent unfortunately of the Colonial Office, to vitiate the Greek inhabitants of the island especially by means of the education laws of 1923 and 1929.’

Over and above characterising legislation to be one of the causes of the 1931 uprising, the Bishop went on to say that the more recent educational laws of 1933 and 1935 had sought to undermine the descent, language and traditions of the island. Waterlow simply acknowledged the Bishop’s congratulations and prayers for the happiness of the King and the prosperity of Great Britain ‘of which Cyprus is now a component and valued part’. The curtailment of the powers of the Church was to become one of the main goals of the British administration in the second half of the thirties. Legislation would shortly make possible the exclusion of the Church from decision-making bodies such as District Councils in order to diminish its involvement in educational issues; to sort out the archiepiscopal question; and finally to subject the finances of the Church to Government control. In this context Palmer informed Orsmby-Gore in the summer of 1937, that the Educational Laws would be amended in order to facilitate the Education Department in various matters by ‘eliminating altogether the ex-officio representation of the Archbishop on the Board of Education for Orthodox Christian Schools’.

More crucially, in 1937, the Cyprus Government took measures to combat one of the most serious deficiencies of the local education system: the training of elementary teachers. Hitherto, Greek-Orthodox teachers received their training in the Pankyprion Didaskaleion attached to the Pancyprian Gymnasium while Muslim teachers were given no training at all. The instruction in the Pancyprian Gymnasium was mainly academic and of problematic standards, and it had no link with agricultural science despite the fact that 80% of children attending school came from rural areas. Having said that, the need for a teachers’ training college was mainly political. Since the 1931 riots the Government had been deeply concerned about the training of elementary teachers who they considered to be one of the most active agitators. Although the Government might succeed in taking control over the appointment and dismissal of teachers they continued to be a source of sedition as long as they were graduating from secondary schools uncontrolled by the

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92 Bishop of Kerynia to Waterlow, 12 May 1937, TNA, CO 67/272/19.
93 Ibid.
95 Both quotes from Palmer to Orsmby-Gore, 4 August 1937, TNA, CO 67/273/1.
Government. Bearing this in mind, the Teachers’ Training College in Morphou, run by an English headmaster, was ready to admit its first students in 1937. The College accepted graduates from all denominations while English was the language of instruction. In a letter to the Secretary of State, the Colonial Secretary, William Battershill underlined the importance of having such an institution in Cyprus which he perceived as the foundation of all future developments in elementary education.96 Here, is not the place to discuss matters relating to teachers’ training, so, we should merely stress that despite the popularity it enjoyed among future teachers and the quality of training it provided, it never escaped the attack of the Greek Board of Education and the Church who detected in it a British effort to de-Hellenise education.97

‘What Are You Boys? You Are Greeks!’

By the end of the decade, although the international crisis was increasingly overshadowing local politics, political manifestations managed to find their way through, not least in the elementary schools. In February 1939 advertisement leaflets were distributed to Muslim schools for cigarettes which bore on their cover the symbol of the People’s party in Turkey plus the portrait of Turkish nationalist leader, Nejati Okan. This, much to the disappointment of the Locum Tenens, prompted the Department of Education to step in. With a circular the Department warned that it was highly undesirable that schools should become places for the advertisement of any individual, firm or commercial product, or for any political influence other than the teaching of loyal service to Cyprus and its established Government.98 As soon as the circular became known to Leontios he delivered a rather dramatic sermon:

I protest for this [circular] in the name of Hellenism and Christianity. Oh! This is terrible for them to condescend and express themselves in such a manner, to make use of their power and to wish to enslave the freedom of small nations in this way. They do not want our children to know that they are Hellenes! ... What [do] they want us to be? We are not Turks, we are not Jews, we are not Poles, also they do not admit us as Englishmen; ... Hellenism had never been anti-British, but always an ally and assistant of Great Britain in all its difficulties ... I am not against the Central Government but against the local Government who thinks that she serves the British interests in this way, why on the contrary, they themselves are doing the greatest anti-British propaganda.99

98 Palmer to MacDonald, 24 February 1939, TNA, CO 67/293/1.
99 Ibid.
Two months later Leontios made a similar speech during his visit to two elementary schools, saying:

'I am a Greek; I know it and I boast of my origin: my soul is free – I have always remained free to live free. My Greek soul remains free. So boys, if our body is enslaved our soul always remains free and you are free, boys, to say what you want. What are you boys? You are Greeks. Say it once more. Greeks!'\textsuperscript{100}

The address aroused great excitement among the boys some of whom uttered shouts of ‘Long Live Greece, Long Live Union!’\textsuperscript{101} Furthermore, Leontios’ trial on 15–17 May 1939 was itself a major political event, and suggestive of the paroxysm it provoked was the fact that when the boys at Scala elementary school were left free to draw whatever they liked during their drawing class, the whole class drew the Greek flag.\textsuperscript{102} According to the Acting Governor, during the proceedings of Limassol against the Locum Tenens, badges exhibiting flags of the Greek Army and Navy were worn by schoolboys in the streets near the court. Large crowds gathered and every appearance of the Bishop and his attendant priests was met with cheering, applause and occasional cries of Ζήτο Ενώσις (Long Live Union). On 18 May, a Greek flag made of paper was found in the doorway of the Ayios Kassianos Elementary School in Nicosia.\textsuperscript{103} During his apology in the court, Leontios, having complained of subversion on behalf of the Government against the Church, did not lose the opportunity to reiterate his profound disagreement with the Government’s educational policy which he described as a ‘propagandist formidable persecution against the Greek youth of Cyprus in the Schools’.\textsuperscript{104} Leontios remained a fierce opponent of the Government’s educational policy in the years that followed and it can be said that education was one of those subjects which subverted the relations between the Church and the Government.

\textbf{Conclusion}

From the onset of British administration in 1878 and up to the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, educational policy underwent several changes. The administration of education was in the hands of the communities and the religious authorities until 1923, however, in order to combat severe administrative inefficiencies and diminish Hellenic orientation in the schools, the Government embarked on a process of centralising the education system. This action aimed at gradually shifting the control of elementary schools from the communities to the Government, and this process culminated in 1933 with the introduction of a new law which gave the

\textsuperscript{100} Wright to MacDonald, 23 June 1939 TNA, CO 67/299/2. \\
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{102} Extract from police report, 29 May 1939 TNA, CO 67/297/8. \\
\textsuperscript{103} Wright to MacDonald, 23 June 1939 TNA, CO 67/299/2. \\
Government the power to choose both the curriculum and the school textbooks. The 1933 law was enacted against the background of unrest of the 1931 disturbances and the repressive regime that succeeded them. Elementary education was key to the implementation of this new regime whose ambition was to transform the island into a proper British colony and convert the Cypriot people into loyal subjects, for Britain’s interests prohibited anything less. The transformation process of elementary education was relatively gradual and can hardly be characterised as a ‘coup d’etat’, as labelled by Leontios. In spite of the British boost which the education system received, both the Greek language and religion continued to be regularly taught and professed. Even if there was a coup, it was an ambivalent one – and as such it was fully in line with the nature of British colonialism in the island – always surrounded by ambivalence and qualification.

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An Empirical Test of Hirschi’s Control Theory of Delinquency: Cypriot Criminal Youths in Nicosia

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Abstract
Cypriot youth crime, as most types of crime on the island, has thus far evaded thorough examination. Hirschi’s theorisation that delinquency occurs only after an individual’s connection to society attenuates is examined within a Cypriot context. The analysis of data collected from 53 Cypriot male criminal youths, points out that Hirschi’s theory does not satisfactorily explain the reasons behind their criminal acts. However, given the small size of our sample and its non-probabilistic selection, shortcomings for robustness become inherent. Nonetheless, incumbent findings open the way to further pertinent exploration.

Keywords: social control theory, juvenile delinquency, Cypriot criminal youths

Theoretical Framework
In the late 1960s, Hirschi introduced a rather converse approach to explaining criminality. Contrary to contemporary theories that often sought to explain why certain individuals resorted to crime, he attempted to explore why most people refrained from breaking the law. His reason for doing so was adopted from the Hobbesian conception that all humans are by virtue non-conformist (Wiatrowski et al., 1981). In line with this approach, his research assumes that individuals are naturally prone to criminality, and thus, social control becomes a key function in deterring them from falling into crime. Hirschi argues that youth in particular, whose bonds with conventional social institutions and individuals are fragmented and diffracted, are more likely to deviate. Social control theory prescribes that criminogenic conduct is distinctly possible in cases where attachment and commitment to, and involvement with, conventional activities (i.e. school, occupation) and individuals (i.e. teachers, parents), are anaemic or inimical. Attachment, on the other hand, embraces the quality of relationships between juveniles and conventional others – parents as well as institutions, school, and work. Commitment to conventional activities requires both quality and quantity of effort, time, emotions, and aspirations invested in them. Besides, involvement with such pursuits necessitates time, which preoccupies youth and as a consequence they refrain from criminality. These elements, together with individual beliefs regarding lawfulness and discipline in general, are considered to be crime deterrents. In fact, the locus of control is not
placed within the juvenile, but on his/her social environment. Yet, this does not imply that individual judgement/agency concerning crime is insignificant. On the contrary, social control theory is based on the assumption of rational choice, which to be exact, is a person who invests time, energy, and effort in conventional activities or plans, and abstains from committing a crime so that his stake in conformity is not jeopardised if apprehended (Hirschi, 1969). Notwithstanding the prominence of Hirschi’s social control theory, its assumption that it could determine criminal behaviour across divergent races, genders, cultures, and socioeconomic statuses, spawned a mosaic of responses.

**Prior Theory Testing**

One such response stemmed from Hindelang (1973), who claimed that social bond variables could only partially explain crime, and he doubted the theory’s credibility as it lacked impartial testing. Moreover, pertinent to the assumption that all people have an equal penchant for crime, Schinkel (2002) argued that it is erroneous to assume that all individuals are the same, and therefore they share a static view of conventionality. He affirmed that much like unconventional activities, conventional institutions and activities can also be criminative, and he used white collar crime as an example in which wrongdoing is often carried out within conventional institutions. Aside from shortfalls concerning the nature and type of the conventionality of social elements that exerted control on juveniles, Hirschi’s theory was also criticised for hosting tautological arguments. Akers, for instance (2009, p. 125), castigated social control theory for being conflicting. He notes, in detail, that even if Hirschi attributed the formation of criminal peer associations to individual pathways into crime, he did not accept that such associations could also play a role in the manifestation of criminal behaviour.

Indeed, social control theory’s variables have never ceased to be tested vigorously by numerous studies that have frequently drawn variant and conflicting conclusions. For instance, in a study undertaken by Matsueda and Heimer (1987) the attachment to social institutions – family in particular – among different cultural groups and crime was not found to be correlated, whereas in another critique involving youths of different descent in the Netherlands (Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, and Dutch) it was argued that social control theory had a cross-cultural application (Junger and Marshall, 1997). Additionally, findings from an Asian review illustrated that delinquency levels of Chinese and Vietnamese youth, as opposed to Cambodian and Laotian, were inversely related with school attachment (Le et al., 2005). Similarly, while school commitment, involvement, and attachment were found to be associated with crime (Rankin, 1980) affecting both genders (Burton et al., 1995), such traits had variant effects on males and females in another analysis (Sarri, 1983). Other studies illustrated that parental control was negatively related to delinquency (Gove and Crutchfield, 1982; Wiatrowski et al., 1981), and that social control was altogether inversely connected to drug use (Adlaf and Ivis, 1996; Hoffmann, 1995; Rosenbaum, 1987). Notably, such studies shared a remarkable limitation; they were all cross-sectional. Agnew
(1985) ventured to test the theory using longitudinal research and claimed that the variables in Hirschi’s theory could only determine future crime at a trivial and insignificant level. Nonetheless, other longitudinal studies that followed later gave credence to control theory (Dornbusch et al., 2001; Smith and Krohn, 1995). In brief, despite the shortfalls and flaws found in the application of social control theory, the theory has received wide recognition among many researchers and it is one of the leading social theories in classic criminology.

**Aims of the Study**

As mentioned above, social control theory has been tested on particular youth populations in America, Europe, and Asia (Junger and Marshall, 1997; Le et al., 2005; Matsueda and Heimer, 1987; Smith and Krohn, 1995), yet, it has never been tested on Cypriot youths. As such, our testing of the theory carries a twofold function: one, to bring to the fore knowledge in relation to criminological theory testing in the Cypriot context; and two, to establish a stepping-stone for further research on the matter. While some research has focused on juvenile delinquency on the island (Hatzivasilis, 2003; Kapardis, 2010; Papacosta, 2009; Steketee et al., 2008; Stylianou, 2007), the empirical examination of youth crime and its causes is still deficient. In view of this we attempted to test social control theory, and to facilitate this venture we studied convicted young offenders currently serving an alternative to prison sentence, namely community service. The application of restorative justice in Cyprus is embryonic and it was only put into effect in 2008. So far about 450 cases have been involved. Delinquents, once sentenced by the courts to community service are then monitored by the local Social Welfare Services. It was at this point in time (while under the aegis of the Social Welfare Services) that young offenders were contacted and asked to participate in our research. We did not seek to examine the reasons behind youths’ refrainment from crime, as Hirschi’s theory endeavoured to explain, because the subjects in our sample had all been convicted already. In the main, the basic hypothesis for our research was that participants had not established strong social bonds with any of the conventional elements stressed by Hirschi’s theory, and therefore did not refrain from engaging in criminal activities. Notably, criminal activity (CA) was measured by the frequency of committing particular crimes (see appendix 1), which in turn was contrasted to social control variables introduced by Hirschi.

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1 Hirschi tested his theory on student population and wanted to verify why juveniles did not commit crime. Naturally he had to compare criminal with non-criminal youths so as to draw certain conclusions. We studied only criminal youths to attest whether or not their criminality could be attributed to their attenuated social bonds with conventional (non-criminogenic) persons and institutions.

2 Guardianship and Alternative Treatment of Transgressors Law, L.46(1)/96.
Method

Sample

Research participants in this study were non-probabilistically selected using the method of criterion sampling (Patton, 2002). Specifically, all young offenders under the community service programme in Nicosia who had committed offences other than traffic violations, graffiti, and public nuisance acts, were asked to partake in the study. At the time, Social Welfare Services in Nicosia were contemporaneously monitoring 80 offenders. Fifty-seven youths\textsuperscript{3} between the ages of 16 and 23 eventually consented to take part in our research but four of them did not complete their questionnaires adequately. The four incomplete forms were discounted and the research ultimately comprised a total of 53 valid responses from male subjects aged 19-23 years on average.

Procedure

In total, 53 Cypriot criminal youths from Nicosia – the island's capital – completed a 39-item, self-completed questionnaire. The original questionnaire was composed of 50 items but during a pilot test with five subjects, three of them expressed agitation due to its length and found the procedure to be a rather copious task. As a result, the questions were reduced from 50 to 39 which could be answered within eight minutes. The questionnaire was administered by a trained non-governmental employee who was assigned to supervise delinquents during their community service. He briefed them on the purpose and the non-obligatory nature of the study. Likewise, he reassured them on issues of confidentiality and anonymity. Completion of the questionnaire took place between June and August 2008, and was scheduled early in the morning during weekdays, when juveniles gathered to be briefed on their daily community service tasks. The questionnaire was self-completed anonymously by subjects en masse, and when finished each form was placed in an envelope and sealed. Subsequently, the responses were translated from Greek to English, coded, and then analysed.

Measures

The questionnaire was constructed by the authors based on the model of social control theory of delinquency. A number of variables, affirmed by Hirschi to be reliable determinants of crime, were incorporated into questions that were later formulated to test the following variables.

\textsuperscript{3} Due to the small number of our target population the term 'youth' was applied in its broader context, including subjects from 16 up to 23 years of age (N=53, 16yrs=2, 17-9, 18-10, 19-14, 20-4, 21-5, 22-4, 23-5).
Dependent Variable:

Criminal activity\(^4\) (a ratio variable), was calculated by the number of offences subjects were reported to have committed up to the point when the questionnaire was administered (appendix 2). In addition, study subjects were also asked to declare on a 34-item list, what types of offences they had committed. This helped us to verify whether the subjects under review had committed felonies and/or misdemeanours, and not minor transgressions such as traffic violations, public nuisance acts, or graffiti. This variable was based on a simplified form of the Cypriot Penal Code which was tailored to suit the participants (appendix 1).

Independent Variables:

Parent attachment was measured by two variables; family relations and expression of emotions of shame. The former was measured on a nominal scale with six values, whereas the latter was evaluated on an ordinal scale comprised of four values.

Attachment to (un)conventional others was determined via the use of two items; the co-offending and duration of peer relations. Co-offending was a binary variable consisting of yes/no values. The peer relations among delinquents variable was ordinal, and involved four items.

School attachment and commitment were also measured by two items, namely the grades and educational level. Both were calculated on ordinal scales of six and four values respectively.

(Un)Conventional activities involvement was indicated through three items: alcohol consumption, drug use, and employment status. The three variables were measured on an ordinal, a binary, and a nominal scale respectively.

Beliefs were assessed by using responses towards the legal system and law enforcement. The law variable was measured on an ordinal scale with four values, whereas police were valued on a three-item nominal scale.

Notably, the variable in which respondents were asked to state the reason for resorting to criminal behaviour was employed to juxtapose findings across all variables.

Analysis

For the most part our factor variables were measured on ordinal scales apart from our dependent variable, which was measured by a ratio scale. For data analysis we used SPSS 14.0. Particularly, we utilised three statistical tests to determine possible correlations between variables, namely the

\(^4\) We acknowledge that the number of criminal acts an individual undertakes does not accurately define criminal activity/behaviour, as different types of crime underscore different gradations of criminal behaviour.
Kruskal-Wallis test for independent samples, the Jonckheere-Terpstra test, and the Mann-Whitney test. These statistical tests would be the only options available as our data was not normally distributed, hence non-parametric. Also, apart from the criminal activity (CA) variable, which was measured on a ratio scale, and the binary variables of co-offending and drug use, the remainder were all ordinal and nominal variables. Beyond exploratory analysis, bar charts were also utilised to illustrate the differences between the groups within the predictor variable while contrasted to the dependent variable. Since Hirschi argued that his elements had a unique and individual impact on crime deterrence, we applied a bi-variate analysis to attest each element's influence on criminal activities.

**Results**

Overall, Hirschi was not much concerned with direct control as parental supervision, but focused more on indirect forces like the morals that juveniles developed while being nurtured in conventional families. He specifically claimed that: 'the closer the child's relations with his parents, the more he is attached to and identifies with them, the lower his chances of delinquency' (1969, p. 94).

In relation to the two principal assumptions above, meaning the juveniles’ perceptions of their parents, and the family conditions in which they were nurtured, relevant variables were incorporated in the questionnaire. The respondents were requested to state whether they felt ashamed of their social environment after being arrested for a crime. Moreover, they were asked to reflect on their family relations. The purpose was to verify how juveniles perceived their parents with regard to control and discipline, and also to evaluate what sort of family conditions they were raised in. Although 49% stated that they did not experience feelings of anyone being ashamed of them after they were arrested, 38% admitted feeling ashamed because of the effect their arrest had on their family. Furthermore, after comparing shame emotions expressed upon arrest, together with the number of committed crimes, no significant differences were found across the groups: crime commission was not reported to vary across juveniles who had, or had not, experienced feelings of shame from particular factions/individuals: $H(3)= .514$, $p>.05$ (see figure 1). The assumption that juveniles who did not experience feelings of shame would have a positive relation with crime commission or that those who express feelings of shame for the disgrace brought on their parents or other conventional figures have a negative association with crime, could not be substantiated.

Similarly, in testing the other part of the hypothesis, i.e. that good familial relationships deterred crime, data analysis demonstrated that although there was some positive relationship between bad familial relationships and CA, it was non-significant: $H(3)= .183$, $p>.05$. The same levels of CA were found for those who reported to be on moderate and very good terms with their parents. Elevated CA was paradoxically connected to those who claimed both excellent and bad family relations, with the latter having a stronger relation (see figure 2). In both instances, social control theory was not supported, yet some tendency between CA and bad familial relationships
was reported. Notably, the two variables used in the study to measure parent-child attachment are far from offering insightful information in this respect. It may well be that family institutions in Cyprus are relatively cohesive and the value of ‘bad family relations’ could not possibly reflect family dysfunction or ineptness as documented in corresponding Western studies.

Unlike today’s educational institutions, schools in the past were seen as didactic centres whose crime deterrent capacity was much accentuated. However, schooling itself could not have brought about any effect had juveniles not been receptive towards it. This is what Hirschi (1969) called ‘attachment to school’ and he found it to be an important crime determinant in criminal youth. He believed that ‘a favourable attitude toward school protects the child from delinquency’ (p. 132). He also affirmed that academic ability, school performance, and educational success were reducing the likelihood of crime occurrence. Parallel to existing studies by Dornbusch et al. (2001) and Zhang and Messner (1996) that found school attachment and academic performance (Marguin and Loeber, 1996) to have a negative relation to crime, this current study assumed that school performance and achievement could somewhat reflect the above findings. Thus, attachment and commitment to education and crime were contrasted to CA. In accordance with social control theory, academic performance of Cypriot juveniles was found to have a significant influence on CA: $H(3) = .017, p<.05$. Mann-Whitney tests revealed that the subjects who reported mean grades

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Figure 1

![Figure 1](image)

Emotional responses after being arrested by the police

Mean Number of crimes committed so far

- Ashamed of my family
- Ashamed of my relatives
- Ashamed of my friends
- Not ashamed of anyone

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5 None of the subjects has reported to have delinquent parents, thus parental acceptance/reinforcement of crime is an unlikely event.
of B (U=5, z=-2.74, p< .0125, r=-.37) and D (U=20.5, z=-2.77, p<.0125, r=-.38), differed significantly from subjects with only primary education (see figure 3). However, the educational performance variable only distinguished those students who have, and have not, been graded by an institution, and while primary school graduates do not receive official grades, the results did not provide a clear picture. Although there was a positive relation between low grades and crime, the prospect of whether academic inability could push subjects not to pursue further education and instead become more involved with crime, remained unanswered.

Figure 2

Figure 3
Hirschi (1969) made note of a causality process that 'runs from academic incompetence to poor performance to disliking school's authority to the commission of delinquent acts' (p. 132). As recorded above, the question arose as to whether Cypriot juveniles with limited academic capabilities were more prone to criminality. By analysing the results from the educational level variable, primary school graduates still appeared to report more crimes than their counterparts who achieved higher gradations of education. Conversely, the difference between the groups was non-significant: $H(3)=0.093$, $p>.05$. Adolescents with university, high school, and primary school education, were compared in relation to crime prevalence and no statistically significant difference yielded. Yet, it must be borne in mind that the educational performance measured by the grades variable failed to determine whether low marks were a result of inaptitude or mere disinterest in education expressed by youths. Nonetheless, if we are to assume that educational achievement also reflects the capability to learn, then university students when compared to primary school graduates did not differ with respect to CA (see figure 4). Overall, educational performance was found to be a significant predictor of CA – although groups were unevenly distributed – but academic achievement did not reveal such a strong relationship, albeit with some tendency among low educational achievement and CA. Having said that, the assumption held by Hirschi that low educational performance leads to low educational achievement, which consequently meets crime, is not confirmed.

![Figure 4](image)

Juvenile co-offending is probably the least contested assumption in criminology as its prevalence has been confirmed time and again (Akers, 1973; Le et al., 2005; Matthews and Agnew, 2008; Matsueda and Heimer, 1987; Matza, 1964; McGloin and Shermer, 2009; Sutherland, 1947; Weerman and Smeenk, 2005). Sutherland (1947), Matza (1964), and Akers (1973) claimed that
juvenile co-offenders shared common criminogenic values, interests, or just wanted peer recognition, and via their interaction with delinquent peers, criminal actions resulted. Studies on gang crime (Brezina et al., 2004), crime against persons (Gottfredson and Soule, 2005), and drug use (Hoffmann, 1995) confirmed such findings. Hirschi, however, did not accept that youth crime resulted only because of the confluence of delinquent peers. Contradistinctively, he contended that criminal behaviour was an individual outcome, of which repetition and not initiation brought delinquents together. Moreover, Hirschi’s control model illustrated that the conjunction of delinquent companions and low stakes in toeing the line led to criminality. He declared that criminality does not result solely from peer association but from a coming together of delinquent friendships and low individual stakes in conformity.

Hirschi did in fact accept the relationship between delinquent peers and criminality but he attributed it not as causal but incidental, since, as he acknowledged, delinquents bonded together just because they had many commonalities. Hirschi’s argument that a ‘boy’s stake in conformity affects his choice of friends rather than the other way around’, (Hirsch, 1969, p. 159) aligns with the notion that delinquent friendships are formulated much before delinquent acts due to common characteristics, such as low stakes in traditional values. This is supported by our findings which illustrate that 61% of the co-offending subjects knew their accomplices from childhood, supporting to some extent the idea that these friendships were not formulated because of criminal involvement. Shared spaces and interests could be plausible reasons for this, and possibly low stakes in conformity as Hirschi argued. Nonetheless, the duration of friendships variable was contrasted to CA and no significant relationship was revealed: $H(3) = .142, p > .05$ (see figure 5).

**Figure 5**
Although the friendships among co-offenders that were founded in childhood and established longer than four years before the administration of the questionnaire showed a positive correlation to higher CA – as opposed to the friendships that existed up to three years – no statistically significant differences were reported. Unlike peer relations, co-offending/solo offending was reported to have a significant influence on crime (see figure 6). When comparing the variable on companion offending to CA using the Mann-Whitney test it was found to be significantly associated with CA: U=96, z=-3.20, p<.001, r=-.43. Co-offenders opposed to solo-offenders were far more likely to report higher CA. Hirschi admitted that co-offending could not be adequately explained by his theory which assumed a natural deviation to delinquency. He explicitly affirmed that: 'if such natural motivation could legitimately be assumed, delinquent friends would be unnecessary, and involvement in conventional activities would curtail the commission of delinquent acts' (ibid., p. 230). Likewise, this study’s findings demonstrate a positive relation between co-offending and the frequency of offending, yet the exact reasons behind this correlation are far from clear. That is, to what extent, if at all, do Cypriot criminal youths influence each other’s criminal behaviour? Would they still have become involved with crime had they not been affected by peer pressure? In fact, when our subjects were asked to explain why they had committed a crime they did not score high on the ‘peer pressures’ value (see figure 12).

Nevertheless, one of Hirschi’s main arguments was that adolescents upon completing their education normally enter an occupational career, and henceforth continue to be attached to a conventional activity as before. In other words, the succession of schooling by employment is deemed to be a necessary sequence for adolescents’ non-involvement in crime. According to
Hirschi, negative endeavours such as dropping out of school, leads to a detachment from educational aspirations, and also to an adaptation to adult conduct – drinking, smoking, dating, and driving – of which, without the familial and occupational responsibilities of adulthood, dispose youths to delinquency (ibid., pp. 163–164).

In effect, youths who have plenty of free time and are freed from the aforementioned responsibilities tend to engage in illegalities. In view of this, our subjects were tested on three variables, namely alcohol consumption, drug use, and employment status, all of which were subsequently found to be significantly correlated to CA. With respect to alcohol, parallel to prior studies (Ensor and Godfrey, 1993; Ireland and Thommeny, 1993; McClelland and Teplin, 2001; Zhang et al, 1997), a positive relationship with crime was found. In particular, those who reported excessive consumption of alcohol to the degree of drunkenness every week far exceeded the rest of the groups in CA, followed by those who adhered to the same behaviour less frequently, meaning every month: $H(4)= .038, p<.05$. Excluding everyday drunkenness, the more frequently adolescents reported to being intoxicated the more median crime numbers ascended: $J= 53, z= -2.15, r= -.29$ (see figure 7). The low criminality rates attributed to daily drunkenness could be explained because of alcoholism too. In this case alcoholism could somewhat render adolescents incapable of actively seeking to commit crimes.

As shown by figure 8 and also analysed by Mann-Whitney tests, those individuals who have admitted using drugs committed more crimes than those who used no drugs to a statistically significant degree: $U=75, z= -2.93, p<.05, r= -.40$; a finding that is also supported by the reasons for crime commission variables, discussed at the end of this section. Variables from social control
theory such as the family attachment and involvement in conventional activities have explained drug use effectively (Adlaf and Ivis, 1996; Hoffmann, 1995; Rosenbaum, 1987); partially (Butters, 2002; Crawford and Novak, 2007); or even not at all (Ginsberg and Greenly, 1978). This study’s findings partially emulate Hoffmann’s results (1995); which is that association with drug-users increases drug use, which in turn perpetrates crime (Huizinga et al, 1995; Menard et al, 2001). This assumption is drawn from the data on co-offending, drug use, and the reasons for crime commission (see figure 12) variables, which were found to be positively related to CA.

As regards the employment factor, participants claiming not to be employed but receiving welfare benefits far outnumbered their counterparts on crime commission: $H(4)= .040, p<.05$. Although Hirschi mentions free time as a result of unemployment, the homonymous value was not found to be significant to CA but, one could easily argue that youths on welfare benefits have no less free time than those who are unemployed, therefore having free time on ones hands could possibly influence CA (see figure 9).

Social control theory recognised that ‘the less a person believes he should obey the rules, the more likely he is to violate them’ (Hirschi, 1969, p. 26). ‘Respect for law’ is closely related to criminality, irrespective of beliefs toward law enforcers. This is so because delinquents do not always act according to a fixed system of beliefs which is consistent with criminal behaviour, an assumption which has been adamantly opposed by theorists who claim that crime surfaces from the justification of criminal values (Akers, 1973; Matza, 1964; Sutherland, 1947). In other words, criminals may recognise the function of law and acknowledge its importance, yet, still violate legal codes (Hirschi, 1969, p. 204). Beliefs are important insolar as commitment, attachment, and
investment to conventional activities are not present. In the absence of the latter three elements the individual will most likely deviate, but if those elements are in place then deviant beliefs are not catalytic in determining deviancy (ibid.). When subjects were asked to give their opinion on law enforcers in comparison to reported CA, no notable variances were revealed: $H(2) = .268, p>.05$, although adolescents who reported that police have a protective role to fulfil scored lower on CA. On the other hand, respondents who claimed that police are composed of ordinary people – normalising police activity – compared to those who characterised police to be austere and unjust – opposing police activity – reported higher CA, yet with no remarkable variance (see figure 10).

Figure 9

![Graph showing mean number of crimes committed so far by employment status: Student, Employed, Unemployed, On welfare benefits, Soldier.](image)

Figure 10

![Graph showing mean number of crimes committed so far by police role: Protect the citizens, are comprised of people like us, act with austerity and injustice.](image)
Apart from law enforcement responses, juveniles were asked to reflect on the local legal system too. Surprisingly, no significant difference with respect to the number of crimes committed was found between those who stated that the law must, and must not, be followed (see figure 11). These findings, puzzling as they seem to be, were congruent with Hirschi's original statement that juvenile delinquents recognise the importance of a justice system, regardless of whether they do or do not follow its stipulations. Overall, the adolescents’ view of the Cypriot legal system did not significantly influence their CA: $H(3)=.219, p>.05$.

**Figure 11**

Last of all, an attempt was made to detect the real reasons behind crime commission, although a single variable to explain such motives has not proved to be enlightening. Nonetheless, drug and alcohol consumption were found to significantly increase CA; a correlation that was also demonstrated earlier on drug and alcohol use variables: $H(7)=.028, p<.05$ (see figure 12). This finding dovetails with the studies already mentioned during the discussion on drug and alcohol factors, but, whether the sole (ab)use of alcohol and drugs induces crime or not, remains unclear. All the same it is highly probable that alcohol and drugs, of which abuse is particularly high among adolescent populations, have a mutual causality effect; that is, crime and drugs are reciprocally connected (Menard *et al.*, 2001).
Discussion

Admittedly, there are several limitations in this research that need to be discussed. The type of this research, the sample selection, and the data collection altogether, impede the generalisation of the incumbent findings. First, the cross-sectional data alone collected in this study do not effectively explain CA through the variables suggested by social control theory. A research with compared samples involving criminals and non-criminals might have been more insightful. In addition, a longitudinal approach or a combination of qualitative and quantitative research with a wider sample would have provided us with more precise information concerning cross gender, and other types of offenders too; for example the incarcerated or short-term criminals who have been ‘lucky’ enough not to see the light of justice yet. Second, the low number of participants and the single-sex sample, which was purposively selected, could not effectively represent the criminal population of the corresponding age group nationwide. Regardless, this was the only viable option in reaching criminal youth given the limited resources and access restrictions. Third, as regards our method of data collection, self-reporting studies are faced with certain shortfalls since participants might
misreport their involvement into criminal activities in their unwillingness to register socially disapproved actions (Stolzenberg and D'Alessio, 2008); yet, the criminal identity of our subjects was conspicuous, therefore, the likelihood of underreporting their criminal backgrounds could not be marked as a major data nuance. Fourth, issues of content validity and test reliability are also raised since both the once-tested sample and the rudimentary construction of variables included in the questionnaire, are issues of concern. It is very likely that the variables used for measuring social bond suffer from flaws for two reasons; first, most of them have not been tested in other research, and second, some variables were vaguely defined or inaccurately constructed to control confounding factors. For instance, criminal activity is measured by the number of crimes the subject reports to have committed up to the date he completes the questionnaire. Although the intention is to collect the most accurate responses, it is expected that some participants, especially those who have committed numerous crimes over a long period of time, would not be able to recall with accuracy the exact number of such crimes. Moreover, as we used two to three variables for measuring each social bond element, this is far from comprehensively encapsulating the real attitudes concerning each of these elements. However, when we originally administered the 50-item questionnaire as a pilot test, our subjects objected to cooperate because the task was too lengthy. As a consequence, certain variables were omitted in our attempt to truncate the questionnaire, and this may have altered the direction of our findings significantly. Although the wide age range must, to some degree at least, have impeded our findings, not comprising our sample with subjects up to the age of 23 years would have led to a much smaller sample. Notwithstanding, variables of social control theory, such as occupation, commitment, and family attachment, have been reported to be linked to adult criminal behaviour too (Sampson and Laub, 1990).

In line with other studies that only partially confirmed social control theory's predictions (Burton et al., 1995; Hindelang, 1973; Matsueda and Heimer, 1987), the present research has given limited credence to Hirschi's crime determinant variables too. Significant correlations with respect to CA were found within the involvement and commitment to conventional activities spectrum. Respondents reporting drug and alcohol (ab)use, as well as being on welfare benefits scored high on CA. In Hirschi's terms these individuals were not committed or involved in conventional activities, but quite the opposite – unconventional ones – and therefore resorted to criminal behaviour. Those subjects who stated that they were receiving welfare benefits too – detached as they were from conventional institutions and whilst enjoying an abundance of leisure time – reported to have committed more crimes. As regards adolescents' beliefs toward justice and law enforcers, and their link to CA, Hirschi was somewhat justified in characterising the two as not being mutually exclusive. Negative beliefs toward the local legal system were not found to influence crime commission. This finding in a way contradicts the contention that juvenile delinquents bond together because of shared criminogenic values (Matza, 1964; Sutherland, 1947) and supports Hirschi's claim that shared interests among juvenile delinquents are not necessarily
Having said that, it should be noted that co-offending was not thoroughly problematised by Hirschi, therefore the statistically significant connection between co-offending and CA as illustrated in the paper cannot be vectored towards doubting social control theory’s application in this respect.

For the most part, the findings of the study fail to support social control theory. The hypothesis that adolescents scoring high on criminal activity would report bad familial relationships, low respect towards conventional (law-abiding) persons, and low academic achievement was not confirmed. In a way, the strong relation between academic performance, alcohol, drug, and welfare subsidence and criminal activity cannot be explained by social control theory with much confidence as the preconditions to criminal behaviour mentioned above were not met. In acknowledging that the study was constricted in many ways, it is only fair to conclude that this research has been but a diminutive attempt to undertake criminological theory testing, and as such it could effectively serve as a stimulus to future research on the matter at hand. Relatedly, the prospect of further studying the positive connection of crime to co-offending and substance (ab)use among Cypriot adolescents, as indicated in the study, should not be left unattended.

References


AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF HIRSCHI’S CONTROL THEORY OF DELINQUENCY

Available from [http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/2679/1/Papacosta-Female_delinquency_Cyprus. D_prof. pdf], accessed on 26 May 2010.


Appendix I

1. Threat to attack a person
2. Attempt to hit a person
3. Attack on a person
4. Attack and injury of a person
5. Attempted rape
6. Rape
7. Theft
8. Trespassing
9. Burglary
10. Attempt to use force against a person with the intention to commit a crime
11. Use of force against a person or property and crime commission
12. Resist arrest / Disobedience of police orders
13. Handling stolen goods
14. Graffiti
15. Illegal possession of a knife(s)
16. Produced or used counterfeit currency
17. Illegal possession of explosives
18. Identity theft
19. Sexual assault
20. Deception
21. Forgery
22. General harassment
23. Recklessness
24. Vandalism
25. Illegal possession of weapon
26. Indecent exposure
27. Corruption of a minor
28. Traffic violations
29. Illegal drug use
30. Illegal drug possession
31. Distribution and sale of illegal drugs
32. Public nuisance
33. Issuance of unsubstantiated cheques
34. Other(s)
Appendix 2

Number/Type of committed crimes:

- Issuance of unsubstantiated cheques
- Public nuisance
- Distribution and sale of illegal drugs
- Illegal drug possession
- Illegal drug use
- Traffic violations
- Corruption of a minor
- Indecent exposure
- Legal possession of weapon
- Vandalism
- Recklessness
- General harassment
- Deception
- Identity theft
- Legal possession of explosives
- Produced or used counterfeit currency
- Legal possession of knife
- Graffiti
- Handling stolen goods
- Resist arrest/disobedience of police orders
- Use of force against a person or property and crime commission
- Attempt to use force against a person with the intention to commit a crime
- Burglary
- Trespassing
- Theft
- Rape
- Attack and injury of a person
- Attack on a person
- Attempt to hit a person
- Threat to attack a person
Decolonising the Cypriot Woman: 
Moving Beyond the Rhetoric of the Cyprus Problem

SOPHIA PAPASTAVROU

Abstract
The long-term consequence of the Cyprus conflict referred to by the international community as the 'Cyprus problem' rests on the bodies of Cypriot women. Cypriot women's diverse experiences and roles in resistance of war and mobilisation of peace impacts post-conflict conditions. The issues relevant to Cypriot women in post-conflict who have experienced trauma and violence due to war, requires a practice and theory that goes beyond Western universal applicability. This study challenges capitalist heteronormative patriarchy and European models of civil society building that have kept Cypriot women on the margins. An investigation of Cypriot women's voices cross war zones in the documentary film entitled Women of Cyprus (Kattrivanou and Azzouz, 2009) bring to light the impact of ethno-nationalism and ethnic divisions and the complexities of women's positionality in conflict. A transnational feminist perspective is used to advance theories of gender and serves as a critique for reconciliation in Cyprus.

Keywords: Decolonization, Cypriot women, conflict, transnational feminism, feminist epistemology, oral history, identity, nationalism, militarism, heteronormative patriarchy

ικοίμαν ποτὶ Κύπρον,
νόσσον τὰς Ἀφροδίτας,
Ἰν’ ὀι θελξῆξαν νέμον-
tαι θανατοίσιν 'Ερωτες,
Πάφον δ᾽ ἄν ἐκατόστομοι
βαρβάρου ποταμοῦ ῥοεῖ
καρπίζουσιν ἀνυμήροι. - Ευριπίδης, Βάκχες (400 BCE)

would I might go to Cyprus,
island of Aphrodite,
where the Erotes,
bewitching goddesses of love,
soothe the hearts of humankind,
or to Paphos, rich and fertile,
not with rain, but with the water of a hundred
flowing mouths of a strange and foreign river – Euripides, Bacchae (400 BCE)
Introduction

The long-term consequence of the Cyprus conflict referred to by the international community as the ‘Cyprus problem’ rests on the bodies of Cypriot women. The Cyprus problem is based on the assumption that a Eurocentric heteronormative heterosexual “order” is an underpinning for creating the nation (Riley et al., 2008, p. 3). In the case of women in Cyprus, the multi-level perspectives of power relations that include race, gender, ethnicity or religion, for example, are engaged within a critical analysis of the issues surrounding women and war. Cypriot women have been left out of the historical narrative based on the patriarchal assumptions of war (Turpin, 1998). This paper will explore Cypriot women’s voices across war zones in the documentary film entitled Women of Cyprus (Katrivanou and Azzouz, 2009). Transnational feminist theory is used to address the multi-level perspectives of power relations and as a lens to observe the different threads that bind women together – the sense of home, the love of place, the need for personal safety, the emotional and political price of war, and the personal tolls exacted by occupation, partition and atrocities. Although the authority or right to re-tell these women’s experiences does not seem proper, oral history is critically engaged through this paper as a way of decolonising the Cypriot woman in order to make room for her to speak and to make her visible in both Western and transnational feminist writings in decolonial processes. The process of decolonisation can be defined as an attempt of the previously colonised to reflectively work out a historical relation with the former coloniser, culturally, politically, and economically (Chen, 2010). Fanon (1999) suggests that the colonial world is a world cut into two; on the one hand it consists of the Western/European and on the other the native quarters. He further illustrates that the ‘colonial world, its ordering and its geographical lay-out will allow us to mark out the lines on which a decolonized society will be reorganized’ (Fanon, 1999, p. 26). For Fanon, the process of decolonisation as a response to colonialism is part of the struggle that the colonised face to become free. He advocates that ‘Decolonization unifies that people by the radical decision to remove from [it] heterogeneity, and by unifying it on a national, sometimes a racial basis’ (ibid., p. 30). Three major themes are apparent in the decolonisation process that we can observe in the geocolonial historical Cypriot narrative (Chen, 2010). These include: nationalism, brought forward during anti-colonialist movements; nativism or revitalisation of culture within the categories created by the colonisers; and civilisationism or the struggle for political/cultural justice (ibid.). Decolonisation brings with it the rise of nationalism, which can rally anti-colonial movements and solidify cultural identity and in doing so it excludes other groups. In the case of Cyprus, a Greek national identity missed out those who identified themselves as Turkish or as other minorities.

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1 The category Cypriot woman includes women from Greek, Turkish, Armenian, Maronite, and Latin communities living on the island of Cyprus (Hadjipavlou, 2010) as well as Roma and migrant workers. This by no means suggests that each ethnicity is homogenous: the multiple subjects at play are recognised here.
living within the two major ethnic groups. The making and re-making of Cypriot culture and national identity occurred during foreign rule and throughout most of the island’s history. This concept is an important one in addressing the complexities of nationalism. Here, the use of nationalism is informed by Jusdanis’ (2001) research on nationalism to define it as a process. Jusdanis is useful here in understanding nationalism as a form of expression. In this work he writes, ‘Nationalism works through people’s hearts, nerves, and gut. It is an expression of culture through the body’ (p. 31). It is necessary to address the island’s long road from imperialism to colonialism and the conditions at play that have kept women on the margins.

During the course of the island’s history the female body became the site of discovery, rape, and conquest (Loomba, 2005). The Cypriot woman’s body is a physical and symbolic space, where the creation of the nation is justified and defended. In her work on women and war, Giles (2003) argues:

‘The public/private distinctions between battlefield and home, soldier and civilian, state security and human security have broken down. Feminist analyses of conflict elucidate the intimate connections between war, political economy, nationalism, and human displacement and their various impacts across scale. The body, household, nation state, and economy all represent the site at which violence can be invoked against people in highly gendered ways’ (p. 3).

The role of Cypriot women as reproducers of the nation in the form of mothers and wives is central in the maintenance of the colonial project. Women became signifiers for ethnic, national, or religious difference and symbols of nation-hood. Social structures, like the state, family, law and education regulate women through social markers that are gender specific. Cypriot women face multiple layers of oppressions by a superior (men) and foreign, or white and Western (Vassiliadou, 2002). Hadjipavlou (2010) observes that ‘No woman, from any of the communities in Cyprus, has ever been appointed to the high-level negotiating team that discusses the future of the island’ (p. 10). Colonial practices and the rhetoric of war construct Cypriot women’s inadequacy and inferiority that precluded women’s invisibility at the negotiating table.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 states that women can and should be involved in peacemaking (2000). In response to the latter, Meintjes et al., (2001) address a key issue

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2 The term ‘women’ is used to refer to those who are female-identified, but it is recognised that they are not a homogenous group.

3 It is also argued that the maintenance of Cypriot women’s roles was central to anti-colonial movements and nationalist struggle starting from the Ottoman Empire to British rule in 1878–1974. In present day Cyprus, women are the symbols of home and nation-hood, and continue to be producers to maintain the population of the two main ethnic groups (Greek and Turkish).

4 The negotiating table is known as the official peace negotiations and policy created by the United Nations, Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus.
that is missing from the way women are understood (in both war and peace). It is important to recognize that women are involved in a variety of ways in ‘peacemaking’, whether it is on the front line as soldiers or as part of anti-nationalist movements or bicomunal organisations. The international community cannot assume women the role of ‘peacemaker’ as this in itself is problematic and keeps women ‘in the single dimension of her sex’ (ibid.). Indeed, Cypriot women have yet to be employed as part of elevated team discussions regarding the future of the island. As a consequence, the pomposity of war diction creates a subservience which has excluded women from any negotiating table in the post-conflict period.

The issues relevant to Cypriot women in post-conflict who have experienced trauma and violence due to war, requires a practice and theory that goes beyond Western universal applicability. Hadjipavlou (2010) notes that women from a divided island, ‘need their own space in which to listen to each other and to affirm that knowledge is also produced through reflecting on our own experiences’ (p. 8). Such an approach requires an examination of historical records and case studies of women’s groups from Cyprus that have brought alternative approaches to the traditional Western concepts of women, violence, and war. Meintjes et al., (2001) assert that women’s diverse experiences of war, such as displacement, loss of home and family, as well as gender-based violence does not end once the conflict has ended. In fact, women become more vulnerable in post-conflict conditions. In the case of Cyprus, patriarchal gender relations remain deeply embedded in the fabric of the society. In that moment from conflict to peacetime ‘the rhetoric of equality and equal rights tends to mask the reconstruction of patriarchal power despite recent emphasis on women’s human rights’ (ibid., p. 4).

The film Women of Cyprus provides a case from where women activists across the island stand by addressing the complexities of women’s experiences in war and in post-war conditions. In featuring a sample of Cypriot ‘her-stories’ the film aims at developing an understanding of collective differences in terms of agency and responsibility so that it is possible to build solidarities across borders and boundaries of nationalism and the nation state. This film follows a Greek Cypriot professor Maria and Zehra a Turkish Cypriot teacher as they cross the green line in the spring of 2004. These women have not seen their homes that they lost since the war of 1974 that resulted in the division of the island.

The film provides a historical account by considering the political, social, and historical circumstances that made the partition of the island possible. In historical scholarly texts on Cyprus, inter-ethnic conflict, the activities of Greek nationalist extremists and intolerance of the ‘other’ are blamed for the ethnic divide that led up to the Turkish invasion of 1974 and are referred to as the Cyprus problem (Hadjipavlou 2010; Cockburn, 2004; Morgan, 2011; Vassiliadou 2002). It is argued in the film that these events can neither be observed in isolation nor can they be brushed off as ‘Turks and Greeks’ unable to get along. The films historical analysis is essential to explore the various structures at play that have kept Cyprus in a state of tension. Women in the film share oral histories that are accompanied with narratives of Turkish and Greek as well as Latin, Maronite,
and Armenian women living on both sides of the island. These women came from various socio-economic backgrounds and were from the ages of 25–63. The film weaves each woman's personal journey of pain and their search for reconciliation and peacemaking. The group discussions provided a safe place where women from the various ethnic backgrounds can share their buried stories of war and their experiences of working together to bridge the divide between their communities. This film was created over a four-year period following the women; some were members of an NGO women's group called Hands across the Divide working towards a bicomunal co-existence. The women in the film are struggling with the past, and with their own feelings of anger and loss. Regardless, as they struggle they are deeply invested in reconciliation and inclusive peacemaking. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000 stated that women can and should be involved in peacemaking; however women in Cyprus have not been allowed at the negotiating table. Practices of reconciliation and peacemaking are being done on the ground as these women address fears, distrust and hopes through weekly meetings and when they visit their homes lost in the war.

The film's historical account attempts to capture the complex history of the island. An understanding of colonialism, anti-colonial nationalism, and the cultural politics of nation building is necessary as part of the historical narrative. According to Loomba (2005) colonialism is defined as the conquest and control of other people's land and resources. Anti-colonial nationalism, 'is a struggle to represent, create, recover a culture and a selfhood that has been repressed and eroded during colonial rule' (ibid., p. 182). Nationalism can both enable and constrain as Jusdanis (2001) writes, 'it has inspired people over the past two centuries to fight against the illegitimacy of foreign occupation' (p. 4). Simultaneously nationalism has been responsible for ethnic cleansing and the fight for a dominant cultural identity.5 With the surge of Eurocentrism, 'capitalism, colonialism, and new means of communication and transportation brought people closer together and mixed populations, endangering thereby their cultural existence' (Jusdanis, 2001, p. 5). Nationalism arose through the need to become modern and the newly independent nation-states were in search of a national culture. Though modernity was a Western concept, the formally colonised wanted to preserve their traditional identities within a new national culture (Jusdanis, 2001). To recount some points made earlier, national identity can empower some groups but marginalise others. In the case of Cyprus, a Greek national identity disregarded those who identified themselves as Turkish or as other minorities living within the two major ethnic groups. Nationalism can rally anti-colonial movements and solidify cultural identity and in doing so excludes other groups. The making and re-making of Cyprus culture and national identity occurred during foreign rule and throughout most of the island's history.

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5 Brubaker's in Cooper's text, *Colonialism in Question: Theory Knowledge History* is used to define the use of identity in this text as being 'Understood as a specifically collective phenomenon, identity denotes a fundamental and consequential sameness among members of a group or category' (Brubaker, 2005, p. 65).
In 1400 BC the Mycenaean rule over the island had the most profound influence largely because Hellenism was introduced. The migration of Mycenaean populations established a Greek culture, language, art, and religion from mainland Greece. By the fifth century, when the Byzantine Empire took hold of the island, a Hellenic way of life had been sealed. It was during this period that the Cypriot church (following the Orthodox Christian religion) was granted autonomy and its archbishop given special rights and privileges, which united Cyprus and Greece in a cultural union. The age of Hellenism did not diminish while the Europeans (Franks and Venetians) occupied the island and patriarchal structures remained secure. However, European nobles reduced the native population to serfs or slaves and imposed Roman Catholicism until the sudden invasion and colonisation of the Ottomans. Cyprus fell to the invading forces of Lala Mustafa Pasha and the island came under Ottoman rule in 1571. Cockburn expresses that the Ottoman heritage that some Turkish Cypriots might wish to give more legitimacy as an element within “Cypriot” identity was an extreme case of a militarized imperialist, and polygamous, male power system.

In 1878 the Ottomans leased Cyprus to Britain in an exchange for protection against Russia. The new colonial power implemented new laws, institutions, and practices in order to secularise and ‘civilise’ the island and its people. The British found the geography, archaeological, and linguistic connections to Hellenism familiar (an extension of home), while eroticising and orientalising the unknown on the other. The most significant characteristic of British rule on the island was the complete eradication of the Orthodox Church from politics. Under British rule, Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived together for a number of years, and several villages were co-habituated. But the British policy of divide and rule provoked mistrust between the Greek and Turkish communities while at the same time isolating minority groups. Despite the fact that Greek Cypriots were excluded, Turkish Cypriots were employed by British administrators. And, during colonial life, women’s experiences were limited to the home and to tending the fields. Although elites of Turkish, Greek, Latin, Maronite, and Armenian decent were educated, the majority of the colonised population lived in poverty. Hadjipavlou points out that some Turkish Cypriot women were actually sold to Arabs from mainland Turkey, and both Turkish and Greek Cypriot women were left out of discussions on politics and economics; such dialogue would occur in the coffee shop culture, exclusive to men only.

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6 Hellenic identity was imagined as a national identity for Greeks who, in order to revolt against the Ottoman Empire, created collective symbols to unify Greek peoples through culture, language, history, and geography.

7 In the eyes of the British administration the colonised were neither Greek nor Turkish as one colonist, W. Hepworth Dixon asserts, ‘an indolent, careless mimetic people, but without a spark of Turkish fire, without a touch of Greek taste. With neither beauty of body nor sense of beauty in mind – with neither personal restlessness nor pride of origin’.
The 1950s struggle for independence from Britain stoked further ethnic unrest which Katrivanou and Azzouz (2009) assert was responsible for the rise of anti-colonialist nationalism\^8 struggle and interethnic conflict. The ‘enosis’ movement to unite Cyprus with Greece, the dream from the Byzantine period, re-surfaced in the 1950s and it became a political campaign under the EOKA organisation. Headed by the Greek Orthodox Church, Greek Cypriot youth, men, and a few women, rising to a political arm of the anti-colonial struggle, rallied together against British rule. In response the Turkish minority created the Turkish resistance organisation (TMT) which promoted ‘taksim’, union of the island with Turkey. In the organisations of both TMT and EOKA, women were banned from taking on leadership positions. Female EOKA and TMT supporters participated in street demonstrations, hiding fighters in their homes from the British soldiers, sewing their uniforms, distributing nationalist pamphlets, and boycotting British made products (Hadjipavlou, 2010), but minorities and other ethnic groups on the island were excluded from these movements. As the British colonies around the world successfully fought for independence in the 1950s and 1960s, Britain, Greece, and Turkey guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of the island in 1960 (Katrivanou and Azzouz, 2009) – both Greek and Turkish Cypriots were named as the two official ethnic groups. After independence in 1963, inter-ethnic conflict broke out inflamed by mistrust, fear and political as well as ethnic differences. Chen (2010) affirms that ‘After the colonial era, the strong connection between the inside and outside makes the distinction difficult to sustain. The national bourgeois continues to govern by exercising colonial tactics, dividing and ruling for example, by exploiting ethnic differences’ (p. 84). The removal of British street names, bringing down colonial buildings, and installing a Cypriot president (Morgan, 2011) did little to decolonise the country’s people but rather intensified ‘anxiety of cultural loss’ (Loomba, 2005) and the need to preserve ethnic heritage. Shortly after independence, inter-ethnic conflict fuelled by mistrust erupted leading to the retreat of Turkish-Cypriots into restricted enclaves (Katrivanou and Azzouz, 2009). The intervention of Greece and Turkey led to the 1974 war and the de facto partition of the island into a northern Turkish Cypriot side and a southern Greek Cypriot side. Greek Cypriots numbering 200,000 along with 43,000 Turkish Cypriots found themselves on the wrong side of the island and became refugees in their own country (ibid.). Turkish Cypriots fled north while Greek Cypriots went south of the island. In 1983 Turkey declared the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ as an independent state and new generations of Cypriots were subsequently brought up on each side of a divided island.

Negotiations and talks between the two sides would continue to keep the island divided until April 2003. With pressure from the European Union and United Nations\^9, the Greek and

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8 Post-colonial subjects now sought to be set free but in the case of Greece the desire to modernise the society went hand in hand with the creation of a distinct nationalised culture that would distinguish them from their colonial rulers (Jusdanis, 2001).

9 Turkey’s desire to enter the EU, together with the southern part of the island’s application already accepted pending the partition line, was the deciding factor in the opening of the ‘Green Line’.
Turkish governments agreed to open the partition line that had kept people apart for over thirty years. The following year, the UN secretary, Kofi Annan, with committees and leaders from both sides of the island proposed a plan, known as the Annan Plan, to reunify the island within a federal framework (ibid.). Ultimately, the plan would be rejected in a referendum where the Greek Cypriot majority would out vote the Turkish minority who were hoping that the island would be united.10 Northern Cyprus was now occupied with Turkish settlers as well as Turkish Cypriots, living as a colony under the auspices of mainland Turkey. Conversely, those that identified as Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island were unable to vote in the referendum. Cypriots, primarily peace activists would meet with Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots living on the other side of the divide.

The history of the island needs a transnational feminist lens to take into account the lost, forgotten, marginal and unspoken voices. It is these voices that end up representing the nation, but it is the nation that ends up marginalising such voices. The struggle against colonial rule and for independence in Cyprus, was created by men, ordered by men, and carried out by men. It was a patriarchal struggle on [a] patriarchal island which most women followed and became involved ... in fact they were used by men to promote their interests (Vassiliadou, 2002, p. 459). It should be added that this is not the first instance in Cyprus’ history when women’s voices have been shut out. Women have been left out of most of the island’s historical narrative; but then again, human rights have not always included women (Papastavrou, 2010).

Theoretical Framework

This section will provide the foundation of situating Western European feminist works and transnational feminist theory in the field of colonial/postcolonial and subaltern studies. The feminist movements that came out of Western Europe, Canada, and the USA had a privileged white voice in establishing women’s agenda. The movement was designed, ‘to represent the needs of all women’ (Lee and Shaw, 2010, p. 8). Further, the priorities of white middle class feminists from the Global North would dominate the feminist struggles in the 1970s and 1980s (Lee and Shaw, 2010). Global North countries that were currently neither colonised nor at war had set the stage for social change within a mainstream feminist movement. In the case of Cyprus, ‘the women of Cyprus did not participate in the global women’s movement of the 1960s onwards but instead experienced ethnic nationalism, militarism, and sexism both prior and after independence [...] Cypriot women had to deal with the consequences of armed struggle’ (Hadjipavlou, 2010, p. 247). In addressing the hegemonic male-centred conception and practice of politics that has marginalised groups in Cyprus, Hadjipavlou (2010) observes that the national struggle sharpened

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10 The island is made up of 80% (ethnically identified) Greek, 18% Turkish, and 2% Armenian, Maronite, Latin, and Roma.
gender and cultural roles thus preventing Cypriot women from launching a feminist movement
due to the war. For Cypriot women the armed struggle during the conflict allowed their
participation in different ways (Giles, 2003), and although viewed by women from the Global
North as constrained, the Cypriot women’s participation and experiences were far more complex.
For example, women living in refugee camps post-1974 took care of the children and elderly as well
as working in solidarity with other women in keeping the family together. The role of men during
displacement moved from that of soldier on the front line to migrants seeking employment in
Arab countries to support their families (Hadjipavlou and Mertan, 2010). The challenges within
Western feminist methodology have been in recognising privilege, agency, and positionality while
Western feminist narratives continue to speak for those who cannot. In order to develop political
solidarity between feminists, transnational feminists emphasise that women cannot bond on
terms set by the dominant ideology of Western culture.

Transnational feminist theory offers a framework in understanding conflict areas that have
been framed by histories of colonialism and imperialism and have maintained economic, cultural
and military practices. Transnational feminism considers the complex intersections of race, sex,
ethnicity, class, and sexuality in the lives of women of colour, ‘third-world’ women, and women in
conflict/post conflict areas. Mohanty’s (1997) influential essay, Under Western Eyes is used to
address the notions of ethnocentrism within Western feminist epistemology by drawing attention
to inclusive visions of feminism that suggest a way of understanding race, class, gender, nation
sexuality, and colonialism in terms of social, spatial, and symbolic distance (ibid.). Cypriot women
become bodies that need to be saved by White women, although ‘saving’ happens differently on
each side of the divided island.

In Can the Subaltern Speak? Spivak (1994) writes that the abolition of the Hindu practice
of immolation by widows (sati) in India by the British was a case of ‘white men saving brown
women from brown men’. Using Spivak’s theoretical framework, in the case of Cyprus, Greek
Cypriot women as subaltern subjects are being saved by Greek Cypriot men from both Turkish
Cypriot and white (British) men. Additionally, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot men are saving
Turkish Cypriot women from Greek Cypriot men and white (British) men. Spivak (1988)
suggests that, ‘the subaltern subject’s identity is difference, and that there is no unrepresentable
subaltern subject that can know itself; the intellectual’s solution is not to abstain from
representation’ (p. 80). She seeks to go beyond the coloniser and colonised binary by using the
subject third-world woman11 to illustrate additional social hierarchies of power. The third-world
woman is colonised by both (see Loomba, 2005) and as such experiences multiple oppressions.
Who is the ‘third-world’ woman? According to Mohanty (2003), she is limited by her gender
(feminine and sexually constrained) and her being of the third-world (ignorant, poor, uneducated,

11 The term ‘third world’ is derived from a Western capitalist notion of the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, essentially ‘the
West and the rest’.
tradition-bound, domestic, family oriented and victimised) oppression that deems her unable to speak for herself. This lies in contrast to the Western woman who is educated, modern, free to make her own decisions, and has control over her body and sexuality (ibid., p. 40). By examining the term ‘third-world woman’, there is a continuous layering of political and social categories that are deeply embedded in colonial legacy. In situating Cypriot women within the context of Western feminist literature, Vassiliadou (2002) asserts that ‘women remain marginalized in nationalist discourses because they themselves are constituted by the binaries of modernity’ (p. 473). The challenges within a Western paradigm for example are the understanding of collective differences through their writings; recognising privilege, agency, and positionality. Spivak (1994) suggests that we must be cautious here to acknowledge patriarchy and Western intellectual thought as playing a role in silencing the subaltern voice. Who speaks for whom, and under what conditions?

The gendered nature of war in transnational feminist literature, examines the way in which women confront war, the impact that war has on women due to their gender and the diverse ways that women respond. Who is the Cypriot woman? The Cypriot woman neither fits into Western European feminist concepts of gender due to her multiple experiences of colonial and anti-colonial struggle, living under conflict and post-conflict conditions, and Mediterranean historical experiences of sexualities and moralities (Vassiliadou, 2002, p. 474) nor does she fit into the third-world narrative reflected in transnational feminist works. Vassiliadou (2002) states that in the third-world narrative, ‘issues of female circumcision, the veil, famine, religious “fundamentalism”, succession in terms of (male) royalty’ (p. 474) do not apply to women of Cyprus. The Cypriot woman lies on the cusp of Orientalism; she is the subject in which Europeans experience two worlds at the same time.

Anti-colonial movements organised by the island’s elites, most of whom were educated in the West, drew on the colonisers established rules to challenge control but through the lens of a nationalised (indigenous) culture. For the Cypriot woman living in the in-between, she has had her ethnic identity constructed and maintained from the outside (Greece, Turkey, and Britain). In the exotic Orient and ‘civilized world’ of Hellenism the Western coloniser rules and lives in the comforts of home (Cypriot woman) with the benefits of being located conveniently between East and West. The Cypriot woman’s body must negotiate between Europeanness and Non-Europeanness, positions of belonging and being excluded at the same time. In the case study we observe how Cypriot women begin the process of decolonisation through recognising similarity and difference to the West and their multiple identities. Mohanty (2003), remarks that ‘The best theory makes personal experience and individual stories communicable. I think this kind of theoretical, analytical thinking allows us to mediate between different histories and understandings of the personal’ (p. 191). The film Women of Cyprus as the case study not only provides an example of the complexity and diversity of women’s experiences and issues in Cyprus but also observes the interconnectedness to women’s struggles across war zones.
Oral history is utilised to provide a historically-based approach in research methods. According to Shopes (2011), oral history as a method involves collecting and interpreting human memories in order to foster knowledge and human integrity. Oral history is distinguished from other kinds of interviews because of its open-ended, subjective, as well as historically-based approach in research methods. The research on Cypriot women's narratives in conflict and post-conflict conditions can be understood as an act of memory based upon past experiences. As outlined earlier, the film, Women of Cyprus, follows Maria and Zehra as they go across the 'Green Line' in the spring of 2004. They have not seen the homes they had to leave 30 years ago when war divided their island in 1974. Maria and Zehra share oral histories which are supplemented with accounts from Turkish, Greek, Latin, Maronite and Armenian women between the ages of 25 and 63 years who hail from different socio-economic backgrounds and live on both sides of the island. Personal stories of each woman's passage and suffering are intertwined in the film which documents their search for reconciliation and peacemaking over a four-year period. The group discussions provided a safe haven where these women from various ethnic backgrounds – some of them members of an NGO group called Hands across the Divide – can share their suppressed experiences of warfare and describe their endeavours to heal the rift in their communities together. As the women wrestle with their past and their private emotions, antagonism and loss, they continue to struggle because they are passionate about the reconciliation and large-scale peacemaking effort which has been entrusted to them. In spite of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000 which states that women can and should be involved in peacemaking, the women in Cyprus have not been invited to the negotiating table yet. As these women confront their fears, doubts and optimism through weekly gatherings, reconciliation practices and peacemaking are being carried out on the ground in addition to the visits to their homes lost in the war.

Zehra and a Greek Cypriot woman named Lefki (who occupies Zehra's home on the southern side of the island) use the ritual of making coffee and having their cups read, to express remorse, share common pain, offer forgiveness, develop friendships, and create future plans. The women joke that in the northern part of Cyprus the same coffee they share is known as Turkish but in the southern part it is Greek. They also agree that Cypriots seem to need coffee to help them to feel better. During the discussion, groups sharing their stories of fear and loss discover that they are similar to one another despite their ethnic differences. This is a key point in how they reach their humanness and are able to open their hearts and empathise with one another. Embedded in their experiences of conflict is the commonality as well as the differences they share as women and the challenges they have faced in being silenced by their respective communities. The women are not concerned with retribution or revenge or even getting their homes back, but they rather focus on the need to rethink who they are as women, as mothers, as daughters, and their multiple identities that bring them together, in addition to observing the Cyprus problem as a narrative from both sides. In the process of reconciliation building amongst the women interviewed in the
film, forgiveness is conveyed through their actions of visiting their homes and making peace; even developing friendships with the people who occupy their homes. The women also approach healing by reconnecting with other women, sharing their memories of the war and allowing their hearts to mend.

The women in this film come from working and middle class backgrounds and for many women who experienced the war the discussion groups represented a safe space where their voices, which had been silenced for so many years, were heard. Turkish Cypriot women expressed their fears towards both Greek Cypriots and the Turkish army since Cyprus remains a militarised state. This kind of trauma and violence has remained hidden on the bodies of the women. These are scars that do not leave easily, and some die and take their wounds with them. The pain and violence of the island has been inflicted on the bodies of all ethnicities. Is ‘Cypriot’ gendered? Is there room for women in this Cypriot identity? There is a need for the construction of a new Cypriot imaginary so that women and men from across ethnicities, gender, age, class, race, sexuality, abilities, language and religion can challenge colonial and patriarchal structures that have left women and minority groups on the margins (Hadjipavlou and Mertan, 2010). Since 2004, women’s solidarity groups continue to work at the grassroots level, creating partnerships to work on integration and inclusion of women. Towards the end of the film, Lefki explains that it is ‘Only when you sit at the table with the other person to share your concerns, the bitterness, and the happiness ... to laugh with her ... only then can real unity happen’ (Katrivanou and Azzouz, 2009).

Conclusion

‘Never comfort yourself with the thought that because the worst things imaginable are happening to those other people they cannot happen to you’ (Allen, 1996)

The documentary film provides an example of who the Cypriot woman possibly is. Though it is not assumed that Cypriot women are a homogenous group, it is necessary to be mindful of the multiple layers of ethnic identities and how these categories both enable and constrain the Cypriot woman. Sandra Harding (1987) argues against the idea of a distinctive feminist method of research by simply ‘adding women’. She states that ‘the best feminist analysis goes beyond subject matter in a crucial way; it insists that the inquirer or him/herself be placed in the same critical plane as the overt subject matter, thereby recovering the entire research process for scrutiny in the results ...’ (p. 9). Transnational feminist theory has shown us a way of understanding women and gender by complicating the notion of unity among women and addressing the effects of colonialism, war, and militarism on women’s lives.

This paper has challenged capitalist heteronormative patriarchy and European models of civil society building that have kept Cypriot women on the margins. The Women of Cyprus
documentary is a narrative of how women’s dialogue is questioning ‘the power systems of the economic, the ethno-national, and the sex/gender power – all three intersect and promote inequality and are sustained by coercion and violence’ (Hadjipavlou and Mertan, 2010, p. 265). Women across these borders of nation state begin to dismantle socio-political discourses through alternative spaces. In working through the process of decolonisation by way of their oral history women of Cyprus have strived to decolonise themselves. To decolonise the Cypriot woman, as Chen (2010) suggests, is ‘to free colonizing and colonized subjects from the limits imposed by colonial history’ (p. 113) and in doing so brings visibility to the untold and unknown stories of women whose voices have been silenced.

References
Identity in Conflict: 
An Exploration of Gender across Ethnicity in Cyprus

THOMAEL M. JOANNIDIS

Abstract
The protracted ethnic conflict in Cyprus has meant that life on the island is typically framed in terms of ethnicity, putting the main communities – Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot – before all other communities and identities, including gender. As society focuses on the conflict, social and human rights issues, such as the discrimination and abuses experienced by women, especially foreign women, are often viewed as being unique to their economic standing and not reflecting Cypriot society or gender and social dynamics. This study incorporated a diverse sample of mostly women from varying identities including ethnicity, gender, race, sexual orientation, and immigration status, in order to understand gender consciousness and discrimination in the greater context. Through an analysis of interviews and observations, this article contributes to current scholarship by using a holistic approach and providing an opportunity to redefine notions of community in Cyprus.

Keywords: Cyprus, ethnic conflict, gender identity, intersectionality, domestic workers, gender consciousness

Overview
As a consequence of the ethnic conflict, Cypriot society positions Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ethnicity above all other identities and experiences. While acknowledging that monocommunal and bicommunal approaches have their place and value, the research sought to promote a more comprehensive and inclusive understanding of the diverse voices of Cypriot society, with particular focus on women and gender. This study utilised a holistic, intercommunal approach to analyse interviews and observations, and provide information on the life experiences of a diverse group of individuals and identity groups. The findings challenge post-conflict nationalism and its rigid notions of identity, community, and societal priorities and, also, touch upon the manifestation of patriarchy.

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Methodology

The study was conducted over several months in mid-2010 and includes: 40 semi-structured, in-depth interviews; over 40 participant observations in civil society organisations and activities; and other informal interviews and group discussions. The interview participants identified themselves as Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, Armenian, Maronite, Australian, British, Turkish, Filipina, Sri Lankan, Lesbian/Gay/Bisexual/Transgendered/Queer (LGBTQ), as well as foreign-born individuals of varying immigration status. Of the participants, just over half were Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots born and raised on the island, and one-third were born outside of Cyprus. The majority of them were college-educated and over two-thirds were involved in the civil society sector either through their work or volunteer activities. The majority of research participants worked as activists and/or at local non-governmental organisations, while others worked as teachers, government officials, full-time students, domestic workers, and nurses. Beginning the research with on-the-ground activists was beneficial because they were uniquely positioned to explain the issues they see, not only in their lives, but also in the community at large.

This paper sought to reveal identity at its intersections and in multiplicity. The interviews questioned participants in a number of areas including family, work, media, violence against women, interethnic relations, and what interconnections, if any, exist across different ethnicities of women in Cyprus. The interviews explored how participants understood and saw relationships between different genders and ethnic groups, and among women, as well as if/how they perceived the challenges related to their gender and sexuality. The approach used these general areas as possible prompts, but did not seek to emphasise one over the other. During the course of the interviews participants were also asked what they valued in their lives; what other questions they think should be asked; and what they would be curious to ask other participants. This approach was meant to allow participants to guide the research, and give their perspectives on pertinent issues for further exploration.

Considerations

Identity Negotiation in Conflict Societies

According to Dr Maria Hadjipavlou, political scientist and peace activist, "In conflict cultures, there is a tendency to homogenise the communities, failing to acknowledge their complexity and, thus, prolonging misperceptions, stereotypes and misunderstandings between and among conflict groups." Identity becomes politicised and the lines defining group membership become more rigid. This means that expectations of group members – what they can say and do – are narrow and restrictive. Likewise, the concept of the ‘other’ community is similarly monolithic and rigid.

The authorities have, in certain ways, worked to ‘vilify and simplify their (historically constructed) identities’. In his discussion of the damaging and debilitating nature of nationalism in conflict societies in general and in Cyprus, in particular, Dr Harry Anastasiou explains that, ‘The same uncompromising ethnocentric nationalism that originally created the problem found renewed justification in the very historical events that it had triggered and created.’ This is to say that conflict breeds more conflict and nationalist rhetoric, and the promulgation and promotion of one’s ethnic identity at the expense of others becomes justified and further politicised. In the rigid post-conflict context there is not much regard given to the experiences of individuals of other ethnicities or identity groups. This plays out not just in terms of discussions and experiences related to the conflict, but also in how individuals must adhere to socially constructed expectations of them.

Bicommunal activities, including workshops, retreats and other programming, have challenged this rigidity by bringing together Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots for the sharing of opinions, experiences, and concerns of the communities, and facilitated the beginnings of post-conflict healing. Yet, while inclusion is implied in the bicommunal approach, there is often an unanticipated side effect which is to frame Cyprus solely in terms of two homogenous ethnic communities. Costas M. Constantinou has said that, ‘the most disturbing thing about being a Cypriot is that one can only be a Greek or a Turkish Cypriot. Postcolonial Cypriot identity is quintessentially and inescapably hyphenated; and hyphenated across a fixed Greek–Turkish axis.’

In actuality, the demographic breakdown of Cyprus is even more complex. Of the estimated 1.1 million people on the island, 80% are Greek Cypriots in the south, and the Turkish Cypriot community in the north makes up about 20%. Within each community there are historical ethnic minorities who have lived in Cyprus for generations including: Maronites, Armenians, and Latins who make up approximately 7,000 people, and a small Roma population – estimates vary between 1,000 and 2,000. These ethnic minorities have limited inclusion in the greater society, a reality further formalised in the post-colonial period when Armenians, Maronites, and Latins were compelled to become members of either dominant community and thus they suffered “internal exclusion” by being regarded as religious sub-groups of one of the two dominant communities rather than national minorities in their own right.

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5 C.M. Constantinou (2007) op. cit, p. 248.
7 N. Coureas, A. Varnava and M. Elia (eds), Online Abstract, The Minorities of Cyprus: Development Patterns
Furthermore, an estimated half of the approximately 300,000 people in the north are said to be from, or the descendants of those predominantly from Turkey (of Kurdish and Arab origin), as well as from Bulgaria and Tajikistan. Additionally, it is estimated that 14% of those living in the Republic of Cyprus are recent immigrants or foreigners, and registered residents of the island. The Republic of Cyprus grants 4,000 visas annually to ‘artists’ from countries of the former Soviet Union to work in nightclubs where it is known they will be engaging in sex work. Although visa information is not readily available in the north, a recent newspaper report estimated that within the nightclubs there were several hundred women engaging in illegal sexual activities at any given time. These numbers do not include the ‘undocumented’ foreigners residing in Cyprus, or those that work in Cyprus without the proper visas. It also does not make the distinction of whether or not the foreign workers are registered or unregistered which, as Güven-Lisaniler, Ügural and Rodriguez point out, has a great impact on an individual’s treatment and mobility.

**Overshadowing of Societal Problems**

Identity and Cypriot society are seen through a very compartmentalised lens that just recognises Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot ethnic identity and disregards other identities. As stated by Myria Vassiliadou, one should recognise this ‘important aspect of the “Cyprus problem”… how women, as well as “other” defined “subgroups” are oppressed, marginalised, or at best, ignored.’ There seems to be a parallel between the predominance of these ethnic identities over other identities, and the way in which the Cyprus problem overshadows all other issues in the country. This is to say that, similar to the way that ethnicity dominates other identities, resolution of the ‘Cyprus problem’ also dominates, overshadows, and hides social issues. Because of this...
overshadowing, problems such as those perceived to be ‘women’s issues’ are relegated to a lower status, if they are acknowledged as issues at all.13 Exploring the relationship between nationalism and what are seen as women’s issues, however, is an opportunity to explore ‘the detrimental effects of official discourses on aspects of life conventionally associated with the “private” and “personal” sphere’ which is usually associated with women and, therefore, ascribed less value.14

While solving the political problem is essential, so is acknowledging issues such as increasing rates of gender-based violence, human trafficking, discrimination, and the abuse of migrant domestic workers. This ‘social discrimination is ignored, hidden away by the “Cyprus problem”’.15 This is not to say that people do not know about these problems, rather these problems are not considered important. Assigning them importance would mean indirectly questioning the state and the individual’s role in perpetuating injustice. In the case of sex-work, for example, questioning the individual’s as well as the state’s complicity in “feminizing” aspects of its economy through the intensification of the desire industries’ could be seen as going against the state itself.16

**Women as Primary Research Participants**

Using a diverse cohort of mostly women is useful in understanding the expectations of people and the varying messages they receive. In her research on the identity negotiation of women in the north, Moira Killoran states that religious propriety and sexuality intersect to restrict and shame women.17 So conflict creates further fracture within ethnic communities. Myria Vassiliadou explains that in the south, there is a creation of ‘Otherhood’ whereby ‘women in Cyprus become involved in an ambiguous, contradictory process through which they support and perpetuate non-feminist, hierarchical, capitalist, and patriarchal values’ and distinguish themselves from categories of women including lesbians, ethnic minorities, and foreign workers. While the conflict’s impact varies across different identity groups, nationalism and patriarchy are so ingrained in Cyprus that complexity or nuance of experience is not permitted.18 In fact, the “Cyprus problem” has created a sharper division between the island’s women in socioeconomic and psychological terms.19

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13 Ibid., p. 460.
As the research of Simona Sharoni explains, however, the impact of conflict is less cut-and-dry than some earlier literature suggests. For instance, conflict does not work to simply exclude women from international politics or to put efforts for gender equality on hold. In various examples, it can also foster women’s political participation and the interconnecting of peace with equality. Yet, while certain opportunities have opened up to Cypriot women, the core of the patriarchal Cypriot society remains intact. Working to challenge nationalism’s manufacturing of further discrimination and isolation, however, does not just benefit women. ‘Gender equality is not only a basic human right, but its achievement has enormous socio-economic ramifications. Empowering women fuels thriving economies, spurring productivity and growth.’

**Questions of Exclusion and Inclusion**

For an exploration of identity and the experiences associated with various identities to be effective, one must keep the complexity of the Cypriot reality in mind. In *The Line: Women, Partition and the Gender Order in Cyprus*, Dr Cynthia Cockburn discusses the essential elements of what she calls a women’s gendered perspective and movement, one that is holistic, transformative, prefigurative and inclusive. It is holistic in the sense that it deals not only with the issues deemed to be ‘women’s issues’ but ‘the whole spectrum of life, power and politics – including ethno-national strife’. She also goes on to say that ‘while certain types of feminist theory would see “men as the problem”, others see that many men are themselves damaged by the system, because it generates particular masculine cultures that, in forming boys into men, deform them as human beings – in the same way as rigid dichotomies also produce ridiculously restrictive versions of femininity. Transformative feminism sees patriarchy, not men, as the problem. Men it sees as potentially part of the solution.’ As will be discussed in the findings section, men and women reported seeing and experiencing patriarchy’s impact on themselves and on society at large in Cyprus. Exploring the impact of patriarchy in this research project has meant acknowledging its various manifestations and impacts across different groups.

Of course, while seeking to have a more holistic approach, it is important not to diminish the very real differences within and across the ‘north’ and ‘south’ of Cyprus. Taking an approach to the

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island that includes both sides while, in some ways, more inclusive than a monocommunal approach, runs the risk of minimizing the differences of the people who live on either side of the UN-administered buffer zone. While there are many similarities, common struggles and values, the day-to-day experiences of the people living them is arguably, quite different. Any approach that seeks to be comprehensive must not overgeneralize or ignore these nuances.

Findings and Themes

As can be imagined when interviewing people with different life experiences and backgrounds, there were many perspectives and stories shared. The most pertinent and frequent themes will be expounded upon below.

1. **Cypriot ethnicity was named first when describing oneself, while identity and membership in other groups was, on the surface, less relevant.**

The interviews revealed that ethnicity is the primary and typically the only way of identifying oneself, particularly ethnic membership in one of the two main groups.

In the words of one Greek Cypriot activist, ‘I don’t think Cypriot women have a gender dimension. Ethnicity presides here.’ In a post-conflict country such as Cyprus, it is no shock that ethnicity remains a key identifier, and notions of ethnic membership and belonging are very complex. For example, the ways in which individuals identifying as members of these ethnic groups refer to themselves and others (i.e. as Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, Greek or Turkish) is contextual and can indicate a number of things, including the participant’s political affiliation, ethnic identity, and life experience. Regardless of the specific language used, the post-war dualism continues on the island, for instance, as Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots, Cypriots or others, or us versus them.

In order to explain this dichotomous and nationalistic thinking, a Greek Cypriot primary school teacher explained, ‘we teach … a history of wars or male heroes, that kind of stuff … [we leave out] women, or alternative voices, or a different kind of male hood. It’s the hero who dies for his country … You don’t have big women, or you don’t have small men, or you know, everyday life, social history, where is that?’ Related to this concept of national identity and history, emerged the concept of ‘Cypriotness’ as a direct correlation to one’s loyalty and connection to the island, the conflict, and the present situation. Part of this notion of Cypriotness is membership in one or both of the main groups (depending on the perspective of the individual and community), but there are other combinations of factors – place of birth, country where one was raised, experience with the conflict such as individual/family refugee status – which can also contribute to ideas of how Cypriot one is. By way of illustration, Cypriots of the diaspora are sometimes believed to have less of a right to contribute to national conversations and have an opinion.

Expatriates residing in Cyprus regardless of the number of years they have lived on the island are typically further removed from these larger discussions. Many times it is ‘foreigners’ who are
involved in the civil sector, with bicomunal work aimed to reconcile the two communities. There are communities of ethnic minorities who have lived on the island for generations — Maronites, Armenians, Latins, and Roma — who do not fit neatly into either category, even if they are affiliated with one of the two communities. This phenomenon, categorised as ‘internal-exclusion’, reinforces the view of the island as only Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot. According to one Maronite research participant, ‘you know when we say bicomunal we try to be inclusive, but in fact we are being exclusive. And I think, not only because we have Cypriot, and I say this with all of its qualifications, Cypriot minorities, as in the Armenians, the Maronites, the Latins and yeah, you might think that their numbers are insignificant, but they’re here and they’re Cypriot and they’ve been here, [and there are] migrant communities who are members of our community as well. So where do they fit into this whole, into the new Cyprus that we’re trying to create, should we have a solution. Where do they fit in? Shouldn’t they also have a say? Or are they not Cypriots?’

In talking about the possibility of working for gender equality in these circumstances, one Turkish activist explained that efforts have to be intercommunal, but ‘It necessitates some kind of groundwork to be able to say, look we are not going to use these [ethnic] distinctions, we’ll make no distinctions, we work for all women, for the general gender equality. That necessitates a lot of work ... and the issues will become more politicised with the Cyprus issue rather than the women’s issue.’ In other words, it is a constant battle to get beyond ethnic lines, and consider a multiplicity of identities and experiences. As the remaining findings reveal, there are gender-specific experiences to warrant further discussion.

2 While many participants did not initially define themselves by gender, the complexity and conflicting messages of gender were often reported.

Few people identified themselves along gender lines and many women did not see themselves as different from men, but many did go on to recount experiences of discrimination and expectations resulting from the fact that they are women. Those individuals who identified gender as essential to their lives, as well as those who did not necessarily recognise it as such, reported gender-specific expectations and roles.

Participants frequently referred to the idea that more women are becoming ‘independent and empowered’ and cite rates of higher education as evidence. Postwar changes greatly affected Greek Cypriot women’s place in society, especially changes which gave them expanded access to education and increased participation in the work force. Related to this, participants reported that there are more women with decision-making power and visibility in the public arena. At the

same time, more and more women can have relationships and premarital sex before marriage and
may get married later in life. These changes have allowed women to feel that they have more
options and more flexibility in their choices. One Turkish Cypriot who works in business points
to grassroots organising of recent years as a sign of improvement saying, 'the political situation even
brought the men and women in the Turkish side together. They join the rallies together and the
political parties, have their headquarters, their own functions. [It has] brought them more together
than before.'

In spite of what is understood as a shift toward equality and more choices, young women in
particular reported the struggle to manage competing and often conflicting messages they receive
from the media, their family, friends, and from their own internal desires. From the media, they see
images of women that are very simplistic and archetypal – sex object, mother, wife, and in rare
instances when a woman is in a position of power in the workplace, she is cold-hearted and cruel.
The messages they feel they receive from the media are to be independent, but this independence
manifests itself in sometimes confusing ways. As an example, several participants pointed to more
'liberal dress' as a sign of independence and the changing opportunities of women. But some felt
that style of dress was no indication of the level of independence a woman had, or the progress as
a whole that society had made. One Turkish Cypriot woman raised abroad explained, 'you know
women are so modern in the sense that women can walk around in short skirts and high heels and
revealing clothing and that's fine, but, there's no issue about that, but if there was to be a woman in
a position of power, then that's an issue. So it's like you can look great, but don't be great, you
know?' In fact, many participants of varying ages said that liberal dress was superficial as an
indication of independence, and pointed to what they believe is still a conservative mind-set.

One academic confirmed that there exists a tension between your success in the workplace
and your reputation. She reported that she must not only produce exemplary work, but she must
also make sure she appears to be a woman of good character. She continued, ‘... at the end of the
day, it shouldn’t matter, even if I was, even if I did all of the things that would qualify, that would
put me in the super slut category ... the quality of my work should stand on its own, be that the
work that I do here, or my academic work. And internationally it does, but locally, it doesn’t work
like that, so you grow this skin and like, either you become very dignified or you become very cold,
but ... you play a game, you put on a façade'.

A Turkish Cypriot woman from Girne/Kyrenia reiterated this struggle and went on to say
that, ‘women are so made up in most workplaces and yeah, it’s as if they’re more decorative or
something. And at home, definitely, like all the housekeeping is the women’s job and the
childbearing, and all sorts of care jobs are women’s jobs'. Aside from the maintenance of reputation,
gendered expectations are most apparent in the domestic realm, which is still very much a woman’s
responsibility. As such, it is also assigned a lesser value. While Cypriot women have become
financially empowered by working in greater numbers outside of the home, the notion that the
domestic sphere is their responsibility still exists, which requires that women be responsible for
home life, including cooking, cleaning, and child care. If women received any help, it would most likely be from females who, in all probability, are family members such as mothers and grandmothers, or perhaps even from foreign women working in their home. In the less common instances where they received assistance from a male partner, it was considered men helping with women’s work, not work that should automatically be shared. While they talked of the struggle to balance these goals, the majority never mentioned expecting or receiving help from males.

In both the distribution of labour, as well as the expectations of chastity and of being a ‘good woman’, the research confirmed Maria Hadjipavlou’s findings that the ‘the sexual division of domestic labour and the value system that sustain the patriarchal structures have still remained intact’.27 Furthermore, many of the domestic examples and relationships cited in interviews were heterosexual. During the course of these interviews, very few people acknowledged relationships outside of the heterosexual kind, or gender beyond the male-female binary, which will be discussed later in the findings.

3. Gender consciousness does not transcend ethnic lines, so the mistreatment foreign women face is understood as an issue of class and unrelated to gender.

Previous research has connected the reality of migrant workers to the larger contradictory nature of women’s role and position in society, namely ‘that although women in Cyprus have entered the labour force, there is a lack of policies in relation to the reconciliation of family and professional life. This, in combination with the absence of the role of men in such discussions, as well as lack of a welfare services, female migrant domestic workers have replaced unpaid informal work in the household, reinforcing traditional gender roles in Cyprus’.28 The gendered division of labour thus continues as Cypriot women, with more opportunities for growth and equality, pass these less desirable responsibilities to foreign domestic workers, for example. In fact, a recent study found that the ‘entire employment sector of domestic work’ is gendered because the work gets transferred from one woman to another.29 These women, from countries such as Sri Lanka and the Philippines, often work for long hours in vulnerable conditions in private homes, uncertain of their visa extension. Areas such as construction and agriculture are reserved for foreign males.

While female domestic workers in the Republic of Cyprus are ‘one of the largest migrant groups in Cyprus, reaching 25,000 in 2006, they remain “invisible” … when discussing issues affecting Cypriot society such as poverty, unemployment, social inclusion, as well as their legal status and their future in Cyprus’.30 Sondra Sainsbury explains that with increasing globalisation

29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 2.
more female migrant workers are working in Cyprus under precarious conditions. They are restricted from joining trade unions, most of them live in the home of their employers, and often report mistreatment including verbal abuse, threats not to have their visa renewed, and sexual advances from their employers. In discussions with interview participants about this mistreatment, some sympathised, but generally, did not see this phenomenon as an issue relating to gender at all. When asked about the challenges facing foreign women in their workplace and in the public space in particular, one participant responded that foreign women are seen in ‘that way’, meaning that they are considered more sexually accessible and open to advances. Moreover, mistreatment of foreign women—for example, one Filipina domestic worker in her 40s reported verbal abuse in the public space and sexual harassment by her employer in his home—is understood by many Cypriots as a manifestation of class and ethnicity, not gender.

In discussing these realities, even female participants active in women’s organisations and groups, while more likely to be gender conscious, often had to make an effort to push against the ethnic lines separating them. This meant that many of the gender-relevant experiences of discrimination, and violence against women, were still, for many related to ethnicity or even socioeconomic status, rather than gender. Ethnicity, particularly if one is a member of one of the two main ethnic groups, overshadows all other identities even for individuals who are openly members of other identity groups, such as ethnic minorities and women, among others. When asked if this treatment/understanding of foreign women impacts Cypriot women, the majority of respondents said it did not and that they did not see an interconnection between different groups of women.

Though the demographic profile of migrant workers is different in the north, one Turkish Cypriot research participant explained that the stereotype and sentiment of migrants in the north is similar: ‘They’re [considered] dirty and ostracised, and there’s a lot of racism in that aspect. It’s the same with the cleaning people, and there’s this hypocrisy that we don’t want them, but who would do this work?’ This tension is further complicated by the political situation. Another Turkish Cypriot woman said, ‘It’s always like an us-and-them attitude and the animosity towards mainland Turks is huge from Turkish Cypriots, from Greek Cypriots especially.’ Another participant agreed, citing a recent political campaign as an example: ‘they don’t want them, and one of the parties in the last election, the leftist party, and their slogan was, we are from here, vote for us ... There is this distinction, we are from here, we are the real Cypriots, we don’t want these people, we want them to go. But we want them to do all the work also.’

The negative perception of foreign women also extends to women in the sex work industry in Cyprus, which, typically, occurs with full knowledge of the government/authorities across the island. Nightclubs, cabarets, and other sex work establishments are often visible despite the fact

that prostitution is not legal. To make things more complicated, many women are given visas to come to the country with the purpose of sex work, but under a different name (in the Greek Cypriot south the visa is called a ‘performance artiste’ visa) and the police are well aware of this phenomenon. In the north, for example, where cabaret owners used to retain the passports of girls/women who arrived in Cyprus, the police have now been found to hold on to the passports of foreign women – often from countries of the former Soviet Bloc – because they are judged safer with the authorities than with cabaret owners. Their vulnerability and mistreatment seems to be generally accepted by mainstream society as well as by many Cypriot women, who believe they could not fall victim to such abuse. While the women (many of whom, in the north, are from Moldova, with the remainder coming mostly from other countries of the former Soviet Union) typically have legal documents to be in the country, their working conditions plus the terms of their contract subject them to mistreatment seen in human trafficking around the world, including: forced labour, debt bondage, passport confiscation and the involvement of police.32

These occurrences are often explained as a question of class, with the socioeconomic status of foreign workers used by some to give a sense of justification. In interviews and discussions with Cypriots, many reported that they feel they and their families are protected from such abuses and they would never experience them. The fact that these abuses do not happen to ‘Cypriot girls’ gives them less importance and, also, a sense that Cypriots are safe from such mistreatment and violence. By remaining complicit in this, Cypriot women sustain not just the exploitation of the foreign workers on multiple levels, but their own exploitation in the wider, societal framework.33

4. Cypriot women are pressured to remain chaste in their strict gender roles; foreign women are sexualised.

With all the societal changes and increased number of women in the workforce, there is still an expectation of women’s chastity and maintaining one’s reputation. One journalist referred to Cyprus as ‘this patriarchal society that has this rule, sort of this Victorian style ethics, that everything is allowed, but not with your daughter, mother, sister, whatever’. What ends up happening is that women have varying roles and stereotypes assigned to them based on their ethnicities. The same journalist goes on to say that, ‘you don’t see equality in the sexual enjoyment, or participation. So the foreigner, and if you relate that with the nationalistic identity, then the foreigner becomes the object, and with the object you can do whatever you want’. This not only reinforces the notion that the foreigner is more accessible and easily objectified, but that the Cypriot woman has only a domestic and familial function in relation to others as mother, daughter, wife, or sister.

A Greek Cypriot said, 'There is still that kind of sense, that you don't screw around with a Cypriot woman, you do it with the foreigners, and even among the most liberal men here, both sides, if you have too many kind of, casual relationships, no matter how much they like you, how long you've been their friend, there is still that kind of stain or question about your honour.' She went on to say that, 'as a woman, as a woman academic if you dress in a certain way, you're sexualised immediately. So the first thing that happens to your image is that you're very careful about the way people see you, about the things you say about yourself. Um, I never, I don't even go out with my colleagues, and if I do, I never drink, because immediately, the women and the men are looking for an opportunity to gossip. And gossip is something that can be deadly to your professional reputation.'

Women, particularly young women, also explained that they share very little with others. Not just because of the small size of their community, but also because of the importance placed on reputation, these women felt it better to keep to themselves and not trust other women with their more personal thoughts and feelings. One Turkish Cypriot college graduate explained 'And I think that's something that Cyprus women especially are brought up with, you keep to yourself … so you're always talking about something superficial, some general topics, so if I'm having a tough time, I'm not supposed to tell you, I'm not gonna confide in you, because you will go and tell someone else. So people have a lack of trust.' While society has become more liberal, they still do not want to tarnish their image and reputation, or shame their families. This is then transmitted to the foreign woman who is stereotyped and portrayed as having fewer morals and being more sexual than Cypriot women. In her research on the north, Moira Killoran points to a lack of 'cultural privacy' as one of the factors contributing to this.34

5. Gender-based roles and expectations also impact males in Cyprus.

It also appears that men are affected by gender-specific roles and expectations to be ‘masculine’. Related to the previous example of sex workers, there is pressure to have numerous sexual partners, and not the same pressure of maintaining one’s reputation. In fact, one’s reputation can rely on sexual prowess. One sexuality rights activist explains, ‘For the boys of the family, if they have a lot of partners, it’s the honour of the family. Fathers were expecting for their boys to have relationships, because it was their fear also that their boys were gay, so by having sex with women, it would let out their fear, you know.’

Male participants discussed these pressures to be more stereotypically masculine, citing compulsory military service for males as the primary form of gender discrimination they see in their lives. Additional pressures and gender-based expectations included feeling pressure to enjoy hunting and football, have numerous sexual partners, and not engage in domestic tasks. One

34 M. Killoran (1998) op. cit., p. 192
Greek Cypriot academic explained that with the changing roles and influence of women, some men struggle to adjust: "there's a tension between women and men and the way that, like, the more professional the women become, their partners on a personal level — unless they're really capable and really quite strong men — feel really threatened by it. So what you see even now is this game, this tense game between women and men."

Despite that, a recent college graduate of Greek Cypriot descent said, 'Men are more willing to contribute to whatever is expected.' He perceives a willingness among his peers to contribute in ways that their fathers and other males have not done in the past, though he sometimes finds that this contribution is criticised by other men, and this unexpected behaviour makes certain women uncomfortable. This same participant who identifies as a heterosexual ally of the LGBTQ community is involved in the movement for LGBTQ rights on the island and said that his participation has concerned others around him who feel it calls his masculinity and sexuality into question. Of his participation, he says, "I definitely don't hide it or avoid it. Going to a meeting, my father asked, 'Where you going?' [My] father said, 'What? I'm not sure I agree with it.' I don't see why not, obviously I have the right, [but he was] also a bit worried, asking me about girls.' A British medical professional further discussed this contradiction when she said that, 'the sexuality thing actually is really interesting because on the north side, I've met several men who … are gay. But no, no, no mention. Absolutely not. The whole thing of being gay here is just not, not, not allowed'.

For men who go against rigid gender expectations, this seems to be familiar. One Greek Cypriot teacher explains that because of the distribution of responsibility in her household, her husband is criticised by his peers "because we share everything, and they think this is not a good thing." Her husband is criticised for creating a bad precedent by sharing responsibilities with his wife and, at times, staying home while she attends political events.

In particular, regarding the pressure to have numerous sexual partners, men did acknowledge that there is a contradiction between expectations for men and women. In a joint interview, two Greek Cypriot males stated that many of their friends had been to cabarets and nightclubs, but did not explicitly state that they themselves had paid for sexual services. They did also explain that they have male friends in monogamous relationships that continue to go to cabarets. And one difference between them and the previous generation is that these men hide it from their partners, whereas older generations were more open about their affairs/cheating. While there is still some pressure to get married, one Turkish Cypriot male explained that his window of time before the pressure really begins is greater.

6. Conversations on gender focus on the gender binary and females in particular.

While it was not the primary focus of the research, a handful of participants did mention the struggle against heteronormativity, in particular trying to acknowledge experiences outside of the male-female gender binary and a diversity of sexualities and relationships. They also discussed
what they feel are the shortcomings of current research and activism on gender that focuses just on women and heterosexual. When discussions of gender do occur in private or in the more public realms, it is often oversimplified. Gender is discussed typically in terms of a binary of male-female, which does not acknowledge the experiences of individuals who feel they do not identify strictly as male or female. For these participants, gender expectations were even more complex, as they try to navigate through the gender expectations society assigns to them, and the ways in which they actually see themselves.

As specified by several participants, discussions of gender often leave out the importance of sexual orientation. Or, as one Greek Cypriot activist explains, gender is often confused with sexual orientation: 'There is a great confusion in the people between how they view gender and sexual orientation. I mean I, I hear a lot for men for example, if they look more feminine, they are gay. For women that are more masculine, ah they are lesbians. They don't realise the difference between sexual orientation and gender identity which are two different things.'

Conclusions

An inclusive approach can work to combat the compartmentalised view of society that defines experience in terms of a Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot binary and, by extension, ignores all challenges outside of the Cyprus problem. It can also allow for the interconnections to be explored across identities and experiences with the hope of redefining and expanding notions of Cypriot society, thereby breaking down this highly compartmentalised and rigid understanding of community. Additional research needs to be undertaken with a variety of cross-sections including women and ethnic and sexual minorities, thereby contributing to an even more holistic understanding of the community of Cyprus.

References


Cyprus:
The Courage to Compromise

CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES

I write as a son of Greek Cypriots, who was born in Cyprus, and was evacuated from the island in the wake of the Turkish invasion in the summer of 1974.

But for the invasion, I would have grown up a Cypriot. Despite the invasion, I remain proud of my Cypriot heritage, and am afflicted – like all those who, in one way or another, were its victims – by the deep sense of injustice that is its enduring aftertaste. I was four years old when an overwhelming number of Turkish soldiers marched through the island. The phrase ‘ethnic cleansing’ did not exist then, but that was what it was. It was not a bloodless invasion, and I shall never forget it.

Many Cypriots still feel the anger of dispossession, and no one can blame them for that. But it is not that feeling that will lead to a solution. The mindset of war will not achieve a lasting peace. To settle the Cyprus problem what is required – and in this respect Cyprus is no different from any other conflict zone – is a final act of courage by those that have been its victim: the courage to compromise.

The time to find such courage is running out. If this self-evident statement requires demonstration, let me recall a recent tragedy that the world has already forgotten. It is the story of a young and proud republic, which is small but strategically located: A republic that finally obtained its independence, after many years of imperial rule by a domineering neighbour. That neighbour still coveted control of the republic, and used its small ethnic minority within the republic to claim and exert such control. During the long days of a single summer, the powerful neighbour was given a pretext to invade that sovereign republic, and proceeded to occupy an enclave purportedly in defence of its minority. Long after, its forces continue to occupy those enclaves, which it has since unilaterally recognised as ‘independent’.

These facts may sound familiar to Cypriots. But I am not describing Cyprus in the summer of 1974; I am describing Georgia in the summer of 2008: An invasion that happened only four years ago, but one that the world has already largely forgotten. So let us not hold an exaggerated sense of Cyprus’ international importance, or of the world’s attention span. Let us not simply repeat the mantras of ‘invasion’ and ‘occupation’, as if they will magically bring a just settlement to the island. They will not. As we approach the fortieth anniversary of the Turkish invasion, Cyprus is no longer a crisis, it is a problem. And soon it will not even be seen as a problem beyond Cyprus. It is naive to think otherwise. And after what the Cypriot people have endured over the last half century, history will not forgive naivety.
In this essay, I ask one preliminary question alone that is critical to there being even a chance of settling the Cyprus question:

Can we expect anything other than a bizonal bicommunal federation as the basis of a solution now to a division that has lasted for almost 40 years (more than double the lifetime of the independent, unitary Republic of Cyprus)?

The answer I propose will not meet with universal acclaim. It will provoke some, and may outrage others. I ask only that it be considered as the views of someone who was of Cyprus but, paradoxically because of the invasion, has not remained Cyprus-centric. In making this request, I must observe that the Cyprus debate as a national discourse has degenerated in recent years. Instead of a respectful recognition that fellow Cypriots can legitimately hold views that differ, those that participate most vociferously on the ‘Cyprus issue’ respond to those who hold opposing views by questioning their motives and their patriotism. Such insults undermine mature democratic debate. They demean all participants in the dialogue. And they inhibit, rather than encourage, progress to a consensus. So, as I begin to address the question posed, let me ask only that we question each other’s ideas, without questioning each other’s loyalty.

And to answer the question, let us begin with the lessons of the past. The relevant past for these purposes must begin before the Turkish invasion of 1974, with the island’s fourteen years of unity and independence that preceded it.

There are two obvious things to say about that independence: first, it was but a short interlude in over five hundred years of foreign conquest and subjugation of the island; second, it was far from unitary.

During those short fourteen years Cyprus had more than one constitutional crisis, created by and resulting in, communal strife and division. In 1963, following constitutional amendments proposed by President Makarios, which were aimed at diminishing constitutional recognition of ethnic identity and division, fighting broke out between the two communities that led to the end of Turkish Cypriot participation in government, the withdrawal of many Turkish Cypriots into geographic enclaves and the establishment of an international peace-keeping force on the island of Cyprus – hardly a feature of a typical unitary state. In 1967, the outbreak of intercommunal fighting once again led to the threat of a Turkish invasion, the reinforcement of Turkish enclaves and the Turkish Cypriots proclaiming their own provisional administration. Those fourteen years of Cypriot unitary independence were, thus, brief, precarious and far from unified.

Since the invasion of 1974, against the backdrop of total geographic and political division, there have been numerous reunification plans. In all of these, from the very first in 1977 (the four point agreement signed by President Makarios and Rauf Denktas in February 1977) the Republic of Cyprus has accepted that a future Cyprus settlement would be based on a federation made up of two states (bi-zonal) and two communities (bi-communal).

As these plans came and went, two trends were discernible. First, the Turkish Cypriot side – under Rauf Denktas’ leadership – kept retreating from the principle of bi-zonal bi-communal
federation, proposing eventually a ‘confederation’ which amounted to legitimised and recognised division by another name. Secondly, in so doing, Mr Denktas invited widespread international condemnation for his blatant bad faith. That condemnation hardened into international determination to ensure that Turkish Cypriot intransigence in settlement discussions would not prejudice the Republic’s aspiration to become a member of the European Union; an aspiration which was realised on 1 May 2004 when Cyprus acceded to the EU.

The second of those trends was instantly reversed by the Republic of Cyprus’ rejection of the Annan Plan. Whatever the flaws of the Annan Plan and the manner in which it was foisted on the people of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots have paid a heavy price for its rejection. Under President Papadopoulos’ leadership, Greek Cypriots have metamorphosed into the party that said ‘no’. Whether Greek Cypriots like it or not, rightly or wrongly, so far as international public opinion is concerned they have now forfeited much of the moral high ground in future settlement processes. Greek Cypriots may rightly regard themselves as the victims of a long-standing Turkish aggression, but so far as the world is concerned they now share responsibility for the failure to find a solution.

Leaving aside the shortcomings of the Annan Plan, the way in which the Greek Cypriot government manoeuvred itself into the position of taking the blame for the debacle of the UN’s last initiative was a huge political failure. As a consequence, President Erdogan now tours the world telling leaders that the Greek Cypriots moan about the number of Turkish Cypriot soldiers on the island, but that if the Annan plan had been accepted in 2004 there would today be fewer Turkish soldiers on the island than Greek Cypriot soldiers.

Against this recent historical backdrop, for the Greek Cypriots now to go further and reverse thirty-three years of acceptance of the principle of bi-zonal bi-communal federation (something they did not even do when rejecting the Annan Plan) would be political folly on a historic scale. Not only does it of course have zero chances of acceptance by Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, but it will benefit from no international support – even from the Republic of Cyprus’ friends. In a world in which international support is required for political success, such revisionism is worse than futile.

So why should some Greek Cypriots encourage their government to shoot themselves in the foot in this monumental way? Well, for the best possible reason some say: in the service of ‘principle’. This principle can be stated in the following stirring terms: let us leave behind the ethnic divisions of the past; let us not define or discriminate on the basis of ethnicity; let us establish a future in which all Cypriots are equal before the constitutional law, be they Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Maronites or others. Is this not after all what it means to be European in the twenty-first century?

This sounds like an ideal world; but not a real world – at least not the real world of Cyprus today. And it regretfully won’t be until the divided communities on the island build some history of reintegration together. We cannot simply brush aside fifty years of history as if they are only words on a page that can be turned. Whether we like it or not, the people of Cyprus do presently define themselves by reference to their ethnicity; indeed in truth many go further by defining themselves by reference to not being of the other community.
It is to be hoped that one day those divisions become less meaningful. In fact, we must look to a settlement that facilitates and accommodates such ethnic rapprochement by avoiding the cementing of ethnic divisions forever (in respect of which, see below). But today, the divisions could scarcely be more meaningful. Ignoring that reality – even if it could be imposed without support, which of course it cannot – would not be a secure foundation for a lasting settlement. Imagine what problems this might cause the day after settlement?

This is of course a statement of the obvious, and there exist countless examples of successful peace settlements of ethnic conflicts that are, of necessity, based on recognition of ethnic divisions.

Let me give you one example: an example I am personally familiar with. In 1995, as the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British Conservative Party's Bow Group think tank, I led a delegation of young political activists to Dublin Castle in Ireland to address the leaders of Ireland's political parties on a series of proposals for bi-communal rapprochement in Northern Ireland. Through happenstance, we found ourselves in Ireland at a time when the peace process was entering a critical phase.

That critical phase began with an IRA ceasefire in August 1994. It was then given momentum by a joint paper by the British and Irish Governments in February 1995 entitled 'A New Framework for Agreement', in which the British and Irish Governments set out a 'shared understanding' to assist discussion and negotiations involving the Northern Ireland parties. In this document, both governments stated in broad but significant terms that:

‘Given the absence of consensus and depth of divisions between the two main traditions in Northern Ireland, the two Governments agree that such an accommodation will involve an agreed new approach to the traditional constitutional doctrines on both sides. This would be aimed at enhancing and codifying the fullest attainable measure of consent across both traditions in Ireland and fostering the growth of consensus between them.’ (Paragraph 15)

On this basis, they agreed that:

‘... future arrangements relating to Northern Ireland, and Northern Ireland’s wider relationships, should respect the full and equal legitimacy and worth of the identity, sense of allegiance, aspiration and ethos of both the unionist and nationalist communities there. Consequently, both Governments commit themselves to the principle that institutions and arrangements in Northern Ireland and North/South institutions should afford both communities secure and satisfactory political, administrative and symbolic expression and protection. In particular, they commit themselves to entrenched provisions guaranteeing equitable and effective political participation for whichever community finds itself in a minority position by reference to the Northern Ireland framework, or the wider Irish framework, as the case may be, consequent upon the operation of the principle of consent.’ (Paragraph 19)

The road to peace thereafter was neither smooth nor without incident (including the ending of the IRA ceasefire for a time on 9 February 1996 and the explosion of a huge bomb in London's
Docklands one hour after the IRA’s announcement of the end of the ceasefire). But the road eventually led to agreement on 10 April 1998, with the so-called ‘Belfast’ or ‘Good Friday’ Agreement, signed by the political parties of Northern Ireland and the British and Irish Governments.

The agreement contemplated an inclusive Northern Ireland Government, troop reductions and ‘parity of esteem’ for the two communities in Northern Ireland: both the ‘unionist’ (i.e. those, mostly Protestants, who wanted continued union) and the ‘Republican’ (i.e. those, mostly Catholics, who strove for Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic of Ireland).

During the referendum campaign in Ireland and Northern Ireland that followed the agreement, it was easy for many on both sides of the ethnic divide to advocate rejection of the plan on the basis of principle. And they did.

On the unionist side, the ‘no’ campaign focused on the apparent concessions to illegal terrorist activity, the perceived one-way nature of the process and the apparent dilution of majority rule in Northern Ireland.

On the Republican side, the ‘no’ campaign concentrated on the purity of the republican ideal of complete and absolute independence from Britain, pointing to the overwhelming majority of Catholic nationalists on the island of Ireland (if you included Irish Catholics, outside of the ‘north’, in the Republic of Ireland south of the border).

It was momentous that the ‘yes’ campaign prevailed with majorities in both the Republic and Northern Ireland. Indeed, though no official breakdown exists of how nationalists and unionists voted, majorities (slim in the case of the unionists) in both communities within Northern Ireland voted yes.

The resulting constitutional arrangement is instructive for all those around the world searching genuinely for a political settlement of ethnic conflict. Whilst enshrining the principle of consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland on the fundamental question of whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland, the agreement recognises in a variety of important ways the need for obligatory bi-communal involvement in all the institutions of Northern Ireland’s government. In particular, it ensures power-sharing (or ‘Consociationalism’ to give it its more formal legal title); i.e. a form of government involving guaranteed group representation.

Thus, the 108-member Assembly is elected by way of a system of proportional representation (PR (STV)) designed to ensure the representation of all communities, and operates where appropriate on a cross-community basis (i.e. requiring either parallel consent, meaning a majority of both unionist and nationalists assembly delegates, or a weighted majority, meaning a vote including at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist designates).

Moreover, the executive is selected on a cross community basis. Thus, the First Minister and Deputy First Minister reflect the two communities, and the posts of Ministers are allocated on the basis of the d’Hondt system (a system used in over 30 legislatures around the world as diverse as Belgium, Brazil, Paraguay and Poland) which ensures allocation to all major parties across the
community divide.

Importantly, recognition of the responsibility of the British Government to ensure compliance with European law is enshrined in the final paragraph of the Good Friday Agreement. But the peace settlement in Northern Ireland has nevertheless led to a system of government unlike that of most parts of the European Union. It recognises and positively discriminates between different citizens on the basis of ethnicity. But it does so in the interests of peace that is enduring, and today – a decade of peace later – only the few remaining dissident extremists in Northern Ireland denounce such inclusive democracy.

There are of course many differences between the situation in Northern Ireland and that in Cyprus. But there are important lessons to be learned too. First, the solution to a historic ethnic divide is not found simply by pretending the division does not exist. Second, bi-communal inclusive democracy involves both sides across the divide reaching out and forsaking their respective perfect solutions. And third, the resulting compromise can work and endure – even in a region such as Northern Ireland where blood was being spilt right up until the settlement was signed.

Northern Ireland is not the only recent example of a conflict zone compromising for peace by accepting an ethnically-denominated constitution. For Bosnia, the Dayton Peace Agreement forged the creation of a very limited central state with a collective presidency comprising one Bosniak, one Bosnian Serb, and one Bosnian Croat, with central institutions carrying limited responsibilities. This was the price of peace. And most Bosnians today will confirm that it is a price worth paying.

It takes a special kind of arrogance to brush aside these examples of careful compromise as good enough for other conflict zones but not good enough for Cyprus. In truth, those that propose pure democracy as the solution for Cyprus (i.e. treating Cyprus as if it was France or England, with many hundreds of years of unified history), know in their heart of hearts that it means ‘no solution’. That is a legitimate position to hold after all these years. Perhaps the status quo is not the worst of all scenarios, and all of us should recognise that even a successful solution will be hugely disruptive and – at times – traumatic. But advocacy in favour of a permanent division should be stated openly and honestly. It should not be dressed up to masquerade as the alternative route to perfect settlement that it is not. There is no perfect solution that can be delivered. For those who

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1 Gerry Adams, in a conversation over lunch in Dublin Castle, once tried to convince me of the parallels between the position of the Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland and the Greek Cypriots in Cyprus, on the basis that both were majorities on their island oppressed by a minority. This was a parallel that I rejected on the spot, and continue to reject. Looking beyond superficial parallels to religious division and the existence of majorities and minorities, the histories of the island of Ireland and Cyprus diverge in a multitude of ways. Moreover, the continued division of Cyprus is not on the whole supported – as division in Ireland firmly is by the unionists in Northern Ireland – by Turkish Cypriots.
pretend otherwise, who suggest that reciting the words ‘invasion’ and ‘occupation’ will lead us to a promised land, are throwing sand in our eyes.

So let us sweep aside platitudes that are easy to say to each other, but get us nowhere with others. Let us have an honest debate. After all these years, the choice now is between those who are willing to compromise to find a solution, and those who are not and are consequently consigning the island to permanent division.

And for those unwilling to consign the future of Cyprus to permanent, recognised, eventually legitimised division, bi-zonal bi-communal federation represents the only alternative. The next question – the much more relevant question – then follows:

What kind of federation settlement is achievable and fair enough to endure?

This is the real question, and the debate I have engaged with in this paper should not obscure it. Although not the subject of this paper, let me end with the following brief remarks on the requirements of a fair federal solution:

The quid pro quo of the difficult majority compromise that I advocate is that the compromise is – and is perceived to be – fundamentally balanced and fair to the majority. And I cannot help but suspecting that recent rejections of bi-zonal bi-communal federation arise only because the forms of federal solutions offered by successive recent peace-brokers are not seen by the majority as sufficiently balanced and fair.

The Greek Cypriot majority will undoubtedly make significant concessions (as they have already in negotiations) on territorial, governance, economic and EU issues. But they cannot be expected to do so without a sense of basic fairness in the resolution of property dispossessions and the security question that arises from the foreign troop numbers that are to be left on the island following the settlement.

Let us take the example of ‘property’, and recognise that any solution that requires the vast majority of the (still living) dispossessed citizens to say goodbye to properties that were their homes is too difficult for any political leader to impose. And they need not do so. Once again, a review of solutions implemented in other conflict zones is instructive. The return of over one million displaced persons and refugees to destroyed villages throughout the whole territory of Bosnia (from all ethnic communities to all zones) surely challenges those who doubt its appropriateness in Cyprus to give very good reasons why. Restitution in Bosnia has worked. Property has been restored to those from whom it was stolen, dividing lines between communities have been made permeable and – as a result – a future beyond segregation has become real. Why should Cyprus, where less blood flowed less recently, expect less?

The unfairness of officialised dispossession is exacerbated by the insecurity of legitimised militarisation. The genuine fear created by a large standing Turkish army on a small island, which is after all only forty miles from the Turkish mainland from where proximate troops can less controversially be stationed, cannot easily be brushed aside. An overwhelmingly large and ever-
present military presence can be no basis for a lasting solution, particularly as it is so obviously unnecessary for any legitimate defensive purpose.

On these issues compromise must come from those that did the dispossessing (on both sides), and from the party with overwhelming military preponderance (undoubtedly Turkey).

The result can be a solution that can endure. And endure long enough to see the compromises become less necessary. As the need for an ethnically focused constitution becomes less necessary, so the need for a standing foreign group contingent (be it Greek or Turkish) should – it is hoped – recede into irrelevance.

It is for that reason that the compromise solution that is reached should, on all issues, make express provision for periodic constitutional evolution in the future when – we must hope – ethnic tension and suspicion has declined. In this way, communities can more easily be invited to accept the proposed arrangement as an initial solution, rather than final solution.

Conclusion

In November 2010, Jack Straw, the former British Foreign Secretary, wrote an article in the Times of London in which he proposed that ‘It is time for the UK Government to consider formally the partition of Cyprus if the talks fail’. It does not matter that Greek Cypriots vehemently denounce such remarks. What matters is that they are now being said openly. And they will be said with greater regularity, all around the world.

More important than the transient words of politicians who come and go, are the judgments of the world’s international courts. And here too time may be beginning to work against the position of the Greek Cypriot majority. For after a generation of cases before the European Court of Human Rights that have found against Turkey for depriving Greek Cypriots of their fundamental right to property, in 2010 its decision in the case of Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey signalled perhaps the emergence of a changing legal reality. Finding that the so-called ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ establishment of an ‘Immovable Property Commission’ can potentially offer adequate redress for dispossession, the European Court of Human Rights made an observation that profoundly challenges those tempted to think that Greek Cypriots can wait and wait until they get their ideal reunification solution:

“At the present point, many decades after the loss of possession by the then owners, property has in many cases changed hands, by gift, succession or otherwise; those claiming title may have never seen, or ever used the property in question. The issue arises to what extent the notion of legal title, and the expectation of enjoying the full benefits of that title, is realistic in practice. The losses thus claimed become increasingly speculative and hypothetical. There has, it may be recalled, always been a strong legal and factual link between ownership and

2 Jack Straw, ‘No ifs or buts, Turkey must be part of the EU’, The Times 8 November 2010.
possession ... and it must be recognised that with the passage of time the holding of a title may be emptied of any practical consequences.  

So as we debate these questions, let us all recognise that the time for finding a solution is not unlimited. We cannot simply wait and wait until we get what we want. No solution now will, at some point in the not too distant future, mean no solution at all.

And no solution is — let us say it openly — a viable option, for Greek Cypriots: For a ‘solution’ to the division will undoubtedly bring uncertainty and, without doubt, a period of greater insecurity. Ethnic tension may not have been the original cause of the division, but we must accept that it may follow as a consequence of a generation of such division. Extremists can be expected to stoke those tensions on both sides following reunification, and the prospect of Islamic extremism on the island is not far-fetched. The ethnic make-up of the island will also visibly change: Greek Cypriots must acknowledge that, in pulling down the wall, their Cyprus will change too. And, of course, there will be an acute economic cost to reunification that — initially at least — will not be offset by the commercial opportunities that come with reunification.

In short, the price of reunification should not be underestimated. But for all those who like me consider the Green Line to be an open wound across their ancestral home: the price is worth paying for Cyprus to become whole again. And if the problems of reunification are overcome, reunification will bring its own special prize. For having served for a generation as a symbol of ethnic strife, a successfully reunified Cyprus can serve as a future beacon of hope for all those around the world who wonder at the compatibility of western and Islamic civilisation in one land. That is a vision worth showing courage for; that is a future worth compromising for.

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3 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey Grand Chamber Decision of the ECHR, March 2010, at paragraph III.
The Republic of Cyprus is an EU Member State like no other. Its history, geography and legal tradition differ markedly from those of most of its EU partners. Likewise, its path to EU accession has been unlike that of any of the remaining 26 EU Member States, not so much in terms of process but, rather, in terms of outcome. Finally, the overall circumstances of the Republic of Cyprus, whether constitutionally or politically, were, at the time of writing, unique within the EU, with the island claiming the dubious distinction of the longest-lasting UN peace-keeping mission in the history of the Organisation, coupled with a divisive ethnic Communities-driven Constitution (unprecedented in post-colonial history), continuing reliance on the ‘doctrine of necessity’ as the basis of its constitutional operation, 40,000 Turkish troops occupying around 38% of its territory, 38 years on from Turkey’s military intervention in the summer of 1974, and no less than two sovereign (military) base areas (SBAs) on its soil, subject to a special legal regime, already prior to its accession to the EU, in May 2004. The Republic of Cyprus is, no doubt, not an ‘ordinary’ Member State, for yet another reason: despite being an outpost of the EU in the turbulent Eastern Mediterranean, barely 165 miles from Syria and Lebanon, the island belongs to the nucleus of the ambitious European unification project, having acceded to the euro area already in January 2008, hardly four years after its accession to the EU. At the time of writing, Cyprus was holding the rotating presidency of the EU, while partaking in the trials and tribulations in which the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area’s periphery had plunged most of the EU.

The singularity of Cyprus has not escaped the attention of legal scholars. English language legal works on Cyprus abound, with their number having increased in recent years, in the run up to the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU. What the generalists’ works have in common is their treatment of, and emphasis on, specific (arguably very interesting) legal issues arising from the peculiarities of Cyprus’ short but tempestuous constitutional and political history (such as the application, in Cyprus, of the doctrine of necessity, the island’s singular common law tradition, interspersed with elements of continental law, or its constitutional uniqueness). For all its merits, what the extant generalist literature perhaps lacks is a global vision of Cyprus law, from a broader, socio-legal perspective. Works of scholarship addressing the relationship between Cyprus and the EU, the island’s long and winded road to EU accession, and the impact of
accession on the resolution of the Cyprus dispute include those authored by Christou,1 Markides,2 and Vassiliou.3 Legal works addressing the evolution of the relationship between the Republic of Cyprus and the EU and Cyprus’ road to EU accession follow a common pattern, largely dictated by the subject matter’s constraints, and reflected in the mostly descriptive approach favoured by many authors. A sub-set of works examine the germane but distinct issue of the impact of Cyprus’ EU accession on attempts to resolve the Cyprus dispute, culminating in the Annan Plan and its unfortunate, but perhaps inevitable, rejection in April 2004 (see, in particular, Hoffmeister,4 Kyriacou5 and Theophanous6).

How does The EU and Cyprus: Principles and Strategies of Full Integration fit into the extant literature on Cyprus and the EU? Laulhé Shaelou’s work is an outstanding example of legal scholarship, bringing together domestic, EU and international law perspectives, as well as economic, political and sociological insights, already present in some of her earlier work.7 The work’s cryptic (but, with hindsight, content-representative) title hints at the multi-disciplinary perspective that its author attacks her subject matter from. The book’s coverage is comprehensive, addressing the socio-legal objectives of Cyprus’ accession to the EU, the differentiated EU integration of Cyprus, as reflected in the 2003 Treaty of Accession, the sui generis (and largely unknown to many, including some of the better-informed observers) legal status of the SBAs, the political background to, and socio-political implications of, Protocol 10 as well as its relationship with other sources of EU law, and the ‘Green Line’ regime, as an ‘incomplete attempt of institutionalisation of the principles of the Europeanisation of Cyprus through economic governance’ (p. 320), while its treatment of the various subject areas dealt with in its pages is consistently thorough and lucid.

Perhaps more importantly, Laulhé Shaelou’s work draws attention, throughout, to an issue borne out of the unique circumstances of Cyprus’ integration in the family of European nations, which many will no doubt ignore: the feasibility, as a matter of Union law, of a partial model of EU integration – of which Cyprus is a unique example8 – involving, however paradoxically, the

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8 One situation that, arguably, presents some parallels with that of Cyprus is that of the russophone minority in the
temporary but, nevertheless, outright suspension of the four freedoms in an integral part of an EU Member State's territory, which is 'neither a State, nor a region, nor a territory, but part of a Member State of the EU' (p. 323). While in the particular case of Cyprus this somewhat unusual state of integration is the fruit of an, as yet, unresolved regional conflict, its 'partial' EU integration sets an interesting (or, as some might argue, dangerous) precedent, the parameters of which could be adjusted to fit the circumstances of other accession countries, in cases where the EU’s interests in future enlargements would have to be weighed against and reconciled with other political, geostrategic or economic considerations through mutually agreed restrictions or limitations on EU integration, whether rationae temporis or rationae personae or otherwise. Restrictions or limitations flying in the face of the Treaty’s four freedoms, and dictated by the particular circumstances of individual countries, are possible, as Laulhé Shaelou explains in her work. And if, in the case of Cyprus, such restrictions or limitations are attributable to the festering wound of military aggression, in other, future cases they may well be deemed necessary for different reasons, which the fathers of the Treaties had, in all likelihood, never envisaged, but which pragmatism and political expedience may recommend, whether as a means of avoiding that a candidate country is unduly penalised for circumstances largely outside its control (as in the case of Cyprus) or as a means of exerting pressure on candidate countries to further the legal, political, economic or other reforms necessary to render possible their full EU integration at a point in time subsequent (rather than, as one would have expected, prior) to that of their actual accession to the EU. That 'some key areas of policy … such as Schengen or the application of the foreign and defence policy … were arguably not considered within the framework of the Treaty of Accession to the extent they deserved for Cyprus' (pp. 192-193) is clear, hence the uncomfortable relationship between the rationale of the derogatory regime of Protocol 10, as lex specialis for Cyprus, and the overall logic of the Treaty, and the concerns that cases of 'unfinished integration', whether now or in the future, will inevitably raise.

Laulhé Shaelou’s work does not make for light or uncomplicated reading material: the reader should not expect a run-of-the-mill, conventional work of legal scholarship, of which there are many in the public domain, some better than others. Far from being intended as a point of criticism, this last observation explains why her work is of such interest, prompting the reader to reflect on integration possibilities that no level of familiarisation with the Treaties would, prima facie, suggest existed. Considering the multifarious (or, as some might argue, not without good

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Baltic States, which, as Laulhé Shaelou notes, 'has been subject to a different treatment under domestic legislation even after EU accession, with some of them being treated as non-citizens' (p. 328).

9 The examples of Bulgaria and Romania are, in this respect, relevant: both countries acceded to the EU in January 2007, subject nevertheless to temporary restrictions in terms of the free movement of their workers within the EU. These restrictions were to be lifted, in principle, by 31 December 2011. At the time of writing, 9 EU-25 Member States continued applying restrictions to the free movement of workers from Bulgaria and Romania.
reasons, existential) challenges that Europe was confronted with at the time of writing, the realisation that there is more flexibility in the Treaties than one would deduce from their text is, no doubt, reassuring (or, depending on one’s point of departure, sobering). It is this extraordinary degree of flexibility (which, even if unwanted, is, as the case of Cyprus readily shows, very real) that Laulhé Shaelou highlights throughout her work, together with its implications for a new Member State such as Cyprus.

All in all, The EU and Cyprus: Principles and Strategies of Full Integration is a refreshing and original work of legal scholarship, carved out of rather unassuming beginnings: the accession of yet another candidate country to the EU. This is the case not because the specificities of the ‘Cypriot case’ are not known to, or understood by, those interested in the study of EU or international law but, instead, because of what the narrative of Cyprus’ ‘unfinished’ EU integration has to say about future, as yet unwritten integration stories, involving known actors (including Serbia, with particular emphasis on its losing battle over Kosovo, the Ukraine, and, possibly, Turkey) but rather less well-known, ‘incremental EU integration’ possibilities. As the case of Cyprus readily shows, more than one level of European integration is conceivable, however undesirable that may be: as Laulhé Shaelou aptly observes, such ‘dual situations’ have ‘the potential of hampering … full integration into the EU, if not addressed in a constructive way’ (p. 5). Market integration can precede political integration and vice-versa. Incomplete integration, even absent any clear time-line for its completion, is also possible, however unwelcome. The case of Cyprus sets a clear precedent for all of the above and more, with Laulhé Shaelou’s work providing invaluable insights to these possibilities, both academically and practically. It remains to be seen whether and how the precedent that Cyprus has set will be followed in other cases, or whether Cyprus’ EU membership will retain its, admittedly baffling, uniqueness pending a solution to the intractable Cyprus dispute.

PHOEBUS ATHANASSIOU
New Security Frontiers:  
Critical Energy and the Resource Challenge

Edited by Sai Felicia Krishna-Hensel  
Ashgate Publishing Ltd (Farnham, Surrey, 2012), xii+223 pp.  

This book is not about Cyprus. It discusses a global issue with a number of thematic and geographical areas not including Cyprus. Nevertheless, recent developments in Cyprus, such as the explosion in the naval base of Mari in the summer of 2011, the vibrant public discussion regarding Cyprus’ initial decision to import gas, and the subsequent discovery of significant gas deposits offshore the island and the promise of further finds, in conjunction with an Israeli-Cypriot energy and geopolitical alliance in the making and the geopolitical shadow that problems with Turkey thrust upon the region, make this book of great relevance to Cyprus.

At a second level, being a member of the EU, Cyprus is directly involved in the debate on European energy security and sustainability. The EU has yet to clear out its priorities and devise an energy security strategy that will be truly sustainable and will mitigate the risks emanating from increasing prices and overt dependence on external suppliers. As amply argued for in the book, energy security is faced with a number of threats, and dealing with some of them may only serve to exacerbate concerns with regard to others. A holistic reading of the situation then, incorporating as well the developmental and geopolitical impact of these policies on third states, is in demand for the European family, of which Cyprus is a comparatively young but very active member.

In particular, the new role Cyprus is most probably going to acquire as a gas exporter in the next few years is positive from an economic and geopolitical point of view; however, that it concurrently engages Cyprus in a specific geopolitical reconfiguration of alliances, creates new potential difficulties (or opportunities?) for the resolution of the Cypriot problem, and perpetuates the EU’s shift to natural gas which may, by means of discouraging more radical policies for the reversal of climate change, have adverse effects for the environmental and sustainability goals of the EU in the near future.

This book is an important contribution to the overall debate on energy security and sustainability. It is situated within scholarly literature that does not see security in anachronistic, monolithic territorial and military terms, but examines how specific issues can become urgent concerns for security. Consequently, it identifies itself more with neo-liberal understandings of international relations that view a wide range of state and non-state actors as contributing to the global arena, as well as with constructivist ideas that highlight the importance of the political
culture of different states, securitisation processes and the significance of the intersubjective element in international politics. At the same time, the shadow of realism is also evident in the discussion of geopolitics, national strategies to retain control of critical resources, and neo-colonial national projects that aim to ensure food security through land deals in the developing world. The book spans the fields of energy politics, geopolitics, international relations, economics, development and sustainability studies to give a holistic account of new sources of unrest in the twenty-first-century landscape. It also features a global array of case studies covering all corners of the world. As a result it will be of great interest to all members of the academic community working on global politics and how they are shaped in the twenty-first century, and particularly to those researching energy politics, and/or engaged in security, developmental and environment studies.

The book situates the debate of ‘new security frontiers’ in a historical juncture of an energy transition. Every energy transition involves winners and losers and causes a reconfiguration of power and geopolitics. The world is now facing the need to make the transition to a lower carbon economy. Chapter 2 begs the question of how this transition will be effected, what its impact will be on global players and how security risks can be mitigated. As chapter 3 demonstrates, various players take upon different tactics to ensure their energy security. Examples of countries as diverse as Denmark, Brazil, China and Bangladesh show different pathways to energy security that are contingent upon both the societal and material background of these countries, as well as upon their political culture. Nevertheless, a central issue for energy security is how one can balance between the need to mitigate the risks emanating from climate change and the need to secure ample, affordable energy supplies. There are trade-offs between these aspects of energy security with different scholars situating themselves in different spots along this continuum. Chapter 4 makes a strong point for capturing the middle ground, namely intensifying efforts at energy efficiency that will serve satisfactorily, according to the author, both overarching goals. Chapter 5 argues that the belief that a switch away from fossil fuels will terminate all kinds of external dependencies is fundamentally flawed and naive. Less use of fossil fuels means higher consumption of a number of other critical resources, many of which are concentrated in a few places, are scarce and thus create new chains of dependency. Ironically, an abrupt and not cautious environmentally-driven switch away from fossil fuels might well exacerbate, not improve, energy security for a number of states.

Energy security is as much about technological breakthrough, economic considerations and environmental sensitivities, as it is about geopolitics. While political considerations appear in all chapters and are dealt with as significant variables, the theme of chapter 1 is to give a geopolitical account of energy issues. Resource nationalism, the emergence of national champions, political interests tied up with economic aspirations all mean that geopolitics remains a fundamental parameter in the debate on energy security. Chapter 1 highlights the sustained significance of geopolitics in energy issues throughout recent history and presents briefly the case of Russia (similar cases could also be, indicatively, China, Venezuela and Qatar among others) where geopolitical considerations and goals drive to a significant degree the national energy strategy.
Before the conclusions, the last two chapters 6 and 7, have a more specific and narrow focus, but serve to complete the debate on critical security issues pertaining to resources. Chapter 6 discusses water-related problems. The case of the Prata Basin features the centrality of water considerations. The theoretical and historical analysis presented is extremely valuable for stressing the possibility, contrary to mainstream literature that prophecies water wars and water-induced conflict, of cooperation in such critical issues.

Chapter 7 features a comprehensive analysis of the latest trend in the issue area of food security. After the food crisis of 2007–2009, a number of mighty developing states (as China and Saudi Arabia) contracted huge deals with emerging states in Africa in order to grab extensive pieces of land that would cater for the food security of their own populations. These raise a number of ethical, practical, legal and sovereignty-related issues and have been bluntly described as neo-colonial packages that help the strong states, but will serve to further impoverish the destitute peoples of Africa. Since the approach to respond of international institutions such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) is rather deficient and inadequate, major concerns are expressed for future food security crises in the least developed parts of the world and their potential negative impact on peace, stability, order, development and migration.

The book presents an invaluable wealth of facts and information thus examining the issue of energy and critical resources security within a broad historical context. Each chapter makes a strong point within the framework of the main argument of the book, namely what are the security implications of the quest for, and scarcity of, energy resources in a global environment that is under increasing pressure from the rise of the global temperature, overpopulation and environmental degradation. The diversity of methodological tools used (case studies, comparative analyses and interviews) offers a remarkable richness of empirical material and highlights different aspects and policies for tackling energy and critical resources security threats. Although most chapters are quite specific and narrow in focus, and are therefore somehow loosely connected with each other within the framework of such a vast area of study, they all convincingly support the overarching argument of a very ambitious project, namely to uncover the breadth and depth of security threats stemming from the availability, affordability, use, distribution and environmental hazards inherent in the use of critical resources. The book is commendable for its balanced analysis that does not give in to the temptation to illustrate a critical resources-induced conflict-torn world in the near future. It appreciates the potential for differentiated strategies, as well as common projects, that can bring desirable results and avert the potential for conflict.

The analysis would perhaps profit from a greater focus on a global governance perspective, since the object of analysis is fundamentally global in scope and transcends national borders. Furthermore, under the light of bleaker predictions for climate change and the ability of the planet to withstand such changes, it would be worth considering the current challenges within a more ecologically sensitive framework. These considerations, however, could well already be in the minds of the contributors and might serve as the rationale for further research in this extremely interesting and fundamentally important thematic area for the future of the world.
At a global level, the world is at a critical crossroad. It needs to urgently address the threat of climate change in a global system that is undergoing a substantial shift towards the East in the economic sphere and a hesitant reshuffling of global governance patterns with the aim to render it more representative and thus more efficient; facing sustained nuclear threats; witnessing expanding spirals of the economic crisis; and, facing the need to cater for an overgrown, but still rising, human population. This amounts to nothing less than an unfathomable list of challenges. Due to their intimate interconnections they can only be tackled efficiently as a sum, not individually. The basis of a holistic solution is the designation and implementation of the indispensable energy transition, which can only be premised upon comprehensive concerted action among a wide array of state and non-state actors alike. Although the book offers only partial pathways to this transition (it does not set the goal, to be fair, to suggest a holistic solution), its contribution to the analysis and appreciation of the difficulties and risks this energy transition entails is essential.

Cyprus, as a member of the developed West and the European Union, the pioneer actor in environmental issues, is all but indifferent to this debate. Cypriot policy-makers would be prudent to reflect upon the challenges set by a tightening global energy and critical resources market and environmental pressures that make an energy transition to a lower carbon economy mandatory. These should be reflected upon within the framework of a problematic geopolitical situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as the economic crisis of the Eurozone that subsequently poses limitations to the EU’s capacity to finance this energy transition.

Filippos Proedrou
Anastasia Yiangou's account of politics in Cyprus during the Second World War is a timely rendition, but despite the endorsements on the back of the dust jacket it is not an altogether satisfactory account. While the book is successful in offering an account of the development of 'party' politics in the island during World War II and of the rise of the enosis movement, it does not situate these developments in the broader context of the inter-war and war years, and the international and local socio-economic developments.

The main issues of the book are firstly that it has not been set within any historiography, such as studies dealing with the rise of extreme ideologies during the inter-war years, or war and society, or colonialism, and therefore it mostly reads like a descriptive narrative on the relations between local colonial political elites and their colonial overlords; secondly, although the colonial archival material in London has been well accessed, the author has ignored the rich Cyprus archives; and last but not least, there are serious limitations in scope and analysis. On the latter, these are: 1) that the author approaches her questions, data collection and analyses from a Greek nationalist perspective, but she does try to be impartial; 2) she fails to place the political history within the context of the war and its impact on the various sections of society and how all sections of society reacted to the war; 3) that the Turkish Cypriots are not part of her story even though they are an integral part of Cypriot society; and lastly 4) that Greek Cypriot society, beyond ideological differences which are well explored, is treated as a classless society striving for enosis, when in fact it was a very disparate community, mostly divided by class, which cut across the religious/ethnic divide, as well as by the emerging ideologies of the inter-war years – communism, socialism, conservatism and nationalism.

The title of the book, Cyprus in World War II, excited me a great deal, but the sub-title, Politics and Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean, worried me. I was enthusiastic about the prospects of a monograph on the experience of Cyprus during the Second World War, but was disappointed by the chance of yet another account that focused on the politics of the island, which could fall short of locating the political history within the context of the war and its impact on society and vice versa. I tell my students about John Keegan's argument that war is a reflection of the societies and cultures that wage it and make a difference reciprocally. In truth, Cyprus was belligerent during the Second World War on the side of the allies and Cypriot troops were actually
the first colonial troops to engage the Nazis in Western Europe. And yet, the influence of the economic and social impact of the war on Cypriot society along with the motivation for enlistment and its effect on society has not been taken into account by the author. Nor has the question of loyalty and disloyalty.

There are too many occasions when the Greek nationalism of the author comes through in her choice of questions, selection of sources, and analyses of those sources. As early as her introduction Yiangou claims that the request by Charles Woolley, the governor of the island, for a definitive statement on the status of Cyprus foreshadowed the ‘never’ announcement of the British government in 1954. Without any link being made the author moves onto an anachronistic account of the various Greek disappointments with the British since 1878. She even states that the direction of post-war Cyprus was unclear until the EOKA campaign – a not so thinly veiled statement of support for EOKA. Late in the introduction she also states that Cyprus was divided by the Turkish invasion of 1974, when in fact it had been divided since December 1963 by the actions of Greek Cypriot paramilitary troops that led to the Turkish Cypriots creating various enclaves. From chapter 1 it becomes clear that the book is going to lack historical and theoretical context as well as not offer a local context tainted by nationalist discourse. The author’s efforts to connect the events leading up to the occupation of Cyprus in 1878, which are discussed in brief in section 1.1, with those of the Second World War are a good example, since her discussion of the earlier period is potted, while the attempted link assumes that nothing had transpired in between.

Section 1.2 provides an eloquent exposition of the enosis myth that is in perfect keeping with the advocates of that ideal, but is lacking in theoretical understandings of identity formation in the modern period, not counting any critical re-appraisal of the policy. Chapter 2 continues in the same vein. Yiangou bemoans the British for not inviting the Locum Tenens, Bishop Leondios, to meet the new governor, even though he was subject to confinement. She fails to explore further the pro-German views of Leondios or of any other leading Cypriot political elites, which may have been very revealing of right-wing attitudes and colonial disloyalties. She also does not explore the significance of the detail that the first colonial contingent to engage the Nazis in Western Europe was Cypriot. There is a good discussion of worker anxieties and unrest, but then there is a failure to link these, the rise of Greek nationalism and enosis, and the high incidence of Cypriot volunteerism for the British armed and auxiliary forces. Chapter 3 is equally unconvincing in its effort to prove that enosis was ‘revived’ in the hearts and minds of all Cypriots, and that Cyprus was mobilised behind the Greek cause. Rumours of Cyprus’ imminent cession to Greece are exaggerated and the author’s claim that Greek Cypriots preferred to enlist in the Greek army, provides little if any evidence to support this assertion. Yiangou maintains that Greek Cypriot donations to Greek coffers dwarf contributions to British coffers, and although she shows that Leondios issued encyclicals calling on Greek Cypriots to donate for Greece, she does not analyse this further, and her findings contradict the better researched work of Tabitha Morgan (see my review in The Cyprus Review, Volume 23, Number 2), who reveals that Greek Cypriot donations
to the British war effort far exceeded those to the Greek war effort. Additionally, Yiangou seems to favour the church over the trade unions, detailing divisions in the trade union but not in the church, and providing no reasons to explain why the trade unions remained anti-war. Chapter 4 begins with an exposition on the Greek resistance movement, which the author does not relate to Cyprus and her theme, and this is because it is an alien historical context for Cyprus. The claim that Russia was the motherland of AKEL seems to contradict the assertion that AKEL was undergoing a process of nationalisation. The author’s efforts to distinguish between the Church, the right, and the extreme right are unclear, and she more or less presents them as a picture of unity. Chapter 5 begins with the author placing emphasis on pro-enosis British authors and consequently forgetting about balance. Conscription is then mentioned, but she does not go fully into the question, nor does she analyse the interesting assertion of Cypriot political elites that Cypriots contributed recruits beyond their population. It is disappointing that she does not enquire into why so many Cypriots applied to enlist in the Cyprus Regiment: if enosis was such a widespread demand, why not fight in the Greek army? Moreover, Yiangou makes little of Leondios’ offer to agree to conscription in return for enosis. This can only be described as a bribe that could have led to the deaths of so many innocent Cypriot lives. Chapter 6 is an improvement, but suffers again from pro-Greek bias since the author claims that the entry of the USSR into the war did not encourage AKEL to initiate a volunteer movement, yet this has been shown to have been the case by Jan Asmussen’s work. Although chapter 7 commendably deals with the effects of the Greek crisis in late 1943 and early 1944 on Cypriot politics, chapter 8 returns to the well-worn language that Cypriots were universally in favour of enosis, without social distinction. There is no mention of Grivas’ Nazi collaboration and the chapter would have merited some thorough editing since Kýrou, the Greek consul, was not a politician, and the eastern Mediterranean was not a ‘theatre’ during the Second World War. Chapter 9 once more brings into focus Yangou’s pro-enosis view with the semantics framed around all Greek Cypriots supporting enosis. The contradiction is that the majority of Cyprus Regiment recruits came from the poorest areas of the island, from the peasant and labouring classes, who were largely uneducated. What is an interesting revelation, though not explored, is why the Cyprus Regiment was not demobilised immediately after the war and why it served in Beirut.

In my view the author did not know which approach to take and ultimately the book suffers from an identity crisis, devoid of colonial, theoretical and historical contexts. I believe that the outcome would have been better had the author focused on socio-economic dimensions as well. The book would also have been more useful if it had been structured along thematic lines such as: Cypriot society and the rise of extreme political ideologies through the inter-war years; the Cypriot contribution to the Allied war effort, focusing on enlistment; the relations between the British and Cypriot political elites during the war and the development of Left and Right wing politics; the enosis question, from both a local colonial and more broader imperial and military/defence context and why it failed.
Overall the book is a starting point for people interested in the development of enosis and party politics in Cyprus and the relations between local political elites and colonial authorities during the Second World War, but it should be read with the full knowledge of its various limitations.

**Andrekos Varnava**
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